Commit 249ac6cf authored by Nick Mathewson's avatar Nick Mathewson 🌉
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r8912@Kushana: nickm | 2006-09-22 16:18:51 -0400

 Write more of path-spec.txt


svn:r8463
parent 0fe85442
......@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ streams to circuits. Other implementations MAY take other approaches, but
implementors should be aware of the anonymity and load-balancing implications
of their choices.
THIS SPEC ISN'T DONE OR CORRECT. I'm just copying in relevant info so
far. The starred points are things we should cover, but not an exhaustive
list. -NM
THIS SPEC ISN'T DONE OR CORRECT.
I'm just copying in relevant info so far. The starred points are things we
should cover, but not an exhaustive list. -NM
1. General operation
......@@ -32,108 +32,225 @@ list. -NM
if no current circuit can handle the request. We rotate circuits over
time to avoid some profiling attacks.
To build a circuit, we choose all the nodes we want to use, and then
construct the circuit. Sometimes, when we want a circuit that ends at a
given hop, and we have an appropriate unused circuit, we "cannibalize" the
existing circuit and extend it to the new terminus.
These processes are described in more detail below.
This document describes Tor's automatic path selection logic only; path
selection can be overridden by a controller (with the EXTENDCIRCUIT and
ATTACHSTREAM commands). Paths constructed through these means will
violate some constraints given below.
1b. Types of circuits.
* Stable / Ordinary
* Internal / Exit
XXXX
1c. Terminology
A "path" is an ordered sequence of nodes, not yet built as a circuit.
A "clean" circuit is one that has not yet been used for any stream or
rendezvous traffic.
A "clean" circuit is one that has not yet been used for any traffic.
A "stable" node is one that we believe to have the 'Stable' flag set on
the basis of our current directory information. A "stable" circuit is one
that consists entirely of "stable" nodes.
A "persistent" stream is one that we predict will require a long uptime.
Currently, Tor does this by examining the stream's target port, and
comparing it to a list of "long-lived" ports. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,
5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 8300, 8888.)
A "fast" or "stable" node is one that we believe to have the 'Fast' or
'Stable' flag set on the basis of our current directory information. A
"fast" or "stable" circuit is one consisting only of "fast" or "stable"
nodes.
An exit node "supports" a stream if the stream's target IP is known, and
the stream's IP and target Port are allowed by the exit node's declared
exit policy. A path "supports" a stream if:
* The last node in the path "supports" the stream, and
* If the stream is "persistent," all the nodes in the path are
"stable".
A "request" is a client-side connection or DNS resolve that needs to be
served by a circuit.
An exit node "might support" a stream if the stream's target IP is unknown
(because we haven't resolved it yet), and the exit node's declared exit
policy allows some IPs to exit at that port. ???
A "pending" circuit is one that we have started to build, but which has
not yet completed.
A circuit or path "supports" a request if it is okay to use the
circuit/path to fulfill the request, according to the rules given below.
A circuit or path "might support" a request if some aspect of the request
is unknown (usually its target IP), but we believe the path probably
supports the request according to the rules given below.
2. Building circuits
2.1. When we build.
2.1.1. When clients build circuits
When running as a client, Tor tries to maintain at least 3 clean circuits,
so that new streams can be handled quickly. To increase the likelihood of
success, Tor tries to predict what exit nodes will be useful by choosing
from among nodes that support the ports we have used in the recent past.
(see 2.4). [XXXX describe in detail how predicted ports work.]
Additionally, when a client request exists that no circuit (built or
pending) might support, we cannibalize an existing circuit (2.1.4) or
create a new circuit to support the request. We do so by picking a
request at random, building or cannibalizing a circuit to support it, and
repeating until every unattached request might be supported by a pending
or built circuit.
XXXX when long idle, we build nothing.
2.1.2. When servers build circuits
XXXX
If Tor needs to attach a stream that no current exit circuit can support,
it looks for an existing clean circuit to cannibalize. If we find one,
we try to extend it another hop to an exit node that might support the
stream. [Must be internal???]
2.1.3. When authorities build circuits
XXXX
2.1.4. Hidden-service circuits
See section 4 below.
2.1.4. Cannibalizing circuits
When Tor has a request (either an unattached stream or unattached resolve
request) that no current circuit can support, it looks for an existing
clean circuit to cannibalize. If it finds one, it tries to extend it
another hop to an exit node that might support the stream. [Must be
internal???]
If no circuit exists, or is currently being built, along a path that
might support a stream, we begin building a new circuit that might support
the stream.
[XXXX always? really?]
2.2. Path selection
2.2. Path selection and constraints
We choose the path for each new circuit before we build it. We choose the
exit node first, followed by the other nodes in the circuit. We do not
choose the same router twice for the same circuit. We do not choose any
router in the same family as another in the same circuit. We don't choose
any non-running or non-valid router unless we have been configured to do
so. When choosing among multiple candidates for a path element, we choose
exit node first, followed by the other nodes in the circuit. All paths
we generate obey the following constraints:
- We do not choose the same router twice for the same path.
- We do not choose any router in the same family as another in the same
circuit.
