Commit eecc44da authored by Nick Mathewson's avatar Nick Mathewson 🌉
Browse files

r17963@catbus: nickm | 2008-02-07 10:14:25 -0500

 Be more thorough about memory poisoning and clearing.  Add an in-place version of aes_crypt in order to remove a memcpy from relay_crypt_one_payload.


svn:r13414
parent 842a33ff
......@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.19-alpha - 2008-02-??
- Give more descriptive well-formedness errors for out-of-range
hidden service descriptor/protocol versions.
o Minor features (security):
- Be slightly more paranoid about overwriting sensitive memory on free,
as a defensive programming tactic to ensure forward secrecy.
o Deprecated features (controller):
- The status/version/num-versioning and status/version/num-concurring
GETINFO options are no longer useful in the V3 directory protocol:
......@@ -59,6 +63,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.19-alpha - 2008-02-??
from a CREATE cell that we are waiting for a cpuworker to be
assigned" and "onionskin from an EXTEND cell that we are going to
send to an OR as soon as we are connected".
- Add an in-place version of aes_crypt so that we can avoid doing a
needless memcpy() call on each cell payload.
Changes in version 0.2.0.18-alpha - 2008-01-25
......
......@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ aes_crypt(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *input, size_t len,
* of alignmement, using a bigger buffer, and so on. Not till after 0.1.2.x,
* though. */
int c = cipher->pos;
if (!len) return;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!len)) return;
while (1) {
do {
......@@ -312,6 +312,42 @@ aes_crypt(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *input, size_t len,
}
}
/** Encrypt <b>len</b> bytes from <b>input</b>, storing the results in place.
* Uses the key in <b>cipher</b>, and advances the counter by <b>len</b> bytes
* as it encrypts.
*/
void
aes_crypt_inplace(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, char *data, size_t len)
{
/* XXXX This function is up to 5% of our runtime in some profiles;
* we should look into unrolling some of the loops; taking advantage
* of alignmement, using a bigger buffer, and so on. Not till after 0.1.2.x,
* though. */
int c = cipher->pos;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!len)) return;
while (1) {
do {
if (len-- == 0) { cipher->pos = c; return; }
*(data++) ^= cipher->buf[c];
} while (++c != 16);
cipher->pos = c = 0;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(! ++COUNTER(cipher, 0))) {
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(! ++COUNTER(cipher, 1))) {
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(! ++COUNTER(cipher, 2))) {
++COUNTER(cipher, 3);
UPDATE_CTR_BUF(cipher, 3);
}
UPDATE_CTR_BUF(cipher, 2);
}
UPDATE_CTR_BUF(cipher, 1);
}
UPDATE_CTR_BUF(cipher, 0);
_aes_fill_buf(cipher);
}
}
/** Reset the 128-bit counter of <b>cipher</b> to the 16-bit big-endian value
* in <b>iv</b>. */
void
......
......@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void aes_free_cipher(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher);
void aes_set_key(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *key, int key_bits);
void aes_crypt(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *input, size_t len,
char *output);
void aes_crypt_inplace(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, char *data, size_t len);
void aes_set_iv(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *iv);
#endif
......
......@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ crypto_free_cipher_env(crypto_cipher_env_t *env)
tor_assert(env->cipher);
aes_free_cipher(env->cipher);
memset(env, 0, sizeof(crypto_cipher_env_t));
tor_free(env);
}
......@@ -775,10 +776,13 @@ int
crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(crypto_pk_env_t *env, char *to,
const char *from, size_t fromlen)
{
int r;
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
if (crypto_digest(digest,from,fromlen)<0)
return -1;
return crypto_pk_private_sign(env,to,digest,DIGEST_LEN);
r = crypto_pk_private_sign(env,to,digest,DIGEST_LEN);
memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
return r;
}
/** Perform a hybrid (public/secret) encryption on <b>fromlen</b>
......@@ -1156,6 +1160,16 @@ crypto_cipher_decrypt(crypto_cipher_env_t *env, char *to,
return 0;
}
/** Encrypt <b>len</b> bytes on <b>from</b> using the cipher in <b>env</b>;
* on success, return 0. On failure, return -1.
