Commit 5f688503 authored by Roger Dingledine's avatar Roger Dingledine
Browse files

comments from the first pass through dir-voting. seems like a fine

start, though we're going to have our hands full with edge cases when
the time comes.


svn:r9091
parent a3a00df6
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
+23 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
  "most recent" networkstatus sources, and different versions of each
  (since authorities change their statements often).  Also, it is very
  redundant: most of the downloaded networkstatus are probably quite
  similar.
  similar.  Worse, the overhead grows as we add more authorities.

  So if we have clients only download a single multiply signed consensus
  network status statement, we can:
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
       - Assuming that client-side or cache-side clocks are more correct
         than we assume now.
       - Assuming that authority clocks are perfectly correct.
       - Degrading badly if an authority dies or is offline for a bit.
       - Degrading badly if a few authorities die or are offline for a bit.

  We do not have to perform well if:
      - No clique of more than half the authorities can agree about who
@@ -90,7 +90,10 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
        MUST match the nickname in the "directory-signature" entry.

     "directory-signature" -- [XXXX this should be tagged with the nickname
        or identity somehow.]
        or identity somehow. -NM] [The bottom of
        http://belegost.mit.edu/tor/status/authority already puts the
        nickname next to it. So we can just fix the spec to require
        this? -RD]

  Authorities SHOULD cache their most recently generated votes so they
  can persist them across restarts.  Authorities SHOULD NOT generate
@@ -124,9 +127,13 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
       re-English this sentence]

     "client-versions" and "server-versions" are sorted in ascending
       order.
       order based on version-spec.txt.

     "dir-options" and "known-flags" are not included.
[XXX really? why not list the ones that are used in the consensus?
For example, right now BadExit is in use, but no servers would be
labelled BadExit, and it's still worth knowing that it was considered
by the authorities. -RD]

  The fields MUST occur in the following order:
     "network-status-version"
@@ -141,7 +148,7 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
     "server-versions"

  The signatures at the end of the document appear as multiple instances
  directory-signature, sorted in ascending order by nickname,
  of directory-signature, sorted in ascending order by nickname,
  case-insensitively.

  A router entry should be included in the result if it is included by more
@@ -149,7 +156,12 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
  we have).  A router entry has a flag set if it is included by more than
  half of the authorities who care about that flag.  [XXXX this creates an
  incentive for attackers to DOS authorities whose votes they don't like.
  Can we remember what flags people set the last time we saw them?]
  Can we remember what flags people set the last time we saw them? -NM]
  [Which 'we' are we talking here? The end-users never learn which
  authority sets which flags. So you're thinking the authorities
  should record the last vote they saw from each authority and if it's
  within a week or so, count all the flags that it advertised as 'no'
  votes? Plausible. -RD]

  The signature hash covers from the "network-status-version" line through
  the characters "directory-signature" in the first "directory-signature"
@@ -227,6 +239,11 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
  another, we can rely on this existing mechanism to keep authorities up to
  date.

  [We should do a thorough read-through of dir-spec again to make sure
  that the authorities converge on which descriptor to "prefer" for
  each router. Right now the decision happens at the client, which is
  no longer the right place for it. -RD]

3. Questions and concerns

3.1. Push or pull?