Commit 073d574a authored by Roger Dingledine's avatar Roger Dingledine
Browse files

Point out a potential DoS flaw in caching untrusted network 

statuses to disk. We should resolve sometime.


svn:r6206
parent 415c9e87

src/or/routerlist.c

+5 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1974,7 +1974,7 @@ add_networkstatus_to_cache(const char *s, 
#define NETWORKSTATUS_ALLOW_SKEW (24*60*60)

/** Given a string <b>s</b> containing a network status that we received at

 * <b>arrived_at</b> from <b>source</b>, try to parse it, see if we want to

 * store it, and put it into our cache is necessary.

 * store it, and put it into our cache as necessary.

 *

 * If <b>source</b> is NS_FROM_DIR or NS_FROM_CACHE, do not replace our

 * own networkstatus_t (if we're a directory server).
@@ -2065,6 +2065,10 @@ router_set_networkstatus(const char *s, time_t arrived_at, 


  if (!trusted_dir) {

    if (!skewed && get_options()->DirPort) {

      /* XXX This is great as a first cut, but it looks like

       * any old person can give us an untrusted network-status and

       * we'll write it to disk as the newest one we have?

       * Also, there is no limit on the number that we'll store? -RD */

      add_networkstatus_to_cache(s, source, ns);

      networkstatus_free(ns);

    }