Commit 0642ab24 authored by Roger Dingledine's avatar Roger Dingledine
Browse files

weight guard choice by bandwidth; discard old guards

parent f43f87db

ChangeLog

+11 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
Changes in version 0.2.1.23 - 2010-0?-??

  o Major bugfixes (performance):

    - We were selecting our guards uniformly at random, and then weighting

      which of our guards we'd use uniformly at random. This imbalance

      meant that Tor clients were severely limited on throughput (and

      probably latency too) by the first hop in their circuit. Now we

      select guards weighted by currently advertised bandwidth. We also

      automatically discard guards picked using the old algorithm. Fixes

      bug 1217; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. Found by Mike Perry.





Changes in version 0.2.1.22 - 2010-01-19

  Tor 0.2.1.22 fixes a critical privacy problem in bridge directory

  authorities -- it would tell you its whole history of bridge descriptors

src/or/circuitbuild.c

+20 −9
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1697,7 +1697,7 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state) 
  routerinfo_t *r, *choice;

  smartlist_t *excluded;

  or_options_t *options = get_options();

  router_crn_flags_t flags = 0;

  router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_GUARD;



  if (state && options->UseEntryGuards &&

      (purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || options->BridgeRelay)) {
@@ -1734,7 +1734,6 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state) 
  }



  if (state) {

    flags |= CRN_NEED_GUARD;

    if (state->need_uptime)

      flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;

    if (state->need_capacity)
@@ -2203,13 +2202,25 @@ remove_obsolete_entry_guards(void) 
    } else if (tor_version_parse(ver, &v)) {

      msg = "does not seem to be from any recognized version of Tor";

      version_is_bad = 1;

    } else if ((tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&

                !tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||

               (tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&

                !tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha"))) {

    } else {

      size_t len = strlen(ver)+5;

      char *tor_ver = tor_malloc(len);

      tor_snprintf(tor_ver, len, "Tor %s", ver);

      if ((tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&

           !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||

          (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&

           !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha")) ||

          /* above are bug 440; below are bug 1217 */

          (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.3-alpha") &&

           !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.23")) ||

          (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.0-alpha") &&

           !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.7-alpha"))) {

        msg = "was selected without regard for guard bandwidth";

        version_is_bad = 1;

    } else if (entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*35 < this_month) {

      }

      tor_free(tor_ver);

    }

    if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*35 < this_month) {

      /* It's been more than a month, and probably more like two since

       * chosen_on_date is clipped to the beginning of its month. */

      msg = "was selected several months ago";