Loading doc/tor-design.tex +14 −13 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1374,11 +1374,6 @@ acknowledge his existence. % enable us to accept a lot more ORs than if we continue to % require 10mbit connections for all ORs. -RD % XXX In sec9, we should note that we are currently % working with the designers of MorphMix to render our two systems % interoperable. So far, this seems to be relatively straightforward. % Interoperability will allow testing and direct comparison of the two % rather different designs. Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our design withstands them. Loading Loading @@ -1885,14 +1880,14 @@ experience would be helpful in learning the relative importance of these bottlenecks. \emph{Cover traffic:} Currently we avoid cover traffic because of its clear costs in performance and bandwidth, and because its whereas its costs in performance and bandwidth are clear, and because its security benefits are not well understood. With more research \cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, the price/value ratio may change, \cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, this price/value ratio may change, both for link-level cover traffic and also long-range cover traffic. \emph{Better directory distribution:} Even with the threshold directory agreement algorithm described in Section~\ref{subsec:dirservers}, the directory servers are still trust bottlenecks. We must find more directory distribution is still performance-critical. We must find more decentralized yet practical ways to distribute up-to-date snapshots of network status without introducing new attacks. Also, directory retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently Loading @@ -1908,14 +1903,21 @@ implemented. While doing so we are likely to encounter additional issues that must be resolved, both in terms of usability and anonymity. \emph{Further specification review:} Although we have a public, byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this protocol has byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this document has not received extensive external review. We hope that as Tor becomes more widely deployed, more people will become interested in examining our specification. becomes more widely deployed, more people will examine its specification. \emph{Multisystem interoperability:} We are currently working with the designers of MorphMix to make the common elements of our two systems share a common specification and implementation. So far, this seems to be relatively straightforward. Interoperability will allow testing and direct comparison of the two designs for trust and scalability. % XXXX Bandwidth classes. \emph{Wider-scale deployment:} The original goal of Tor was to gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and learn from having actual users. We are now at the point in design learn from having actual users. We are now at a point in design and development where we can start deploying a wider network. Once we have many actual users, we will doubtlessly be better able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our Loading @@ -1923,7 +1925,6 @@ robustness/latency trade-offs, our performance trade-offs (including cell size), our abuse-prevention mechanisms, and our overall usability. % XXX large and small cells on same network. % XXX work with morphmix spec %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Loading Loading
doc/tor-design.tex +14 −13 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1374,11 +1374,6 @@ acknowledge his existence. % enable us to accept a lot more ORs than if we continue to % require 10mbit connections for all ORs. -RD % XXX In sec9, we should note that we are currently % working with the designers of MorphMix to render our two systems % interoperable. So far, this seems to be relatively straightforward. % Interoperability will allow testing and direct comparison of the two % rather different designs. Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our design withstands them. Loading Loading @@ -1885,14 +1880,14 @@ experience would be helpful in learning the relative importance of these bottlenecks. \emph{Cover traffic:} Currently we avoid cover traffic because of its clear costs in performance and bandwidth, and because its whereas its costs in performance and bandwidth are clear, and because its security benefits are not well understood. With more research \cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, the price/value ratio may change, \cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, this price/value ratio may change, both for link-level cover traffic and also long-range cover traffic. \emph{Better directory distribution:} Even with the threshold directory agreement algorithm described in Section~\ref{subsec:dirservers}, the directory servers are still trust bottlenecks. We must find more directory distribution is still performance-critical. We must find more decentralized yet practical ways to distribute up-to-date snapshots of network status without introducing new attacks. Also, directory retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently Loading @@ -1908,14 +1903,21 @@ implemented. While doing so we are likely to encounter additional issues that must be resolved, both in terms of usability and anonymity. \emph{Further specification review:} Although we have a public, byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this protocol has byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this document has not received extensive external review. We hope that as Tor becomes more widely deployed, more people will become interested in examining our specification. becomes more widely deployed, more people will examine its specification. \emph{Multisystem interoperability:} We are currently working with the designers of MorphMix to make the common elements of our two systems share a common specification and implementation. So far, this seems to be relatively straightforward. Interoperability will allow testing and direct comparison of the two designs for trust and scalability. % XXXX Bandwidth classes. \emph{Wider-scale deployment:} The original goal of Tor was to gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and learn from having actual users. We are now at the point in design learn from having actual users. We are now at a point in design and development where we can start deploying a wider network. Once we have many actual users, we will doubtlessly be better able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our Loading @@ -1923,7 +1925,6 @@ robustness/latency trade-offs, our performance trade-offs (including cell size), our abuse-prevention mechanisms, and our overall usability. % XXX large and small cells on same network. % XXX work with morphmix spec %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Loading