*/
int
crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(crypto_cipher_env_t *env, char *buf, size_t len)
{
aes_crypt_inplace(env->cipher, buf, len);
return 0;
}
/** Encrypt <b>fromlen</b> bytes (at least 1) from <b>from</b> with the key in
* <b>cipher</b> to the buffer in <b>to</b> of length
* <b>tolen</b>. <b>tolen</b> must be at least <b>fromlen</b> plus
......@@ -1250,6 +1264,7 @@ crypto_new_digest_env(void)
void
crypto_free_digest_env(crypto_digest_env_t *digest)
{
memset(digest, 0, sizeof(crypto_digest_env_t));
tor_free(digest);
}
......@@ -1286,6 +1301,7 @@ crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_env_t *digest,
memcpy(&tmpctx, &digest->d, sizeof(SHA_CTX));
SHA1_Final(r, &tmpctx);
memcpy(out, r, out_len);
memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
}
/** Allocate and return a new digest object with the same state as
......@@ -1588,11 +1604,13 @@ crypto_expand_key_material(const char *key_in, size_t key_in_len,
}
memset(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1);
tor_free(tmp);
memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
return 0;
err:
memset(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1);
tor_free(tmp);
memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
return -1;
}
......@@ -1668,6 +1686,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(void)
return rand_poll_status ? 0 : -1;
}
RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
return 0;
#else
for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) {
......@@ -1682,6 +1701,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(void)
return -1;
}
RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
return 0;
}
......@@ -1863,7 +1883,6 @@ base64_decode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen)
ret += len;
return ret;
#else
#define ACC32
const char *eos = src+srclen;
uint32_t n=0;
int n_idx=0;
......@@ -2056,6 +2075,7 @@ base32_decode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen)
}
}
memset(tmp, 0, srclen);
tor_free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
return 0;
......@@ -2099,6 +2119,7 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret,
}
}
crypto_digest_get_digest(d, key_out, key_out_len);
memset(tmp, 0, 8+secret_len);
tor_free(tmp);
crypto_free_digest_env(d);
}
......
......@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ int crypto_cipher_encrypt(crypto_cipher_env_t *env, char *to,
const char *from, size_t fromlen);
int crypto_cipher_decrypt(crypto_cipher_env_t *env, char *to,
const char *from, size_t fromlen);
int crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(crypto_cipher_env_t *env, char *d, size_t len);
int crypto_cipher_encrypt_with_iv(crypto_cipher_env_t *env,
char *to, size_t tolen,
......
......@@ -378,10 +378,12 @@ static void
circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
{
void *mem;
size_t memlen;
tor_assert(circ);
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(origin_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->build_state) {
if (ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit)
......@@ -398,6 +400,7 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
} else {
or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(or_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->p_crypto)
......@@ -432,7 +435,7 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells);
memset(circ, 0xAA, sizeof(circuit_t)); /* poison memory */
memset(circ, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */
tor_free(mem);
}
......@@ -499,7 +502,7 @@ circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim)
if (victim->extend_info)
extend_info_free(victim->extend_info);
victim->magic = 0xDEADBEEFu;
memset(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */
tor_free(victim);
}
......
......@@ -266,27 +266,33 @@ static void
_connection_free(connection_t *conn)
{
void *mem;
size_t memlen;
switch (conn->type) {
case CONN_TYPE_OR:
tor_assert(conn->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
mem = TO_OR_CONN(conn);
memlen = sizeof(or_connection_t);
break;
case CONN_TYPE_AP:
case CONN_TYPE_EXIT:
tor_assert(conn->magic == EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
mem = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
memlen = sizeof(edge_connection_t);
break;
case CONN_TYPE_DIR:
tor_assert(conn->magic == DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
mem = TO_DIR_CONN(conn);
memlen = sizeof(dir_connection_t);
break;
case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL:
tor_assert(conn->magic == CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
mem = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn);
memlen = sizeof(control_connection_t);
break;
default:
tor_assert(conn->magic == BASE_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
mem = conn;
memlen = sizeof(connection_t);
break;
}
......@@ -331,6 +337,7 @@ _connection_free(connection_t *conn)
if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) {
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
tor_free(edge_conn->chosen_exit_name);
memset(edge_conn->socks_request, 0xcc, sizeof(socks_request_t));
tor_free(edge_conn->socks_request);
}
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) {
......@@ -365,7 +372,7 @@ _connection_free(connection_t *conn)
connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(TO_OR_CONN(conn));
}
memset(conn, 0xAA, sizeof(connection_t)); /* poison memory */
memset(conn, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */
tor_free(mem);
}
......
