Commit c57ef84f authored by Nick Mathewson's avatar Nick Mathewson 🏃
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r11987@Kushana: nickm | 2007-01-19 14:57:28 -0500

 Implement SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME status event. Defer remaining status events.  Clean up control-spec.txt a little, and fill in recommendations for events.


svn:r9374
parent 39e50cbb
......@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ Changes in version 0.1.2.7-alpha - 2007-??-??
o Minor features (controller):
- Track reasons for OR connection failure; make these reasons available
via the controller interface. (Patch from Mike Perry.)
- Add a SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME client status event so controllers can learn
when clients are sending malformed hostnames to Tor.
- Clean up documentation for controller status events.
o Major bugfixes:
- Fix a crash bug in the presence of DNS hijacking (reported by Andrew
......
......@@ -32,16 +32,16 @@ N - Test guard unreachable logic; make sure that we actually attempt to
R - Reconstruct ChangeLog; put rolled-up info in ReleaseNotes or something.
Items for 0.1.2.x:
N - enumerate events of important things that occur in tor, so vidalia can
o enumerate events of important things that occur in tor, so vidalia can
react.
o Backend implementation
o Actually list all the events (notice and warn log messages are a good
place to look.) Divide messages into categories, perhaps.
o Specify general event system
o Specify actual events.
- Implement or defer remaining events
- Implement or defer GETINFO list of current status events.
- Clean up relevant bits of control-spec.txt
o Implement or defer remaining events
D Implement or defer GETINFO list of current status events.
o Clean up relevant bits of control-spec.txt
. Have (and document) a BEGIN_DIR relay cell that means "Connect to your
directory port."
......@@ -295,6 +295,25 @@ M - rewrite how libevent does select() on win32 so it's not so very slow.
- Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory caching.
- More status event features:
- Missing events:
- DIR_REACHABLE
- BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind
a firewall.)
- BAD_PROXY (Bad http or https proxy)
- UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER (a nickname we asked for is unavailable)
- Status events related to hibernation
- something about failing to parse our address?
from resolve_my_address() in config.c
- sketchy OS, sketchy threading
- too many onions queued: threading problems or slow CPU?
- Missing fields:
- TIMEOUT on CHECKING_REACHABILITY
- GETINFO status/client, status/server, status/general: There should be
some way to learn which status events are currently "in effect."
We should specify which these are, what format they appear in, and so
on.
Minor items for 0.1.2.x as time permits:
- getinfo ns/name/moria2 doesn't include a "v" line, even when some
network-statuses I have show it. I suppose the fix should go in
......
......@@ -487,25 +487,6 @@ $Id$
status events are available as getinfo's currently. Let us know if
you want more exposed.)
"status/client"
"status/server"
"status/general"
These provide a (possibly empty) newline-separated list of status
events from Section 4.1.10 that Tor believes are still
accurate. Controllers can use them to get a summary of any current
problems with Tor's operation.
[Does this mean that Tor must keep state on its side of all the
statuses it's sent, and recognize when they're cancelled out,
and so on? It's a shame that Tor needs to do this and also Vidalia
needs to do this. -RD]
[Is there a good alternative? If we want controllers who connect
to a running Tor to see its status, I think we need to do this. -NM]
[What is the format of this list? Is it space-separated,
newline-separated? Does it include keywords, arguments, etc? Also,
what about STATUS_GENERAL? -NM]
Examples:
C: GETINFO version desc/name/moria1
S: 250+desc/name/moria=
......@@ -967,8 +948,6 @@ $Id$
or higher. They differ from log messages in that their format is a
specified interface.
[Don't rely on any of these until we work out more of the details. -RD]
Syntax:
"650" SP StatusType SP StatusSeverity SP StatusAction
[SP StatusArguments] CRLF
......@@ -989,9 +968,13 @@ $Id$
VERBOSE_NAMES; see the explanations in the USEFEATURE section
for details.
Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized actions and arguments, MUST
tolerate missing arguments, and MUST tolerate arguments that arrive
in any order.
Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized actions, MUST tolerate
unrecognized arguments, MUST tolerate missing arguments, and MUST
tolerate arguments that arrive in any order.
Each event description below is accompanied by a recommendation for
controllers. These recommendations are suggestions only; no controller
is required to implement them.
Actions for STATUS_GENERAL events can be as follows:
......@@ -1003,21 +986,12 @@ $Id$
also happens when the system is swapping so heavily that Tor is
starving. The "time" argument specifies the number of seconds Tor
thinks it was unconscious for.
This status event is sent as NOTICE severity normally, but WARN
severity if Tor is acting as a server currently.
[Recommendation for controller: ignore it, since we don't really
know what the user should do anyway. Hm.]
