Commit 85aeaef6 authored by Peter Palfrader's avatar Peter Palfrader
Browse files

Fix minor typos and add a cite for Privoxy


svn:r691
parent 35892075
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+7 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@
@Misc{anonymizer,
  key =          {anonymizer},
  title =        {The {Anonymizer}},
  note =         {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com}}
  note =         {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com/}}
}

@Misc{privoxy,
  key =          {privoxy},
  title =        {{Privoxy}},
  note =         {\url{http://www.privoxy.org/}}
}

@Misc{anonnet,
+4 −4
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Tor uses the standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS
\cite{socks4,socks5} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based
programs without modification.  This design change allows Tor to
use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing
application-level proxies such as Privoxy without having to
application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to
incorporate those features itself.

\item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ internet chat, or SSH connections.

Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that attempt
to anonymize interactive network traffic.  Because these protocols typically
involve a large number of packets that much be delivered quickly, it is
involve a large number of packets that must be delivered quickly, it is
difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the
interactive communication from points from correlating the timing and volume
of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it.  These
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ Some systems, such as Crowds \cite{crowds-tissec}, do not rely changing the
appearance of packets to hide the path; rather they try to prevent an
intermediary from knowing when whether it is talking to an ultimate
initiator, or just another intermediary.  Crowds uses no public-key
encryption encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all
encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all
nodes on the path so that anonymity of connection initiator depends on
filtering all identifying information from the data stream. Crowds only
supports HTTP traffic.
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ research lacking a generally accepted solution.
  % the enclave-firewall model? -RD
  % I don't think we should. -NM
\item[No protocol normalization:] Tor does not provide \emph{protocol
  normalization} Privoxy or the Anonymizer.  In order to make clients
  normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer.  In order to make clients
  indistinguishable when they complex and variable protocols such as HTTP,
  Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such as Privoxy to hide
  differences between clients, expunge protocol features that leak identity,