Loading ChangeLog +21 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-?? o Security fixes: - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1. Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06 Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself Loading ReleaseNotes +21 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -3,6 +3,27 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file. Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-?? o Security fixes: - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1. Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06 Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself Loading changes/bug6530deleted 100644 → 0 +0 −5 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Major security fixes: - Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus document with an unrecognized flavor name. This could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. changes/geoip-june2012deleted 100644 → 0 +0 −3 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Minor features: - Update to the June 6 2012 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. changes/pathsel-BUGGY-adeleted 100644 → 0 +0 −14 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Security fixes: - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse- grained information about which relays a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1. Loading
ChangeLog +21 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-?? o Security fixes: - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1. Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06 Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself Loading
ReleaseNotes +21 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -3,6 +3,27 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file. Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-?? o Security fixes: - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1. Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06 Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself Loading
changes/bug6530deleted 100644 → 0 +0 −5 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Major security fixes: - Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus document with an unrecognized flavor name. This could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
changes/geoip-june2012deleted 100644 → 0 +0 −3 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Minor features: - Update to the June 6 2012 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
changes/pathsel-BUGGY-adeleted 100644 → 0 +0 −14 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Security fixes: - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse- grained information about which relays a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