......@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_env_t *dest_router_key,
crypto_dh_env_t **handshake_state_out,
char *onion_skin_out) /* ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */
{
char *challenge = NULL;
char challenge[DH_KEY_LEN];
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
int dhbytes, pkbytes;
......@@ -183,7 +183,6 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_env_t *dest_router_key,
pkbytes = crypto_pk_keysize(dest_router_key);
tor_assert(dhbytes == 128);
tor_assert(pkbytes == 128);
challenge = tor_malloc_zero(DH_KEY_LEN);
if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, challenge, dhbytes))
goto err;
......@@ -211,12 +210,12 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_env_t *dest_router_key,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0)
goto err;
tor_free(challenge);
memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
*handshake_state_out = dh;
return 0;
err:
tor_free(challenge);
memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
return -1;
}
......@@ -238,6 +237,7 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
int len;
char *key_material=NULL;
size_t key_material_len=0;
int i;
crypto_pk_env_t *k;
......@@ -277,9 +277,10 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/
puts("");
#endif
key_material = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len);
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, challenge, DH_KEY_LEN,
key_material, DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len);
key_material, key_material_len);
if (len < 0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_compute_secret failed.");
goto err;
......@@ -300,11 +301,17 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/
puts("");
#endif
memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
tor_free(key_material);
crypto_dh_free(dh);
return 0;
err:
tor_free(key_material);
memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
if (key_material) {
memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
tor_free(key_material);
}
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
return -1;
......@@ -327,6 +334,7 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
{
int len;
char *key_material=NULL;
size_t key_material_len;
tor_assert(crypto_dh_get_bytes(handshake_state) == DH_KEY_LEN);
#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
......@@ -337,13 +345,14 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
puts("");
#endif
key_material = tor_malloc(20+key_out_len);
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN + key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(handshake_state, handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN,
key_material, 20+key_out_len);
key_material, key_material_len);
if (len < 0)
goto err;
if (memcmp(key_material, handshake_reply+DH_KEY_LEN, 20)) {
if (memcmp(key_material, handshake_reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* H(K) does *not* match. Something fishy. */
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Digest DOES NOT MATCH on onion handshake. "
"Bug or attack.");
......@@ -351,7 +360,7 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
}
/* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */
memcpy(key_out, key_material+20, key_out_len);
memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
printf("Client: keys out:");
......@@ -359,9 +368,11 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
puts("");
#endif
memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
tor_free(key_material);
return 0;
err:
memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len);
tor_free(key_material);
return -1;
}
......@@ -380,8 +391,9 @@ fast_server_handshake(const char *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
size_t key_out_len)
{
char tmp[DIGEST_LEN+DIGEST_LEN];
char *out;
char *out = NULL;
size_t out_len;
int r = -1;
if (crypto_rand(handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN)<0)
return -1;
......@@ -391,15 +403,16 @@ fast_server_handshake(const char *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
out_len = key_out_len+DIGEST_LEN;
out = tor_malloc(out_len);
if (crypto_expand_key_material(tmp, sizeof(tmp), out, out_len)) {
tor_free(out);
return -1;
goto done;
}
memcpy(handshake_reply_out+DIGEST_LEN, out, DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(key_out, out+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
r = 0;
done:
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
memset(out, 0, out_len);
tor_free(out);
return 0;
return r;
}
/** Implement the second half of the client side of the CREATE_FAST handshake.
......@@ -423,27 +436,28 @@ fast_client_handshake(const char *handshake_state, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
char tmp[DIGEST_LEN+DIGEST_LEN];
char *out;
size_t out_len;
int r;
memcpy(tmp, handshake_state, DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(tmp+DIGEST_LEN, handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN);
out_len = key_out_len+DIGEST_LEN;
out = tor_malloc(out_len);
if (crypto_expand_key_material(tmp, sizeof(tmp), out, out_len)) {
tor_free(out);
return -1;
goto done;
}
if (memcmp(out, handshake_reply_out+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* H(K) does *not* match. Something fishy. */
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Digest DOES NOT MATCH on fast handshake. "
"Bug or attack.");
tor_free(out);
return -1;
goto done;
}
memcpy(key_out, out+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
r = 0;
done:
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
memset(out, 0, out_len);
tor_free(out);
return 0;
return r;
}
/** Remove all circuits from the pending list. Called from tor_free_all. */
......
......@@ -117,19 +117,14 @@ static int
relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_env_t *cipher, char *in,
int encrypt_mode)
{
char out[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; /* 'in' must be this size too */
int r;
if (encrypt_mode)
r = crypto_cipher_encrypt(cipher, out, in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
else
r = crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, out, in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
(void)encrypt_mode;
r = crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
if (r) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error during relay encryption");
return -1;
}
memcpy(in,out,CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
return 0;
}
......
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