general formatting / whitespace / typo fixes

ChangeLog

@@ -2180,7 +2180,7 @@ Changes in version 0.3.0.1-alpha - 2016-12-19
       subprotocol-versions mechanism, so that clients can tell which
       relays can identity themselves by Ed25519 ID. Closes ticket 20552.
-  o Minor features (fingerprinting resistence, authentication):
+  o Minor features (fingerprinting resistance, authentication):
     - Extend the length of RSA keys used for TLS link authentication to
       2048 bits. (These weren't used for forward secrecy; for forward
       secrecy, we used P256.) Closes ticket 13752.
@@ -5246,7 +5246,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.8 - 2015-05-21
   o Major bugfixes (hidden services, backport from 0.2.7.1-alpha):
     - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir
-      flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
+      flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
       can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix
       on 0.2.6.3-alpha.
@@ -5287,7 +5287,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.1-alpha - 2015-05-12
   o Major bugfixes (hidden services):
     - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir
-      flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
+      flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
       can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix
       on 0.2.6.3-alpha.

ReleaseNotes

@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ Changes in version 0.3.0.6 - 2017-04-26
     - Select 200 fallback directories for each release. Closes
       ticket 20881.
-  o Minor features (fingerprinting resistence, authentication):
+  o Minor features (fingerprinting resistance, authentication):
     - Extend the length of RSA keys used for TLS link authentication to
       2048 bits. (These weren't used for forward secrecy; for forward
       secrecy, we used P256.) Closes ticket 13752.
@@ -3239,7 +3239,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.5 - 2015-11-20
   o Major bugfixes (hidden services):
     - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir
-      flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
+      flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
       can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix
       on 0.2.6.3-alpha.
     - When cannibalizing a circuit for an introduction point, always
@@ -3854,7 +3854,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.8 - 2015-05-21
   o Major bugfixes (hidden services, backport from 0.2.7.1-alpha):
     - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir
-      flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
+      flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays
       can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix
       on 0.2.6.3-alpha.

src/or/channeltls.c

@@ -1915,7 +1915,6 @@ certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(int typenum)
  * of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection.
  * If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell.
  */
-
 STATIC void
 channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 {

src/or/circuitbuild.c

@@ -2581,7 +2581,7 @@ extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect)
     ed_pubkey = node_get_ed25519_id(node);
   } else if (node_get_ed25519_id(node)) {
     log_info(LD_CIRC, "Not including the ed25519 ID for %s, since it won't "
-             " be able to authenticate it.",
+             "be able to authenticate it.",
              node_describe(node));
   }
 

src/or/control.c

@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ queued_events_flush_all(int force)
 }
 
 /** Libevent callback: Flushes pending events to controllers that are
- * interested in them */
+ * interested in them. */
 static void
 flush_queued_events_cb(evutil_socket_t fd, short what, void *arg)
 {

src/or/dns.c

@@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ dns_launch_wildcard_checks(void)
       launch_wildcard_check(8, 16, ipv6, ".com");
       launch_wildcard_check(8, 16, ipv6, ".org");
       launch_wildcard_check(8, 16, ipv6, ".net");
-  }
+    }
   }
 }
 

src/or/entrynodes.c

@@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ STATIC entry_guard_t *
 entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs,
                           const node_t *node)
 {
-  log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s as to the entry guard sample set.",
+  log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s to the entry guard sample set.",
            node_describe(node));
 
   /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */

src/or/microdesc.c

@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ update_microdesc_downloads(time_t now)
   smartlist_free(missing);
 }
 
-/** For every microdescriptor listed in the current microdecriptor consensus,
+/** For every microdescriptor listed in the current microdescriptor consensus,
  * update its last_listed field to be at least as recent as the publication
  * time of the current microdescriptor consensus.
  */

src/or/networkstatus.c

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static strmap_t *unnamed_server_map = NULL;
  * status. */
 STATIC networkstatus_t *current_ns_consensus = NULL;
 
-/** Most recently received and validated v3 "microdec"-flavored consensus
+/** Most recently received and validated v3 "microdesc"-flavored consensus
  * network status. */
 STATIC networkstatus_t *current_md_consensus = NULL;
 
@@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
 
   if (from_cache && !was_waiting_for_certs) {
     /* We previously stored this; check _now_ to make sure that version-kills
-     * really work.  This happens even before we check signatures: we did so
+     * really work. This happens even before we check signatures: we did so
      * before when we stored this to disk. This does mean an attacker who can
      * write to the datadir can make us not start: such an attacker could
      * already harm us by replacing our guards, which would be worse. */

src/or/routerparse.c

@@ -3360,8 +3360,8 @@ extract_shared_random_srvs(networkstatus_t *ns, smartlist_t *tokens)
     voter_identity = "consensus";
   }
 
-  /* We extract both and on error, everything is stopped because it means
-   * the votes is malformed for the shared random value(s). */
+  /* We extract both, and on error everything is stopped because it means
+   * the vote is malformed for the shared random value(s). */
   if (extract_one_srv(tokens, K_PREVIOUS_SRV, &ns->sr_info.previous_srv) < 0) {
     log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Unable to parse previous SRV from %s",
              voter_identity);