- We do not choose any router in the same /16 subnet as another in the
same circuit.
- We don't choose any non-running or non-valid router unless we have
been configured to do so.
- If we're using Guard nodes, the first node must be a Guard (see 5
below)
- XXXX Choosing the length
When choosing among multiple candidates for a path element, we choose
a given router with probability proportional to its advertised bandwidth
[the smaller of the 'rate' and 'observed' arguments to the "bandwidth"
element in its descriptor]. If a router's advertised bandwidth is greater
than MAX_BELIEVEABLE_BANDWIDTH (1.5 MB/sec), we clip to that value.
Additional restrictions:
XXX When to use Fast
XXX When to use Stable
XXX When to use Named
(XXXX We should do something to shift traffic away from exit nodes.)
Additionally, we may be building circuits with one or more requests in
mind. Each kind of request puts certain constraints on paths:
- All service-side introduction circuits and all rendezvous paths
should be Stable.
- All connection requests for connections that we think will need to
stay open a long time require Stable circuits. Currently, Tor decides
this by examining the request's target port, and comparing it to a
list of "long-lived" ports. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190,
5222, 5223, 6667, 8300, 8888.)
- DNS resolves require an exit node whose exit policy is not equivalent
to "reject *:*".
- Reverse DNS resolves require a version of Tor with advertised eventdns
support, running 0.1.2.1-alpha-dev or later.
- All connection requests require an exit node whose exit policy
supports their target address and port (if known), or which "might
support it" (if the address isn't known). See 2.2.1.
- Rules for Fast? XXXXX
2.2.1. Choosing an exit
If we know what IP we want to resolve, we can trivially tell whether a
given router will support it by simulating its declared exit policy.
If we're building a circuit preemtively, we choose an exit node that might
support streams to one of our predicted ports; otherwise, we pick an exit
node that will support a pending stream (if the stream's target is known)
or that might support a pending stream.
Because we often connect to addresses of the form hostname:port, we do not
always know the target IP address when we select an exit node. In these
cases, we need to pick an exit node that "might support" connections to a
given address port with an unknown address. An exit node "might support"
such a connection if any clause that accepts any connections to that port
precedes all clauses (if any) that reject all connections to that port.
We pick an entry node from one of our guards; see section 5 below.
2.2.2. User configuration
Users can alter the default behavior for path selection with configuration
options.
- If "ExitNodes" is provided, then every request requires an exit node on
the ExitNodes list. (If a request is supported by no nodes on that list,
and StrictExitNodes is false, then Tor treats that request as if
ExitNodes were not provided.)
- "EntryNodes" and "StrictEntryNodes" behave analagously.
- If a user tries to connect to or resolve a hostname of the form
<target>.<servername>.exit, the request is rewritten to a request for
<target>, and the request is only supported by the exit whose nickname
or fingerprint is <servername>.
2.3. Handling failure
If an attempt to extend a circuit fails (either because the first create
failed or a subsequent extend failed) then the circuit is torn down and is
no longer pending. (XXXX really?) Requests that might have been
supported by the pending circuit thus become unsupported, and a new
circuit needs to be constructed.
If we fail to being a circuit with an EXITPOLICY error, we decide that the
exit node's exit policy is not correctly advertised, so we treat the exit
node as if it were a non-exit until we retrieve a fresh descriptor for it.
XXXX
2.4. Tracking "predicted" ports
* Choosing the path first, building second.
* Choosing the length of the circuit.
* Choosing entries, midpoints, exits.
* the .exit notation
* exitnodes, entrynodes, strictexitnodes, strictentrynodes.
* What to do when an extend fails
* Keeping track of 'expected' ports
* And expected hidden service use (client-side and hidserv-side)
* Backing off from circuit building when a long time has passed
A Tor client tracks how much time has passed since it last received a
request for a connection on each port. (For the purposes of this section,
requests for hostname resolves are considered requests to a separate
port). Tor forgets about ports that haven't been used for an hour
[PREDICTED_CIRCS_RELEVANCE_TIME].
The ports that have been used in the last hour are considered "predicted",
and Tor will try to maintain a clean circuits to them as described in 2.1.
For bootstrapping purposes, port 80 is treated as used at startup time.
Tor clients SHOULD NOT store predicted ports to a persistent medium.
3. Attaching streams to circuits
* Including via the controller.
* Timeouts and when Tor autoretries.
When a circuit that might support a request is built, Tor tries to attach
the request's stream to the circuit and sends a BEGIN or RESOLVE relay
cell as appropriate. If the request completes unsuccessfully, Tor
considers the reason given in the CLOSE relay cell. [XXX yes, and?]
After a request has remained unattached for [XXXX retries? interval?], Tor
abandons the attempt and signals an error to the client as appropriate
(e.g., by closing the SOCKS connection).
XXX Timeouts and when Tor auto-retries.
* What stream-end-reasons are appropriate for retrying.
4. Rendezvous circuits
XXX What if no reply to BEGIN/RESOLVE?
4. Hidden-service related circuits
XXX Tracking expected hidden service use (client-side and hidserv-side)
5. Guard nodes
XXX writeme
6. Testing circuits
......
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