Loading doc/tor-design.bib +7 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ @Misc{anonymizer, key = {anonymizer}, title = {The {Anonymizer}}, note = {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com}} note = {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com/}} } @Misc{privoxy, key = {privoxy}, title = {{Privoxy}}, note = {\url{http://www.privoxy.org/}} } @Misc{anonnet, Loading doc/tor-design.tex +4 −4 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Tor uses the standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS \cite{socks4,socks5} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based programs without modification. This design change allows Tor to use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing application-level proxies such as Privoxy without having to application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to incorporate those features itself. \item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original Loading Loading @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ internet chat, or SSH connections. Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that attempt to anonymize interactive network traffic. Because these protocols typically involve a large number of packets that much be delivered quickly, it is involve a large number of packets that must be delivered quickly, it is difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the interactive communication from points from correlating the timing and volume of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These Loading Loading @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ Some systems, such as Crowds \cite{crowds-tissec}, do not rely changing the appearance of packets to hide the path; rather they try to prevent an intermediary from knowing when whether it is talking to an ultimate initiator, or just another intermediary. Crowds uses no public-key encryption encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all nodes on the path so that anonymity of connection initiator depends on filtering all identifying information from the data stream. Crowds only supports HTTP traffic. Loading Loading @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ research lacking a generally accepted solution. % the enclave-firewall model? -RD % I don't think we should. -NM \item[No protocol normalization:] Tor does not provide \emph{protocol normalization} Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients indistinguishable when they complex and variable protocols such as HTTP, Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such as Privoxy to hide differences between clients, expunge protocol features that leak identity, Loading Loading
doc/tor-design.bib +7 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ @Misc{anonymizer, key = {anonymizer}, title = {The {Anonymizer}}, note = {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com}} note = {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com/}} } @Misc{privoxy, key = {privoxy}, title = {{Privoxy}}, note = {\url{http://www.privoxy.org/}} } @Misc{anonnet, Loading
doc/tor-design.tex +4 −4 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Tor uses the standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS \cite{socks4,socks5} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based programs without modification. This design change allows Tor to use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing application-level proxies such as Privoxy without having to application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to incorporate those features itself. \item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original Loading Loading @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ internet chat, or SSH connections. Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that attempt to anonymize interactive network traffic. Because these protocols typically involve a large number of packets that much be delivered quickly, it is involve a large number of packets that must be delivered quickly, it is difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the interactive communication from points from correlating the timing and volume of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These Loading Loading @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ Some systems, such as Crowds \cite{crowds-tissec}, do not rely changing the appearance of packets to hide the path; rather they try to prevent an intermediary from knowing when whether it is talking to an ultimate initiator, or just another intermediary. Crowds uses no public-key encryption encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all nodes on the path so that anonymity of connection initiator depends on filtering all identifying information from the data stream. Crowds only supports HTTP traffic. Loading Loading @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ research lacking a generally accepted solution. % the enclave-firewall model? -RD % I don't think we should. -NM \item[No protocol normalization:] Tor does not provide \emph{protocol normalization} Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients indistinguishable when they complex and variable protocols such as HTTP, Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such as Privoxy to hide differences between clients, expunge protocol features that leak identity, Loading