[the basic idea for the rest is to do it like the CLOCK_JUMPED entry
above: specify a Type, describe what it is and its arguments, and
describe what Severities to expect and what we suggest the controller
do for each. -RD]
DIR_REACHABLE
[not implemented yet]
typically severity WARN events:
{Recommendation for controller: ignore it, since we don't really
know what the user should do anyway. Hm.}
DANGEROUS_VERSION
"CURRENT=version"
......@@ -1031,12 +1005,21 @@ do for each. -RD]
some recommended versions of Tor are newer and some are old than this
version.
{Controllers may want to suggest that the user upgrade OLD or
UNRECOMMENDED versions. NEW versions may be known-insecure, or may
simply be development versions.}
TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS
"CURRENT=NUM"
Tor has reached its ulimit -n or whatever the native limit is on
file descriptors or sockets. The user should really do something
about this. The "current" argument shows the number of connections
currently open.
Tor has reached its ulimit -n or whatever the native limit is on file
descriptors or sockets. CURRENT is the number of sockets Tor
currently has open. The user should really do something about
this. The "current" argument shows the number of connections currently
open.
{Controllers may recommend that the user increase the limit, or
increase it for them. Recommendations should be phrased in an
OS-appropriate way and automated when possible.}
BUG
"REASON=STRING"
......@@ -1045,12 +1028,8 @@ do for each. -RD]
the controller can explain this to the user and encourage her to
file a bug report?
[The following two are sent as WARNs if CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED and
not DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE, else as ERRs:]
BAD_DIR_RESPONSE
[unimplemented]
// unexpected dir response. behind a hotel/airport firewall?
{Controllers should log bugs, but shouldn't annoy the user in case a
bug appears frequently.}
CLOCK_SKEWED
SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS
......@@ -1061,6 +1040,11 @@ do for each. -RD]
a NETWORKSTATUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a
networkstatus from far in the future.
{Controllers may want to warn the user if the skew is high, or if
multiple skew messages appear at severity WARN. Controllers
shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more accurate source
of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently unauthenticated.}
BAD_LIBEVENT
"METHOD=" libevent method
"VERSION=" libevent version
......@@ -1072,11 +1056,10 @@ do for each. -RD]
fine, but not quickly. If "RECOVERED" is YES, Tor managed to
switch to a more reliable (but probably slower!) libevent method.
Actions for STATUS_GENERAL severity ERR events can be as follows:
BAD_PROXY
[unimplemented]
// bad http or https proxy?
{Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs, though
generally it's the fault of whoever built the Tor binary and there's
not much the user can do besides upgrade libevent or upgrade the
binary.}
DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE
Tor believes that none of the known directory servers are
......@@ -1084,29 +1067,40 @@ do for each. -RD]
down or otherwise not working, and might help to explain for the
user why Tor appears to be broken.
Actions for STATUS_CLIENT severity NOTICE events can be as follows:
{Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs; further
action is generally not possible.}
Actions for STATUS_CLIENT events can be as follows:
ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
Tor now knows enough network-status documents and enough server
descriptors that it's going to start trying to build circuits now.
{Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
to tell them so.}
NOT_ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
We discarded expired statuses and router descriptors to fall
below the desired threshold of directory information. We won't
try to build any circuits until ENOUGH_DIR_INFO occurs again.
{Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
to tell them so.}
CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED
Tor is able to establish circuits for client use. This event will
only be sent if we just built a circuit that changed our mind --
that is, prior to this event we didn't know whether we could
establish circuits.
Suggested use: controllers can notify their users that Tor is
{Suggested use: controllers can notify their users that Tor is
ready for use as a client once they see this status event. [Perhaps
controllers should also have a timeout if too much time passes and
this event hasn't arrived, to give tips on how to troubleshoot.
On the other hand, hopefully Tor will send further status events
if it can identify the problem.]
if it can identify the problem.]}
CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED
"REASON=" "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS" / "DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE" / "CLOCK_JUMPED"
......@@ -1114,11 +1108,11 @@ do for each. -RD]
keyword provides an explanation: which other status event type caused
our lack of confidence.
Suggested use: Vidalia can turn its onion yellow again.
{Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
to do so.}
[Note: only REASON=CLOCK_JUMPED is implemented currently.]
Actions for STATUS_CLIENT severity WARN events can be as follows:
DANGEROUS_SOCKS
"PROTOCOL=SOCKS4/SOCKS5"
"ADDRESS=IP:port"
......@@ -1127,6 +1121,10 @@ do for each. -RD]
If the client application got this address from gethostbyname(),
it may be leaking target addresses via DNS.
{Controllers should warn their users when this occurs, unless they
happen to know that the application using Tor is in fact doing so
correctly (e.g., because it is part of a distributed bundle).}
SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
"DATA=string"
A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port that tried to use it
......@@ -1134,22 +1132,19 @@ do for each. -RD]
using Tor as an HTTP proxy? The DATA is the first few characters
sent to Tor on the SOCKS port.
SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME
[unimplemented]
// Some application gave us a funny-looking hostname. Perhaps
// it is broken? In any case it won't work with Tor and the user
// should know.
UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER
[unimplemented]
// a nickname we asked for is unavailable. no need for this
// quite yet, since no end-user controllers let you configure that.
{Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it
indicates a misconfigured application.}
Actions for STATUS_CLIENT severity ERR events can be as follows:
SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME
"HOSTNAME=QuotedString"
Some application gave us a funny-looking hostname. Perhaps
it is broken? In any case it won't work with Tor and the user
should know.
[none yet]
{Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it
usually indicates a misconfigured application.}
Actions for STATUS_SERVER severity NOTICE events can be as follows:
Actions for STATUS_SERVER can be as follows:
EXTERNAL_ADDRESS
"ADDRESS=IP"
......@@ -1165,36 +1160,32 @@ do for each. -RD]
the method is 'DIRSERV', a directory server told us a guess for what
our IP might be.
// hibernating
{Controllers may want to record this info and display it to the user.}
CHECKING_REACHABILITY
"ORADDRESS=IP:port"
"DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
"TIMEOUT=NUM" [timeout unimplemented]
We're going to start testing the reachability of our external OR port
or directory port.
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED
"ORADDRESS=IP:port"
"DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
We successfully verified the reachability of our external OR port or
directory port.
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
GOOD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
We successfully uploaded our server descriptor to each of the
directory authorities, with no complaints.
Actions for STATUS_SERVER severity WARN events can be as follows:
// something about failing to parse our address?
// from resolve_my_address() in config.c
[unimplemented]
// sketchy OS, sketchy threading
[unimplemented]
// too many onions queued. threading problem or slow cpu?
[unimplemented]
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
NAMESERVER_STATUS
"NS=addr"
......@@ -1203,17 +1194,32 @@ do for each. -RD]
One of our nameservers has changed status.
// actually notice
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
NAMESERVER_ALL_DOWN
All of our nameservers have gone down.
{This is a problem; if it happens often without the nameservers
coming up again, the user needs to configure more or better
nameservers.}
DNS_HIJACKED
Our DNS provider is providing an address when it should be saying
"NOTFOUND"; Tor will treat the address as a synonym for "NOTFOUND".
{This is an annoyance; controllers may want to tell admins that their
DNS provider is not to be trusted.}
DNS_USELESS
Our DNS provider is giving a hijacked address instead of well-known
websites; Tor will not try to be an exit node.
{Controllers could warn the admin if the server is running as an
exit server: the admin needs to configure a good DNS server.
Alternatively, this happens a lot in some restrictive environments
(hotels, universities, coffeeshops) when the user hasn't registered.}
BAD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
"DIRAUTH=addr:port"
"REASON=string"
......@@ -1221,12 +1227,15 @@ do for each. -RD]
include malformed descriptors, incorrect keys, highly skewed clocks,
and so on.
{Controllers should warn the admin, and try to cope if they can.}
ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
"DIRAUTH=addr:port"
A single directory authority accepted our descriptor.
// actually notice
Actions for STATUS_SERVER severity ERR events can be as follows:
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
REACHABILITY_FAILED
"ORADDRESS=IP:port"
......@@ -1234,8 +1243,8 @@ do for each. -RD]
We failed to connect to our external OR port or directory port
successfully.
Controllers must tolerate hearing about actions that they don't
recognize.
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status. The
controller should warn the admin and suggest reasonable steps to take.}
4.1.11. Our set of guard nodes has changed
......
......@@ -652,8 +652,9 @@ base16_decode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen)
/** Allocate and return a new string representing the contents of <b>s</b>,
* surrounded by quotes and using standard C escapes.
*
* Generally, we use this for logging values that come in over the network
* to keep them from tricking users.
* Generally, we use this for logging values that come in over the network to
* keep them from tricking users, and for sending certain values to the
* controller.
*
* We trust values from the resolver, OS, configuration file, and command line
* to not be maliciously ill-formed. We validate incoming routerdescs and
......
......@@ -1212,6 +1212,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
if (addresstype == BAD_HOSTNAME) {
log_warn(LD_APP, "Invalid hostname %s; rejecting", socks->address);
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
escaped(socks->address));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
......@@ -1227,6 +1229,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
} else {
log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
safe_str(socks->address));
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
escaped(socks->address));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
......@@ -1249,8 +1253,9 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {
/* not a hidden-service request (i.e. normal or .exit) */
if (address_is_invalid_destination(socks->address, 1)) {
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
escaped(socks->address));
log_warn(LD_APP,
"Destination '%s' seems to be an invalid hostname. Failing.",
safe_str(socks->address));
......@@ -1264,6 +1269,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
/* Reply to resolves immediately if we can. */
if (strlen(socks->address) > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"Address to be resolved is too large. Failing.");
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
escaped(socks->address));
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,
0,NULL,-1);
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
......
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