Commit 07871a8a authored by Roger Dingledine's avatar Roger Dingledine
Browse files

add future task list to todo

parent 6168b322
......@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ ARMA - arma claims
For September:
- Windows port
- works as client
. Windows port
o works as client
- deal with pollhup / reached_eof on all platforms
- robust as a client
. robust as a client
- works as server
- can be configured
- robust as a server
......@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ For September:
cons of using it, why should I use it, etc.
- a howto tutorial with examples
- tutorial: how to set up your own tor network
- (need to not hardcore dirservers file in config.c)
- correct, update, polish spec
- (need to not hardcode dirservers file in config.c)
. correct, update, polish spec
- document the exposed function api?
- document what we mean by socks.
......@@ -78,29 +78,106 @@ Other details and small and hard things:
. Refactor: add own routerinfo to routerlist. Right now, only
router_get_by_nickname knows about 'this router', as a hack to
get circuit_launch_new to do the right thing.
Rendezvous service:
- preemptively build and start rendezvous circs
- preemptively build n-1 hops of intro circs?
- cannibalize general circs?
- fix router_get_by_* functions so they can get ourselves too,
and audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are
just as likely to be us as not.
In the distant future:
. Scrubbing proxies
- Find an smtp proxy?
. Get socks4a support into Mozilla
- migrate to using IPv6 sizes everywhere
- handle half-open tcp conns
- Extend by nickname/hostname/something, not by IP.
- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
- Make it harder to circumvent bandwidth caps: look at number of bytes
sent across sockets, not number sent inside TLS stream.
- Look at having smallcells and largecells
D Advanced directory servers
D Automated reputation management
D Figure out how to do threshold directory servers
D jurisdiction info in dirserver entries? other info?
X On the fly compression of each stream
- fix router_get_by_* functions so they can get ourselves too,
and audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are
just as likely to be us as not.
***************************Future tasks:****************************
Rendezvous and hidden services:
make it fast:
- preemptively build and start rendezvous circs.
- preemptively build n-1 hops of intro circs?
- cannibalize general circs?
make it reliable:
- standby/hotswap/redundant services.
- store stuff to disk? dirservers forget service descriptors when
they restart; nodes offering hidden services forget their chosen
intro points when they restart.
make it robust:
- auth mechanisms to let midpoint and bob selectively choose
connection requests.
make it scalable:
- right now the hidserv store/lookup system is run by the dirservers;
this won't scale.
Tor scalability:
Relax clique assumptions.
Redesign how directories are handled.
- Separate running-routers lookup from descriptor list lookup.
- Resolve directory agreement somehow.
- Cache directory on all servers.
Find and remove bottlenecks
- Address linear searches on e.g. circuit and connection lists.
Reputation/memory system, so dirservers can measure people,
and so other people can verify their measurements.
- Need to measure via relay, so it's not distinguishable.
Bandwidth-aware path selection. So people with T3's are picked
more often than people with DSL.
Reliability-aware node selection. So people who are stable are
preferred for long-term circuits such as intro and rend circs,
and general circs for irc, aim, ssh, etc.
Let dissidents get to Tor servers via Tor users. ("Backbone model")
Anonymity improvements:
Is abandonding the circuit the only option when an extend fails, or
can we do something without impacting anonymity too much?
Is exiting from the middle of the circuit always a bad idea?
Helper nodes. Decide how to use them to improve safety.
DNS resolution: need to make tor support resolve requests. Need to write
a script and an interface (including an extension to the socks
protocol) so we can ask it to do resolve requests. Need to patch
tsocks to intercept gethostbyname, else we'll continue leaking it.
Improve path selection algorithms based on routing-zones paper. Be sure
to start and end circuits in different ASs. Ideally, consider AS of
source and destination -- maybe even enter and exit via nearby AS.
Intermediate model, with some delays and mixing.
Add defensive dropping regime?
Make it more correct:
Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
we've seen in the wild.
Support IPv6.
Congestion control. Is our current design sufficient once we have heavy
use? Need to measure and tweak, or maybe overhaul.
Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
connection (tls session key) rotation.
Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc.
Use cpuworker for more heavy lifting.
- Signing (and verifying) hidserv descriptors
- Signing (and verifying) intro/rend requests
- Signing (and verifying) router descriptors
- Signing (and verifying) directories
- Doing TLS handshake (this is very hard to separate out, though)
Buffer size pool: allocate a maximum size for all buffers, not
a maximum size for each buffer. So we don't have to give up as
quickly (and kill the thickpipe!) when there's congestion.
Exit node caching: tie into squid or other caching web proxy.
Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
link crypto, unless we can bully openssl into it.
P2P Tor:
Do all the scalability stuff above, first.
Incentives to relay. Not so hard.
Incentives to allow exit. Possibly quite hard.
Sybil defenses without having a human bottleneck.
How to gather random sample of nodes.
How to handle nodelist recommendations.
Consider incremental switches: a p2p tor with only 50 users has
different anonymity properties than one with 10k users, and should
be treated differently.
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