The Tor Project issues
https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/issues
2022-10-20T21:12:38Z
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/443
Reconfiguration, particularly socks and dns ports
2022-10-20T21:12:38Z
Ian Jackson
iwj@torproject.org
Reconfiguration, particularly socks and dns ports
We should be able to add and remove socks and dns listeners. And the existing reconfiguration code's approach to error handling and reporting is not very principled.
!440 is a stab at this but is currently postponed.
We should be able to add and remove socks and dns listeners. And the existing reconfiguration code's approach to error handling and reporting is not very principled.
!440 is a stab at this but is currently postponed.
Arti 1.0.0: Ready for production use
Ian Jackson
iwj@torproject.org
Ian Jackson
iwj@torproject.org
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/rdsys/-/issues/106
Bridges sharing the same IP should have the same bridge distribution method
2024-03-04T15:23:30Z
Gus
Bridges sharing the same IP should have the same bridge distribution method
In the last 'Run a bridge' campaign, Meskio and arma pointed out that having bridges sharing the same IP but using different ports would increase the probability of a censor to discover and block the bridge IP. As the censors are most li...
In the last 'Run a bridge' campaign, Meskio and arma pointed out that having bridges sharing the same IP but using different ports would increase the probability of a censor to discover and block the bridge IP. As the censors are most likely blocking bridges by IP and not IP:Port, bridgeDB/rdsys should attribute the same bridge distribution method for bridges with the same IP.
Example: [these new bridges](https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/sochaczewski) are sharing the same IP but were automatically attributed two different distribution methods (settings, moat).
Sponsor 96: Rapid Expansion of Access to the Uncensored Internet through Tor in China, Hong Kong, & Tibet
meskio
meskio@torproject.org
meskio
meskio@torproject.org
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/onion-services/onion-support/-/issues/71
Module to spread the use of Onion-Location header
2022-04-07T22:20:08Z
Silvio Rhatto
Module to spread the use of Onion-Location header
Is there a way to make easy the setting up of the [Onion-Location header](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/)?
Right now it's just a single line of code to be added either in the webserver/proxy or ...
Is there a way to make easy the setting up of the [Onion-Location header](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/)?
Right now it's just a single line of code to be added either in the webserver/proxy or in the website HTML, but could it be done easier?
Could a tool be built to make this task even simpler?
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/onion-services/onion-support/-/issues/69
Tool to manage Onion Service auth keys
2023-10-20T16:17:37Z
Silvio Rhatto
Tool to manage Onion Service auth keys
Module to create Onion Services authorization keys, given that [the current instructions](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/client-auth/) are not very handy to follow. Some tool/library could automate this manageme...
Module to create Onion Services authorization keys, given that [the current instructions](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/client-auth/) are not very handy to follow. Some tool/library could automate this management in the server side.
Thanks @gus for the idea :-)
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor-ci-reproducible/-/issues/6
GPG_CMD env variable
2022-11-14T17:56:49Z
David Goulet
dgoulet@torproject.org
GPG_CMD env variable
For the Qubes user out there, they use a wrapper around GPG so we need a variable that allows the user to point on where is the GPG binary to use for signing.
For the Qubes user out there, they use a wrapper around GPG so we need a variable that allows the user to point on where is the GPG binary to use for signing.
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor-ci-reproducible/-/issues/5
Wipe build/ before starting script
2022-11-14T17:56:43Z
David Goulet
dgoulet@torproject.org
Wipe build/ before starting script
We need to wipe `build/` in the `build.sh` script before starting else when it lingers, we get bad results.
We need to wipe `build/` in the `build.sh` script before starting else when it lingers, we get bad results.
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/support/-/issues/40068
[Ukraine] Tor usage in Ukraine during the invasion
2022-10-26T20:48:19Z
Gus
[Ukraine] Tor usage in Ukraine during the invasion
There is an interesting spike on Tor usage in Ukraine - https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2022-01-04&end=2022-04-04&country=ua&events=off
People have different opinions about what happened. Feel free to s...
There is an interesting spike on Tor usage in Ukraine - https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2022-01-04&end=2022-04-04&country=ua&events=off
People have different opinions about what happened. Feel free to share your hypothesis here.
![userstats-relay-country-ua-2022-01-04-2022-04-04-off](/uploads/bc770209f0a2907668fd3857b851bce7/userstats-relay-country-ua-2022-01-04-2022-04-04-off.png)
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/423
Design & specify handling UDP traffic from the VPN interface into Tor
2022-03-29T00:51:43Z
Gaba
gaba@torproject.org
Design & specify handling UDP traffic from the VPN interface into Tor
Design & specify handling UDP traffic from the VPN interface into Tor; perform connection mapping on incoming UDP traffic into Tor circuits.
Design & specify handling UDP traffic from the VPN interface into Tor; perform connection mapping on incoming UDP traffic into Tor circuits.
Sponsor 101 - Tor VPN Client for Android
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/40467
Remove build-sunet-a from tools/ansible
2022-07-21T07:31:11Z
boklm
Remove build-sunet-a from tools/ansible
In `tools/ansible` we have some ansible scripts we used to setup build-sunet-a. We can remove them as this host will be retired (tpo/tpa/team#40691).
In `tools/ansible` we have some ansible scripts we used to setup build-sunet-a. We can remove them as this host will be retired (tpo/tpa/team#40691).
boklm
boklm
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake-webext/-/issues/42
"Snowflake is off. Could not connect to the bridge."
2022-07-09T04:32:31Z
Roger Dingledine
"Snowflake is off. Could not connect to the bridge."
I checked my Snowflake proxy in my Firefox, and it told me "Snowflake is off. Could not connect to the bridge." and gave me the option to retry.
I clicked retry, and it connected and seemed happy again.
Was it going to retry on its own...
I checked my Snowflake proxy in my Firefox, and it told me "Snowflake is off. Could not connect to the bridge." and gave me the option to retry.
I clicked retry, and it connected and seemed happy again.
Was it going to retry on its own at some point?
This is either a UX bug, "it should tell me it will retry so I don't get anxious that it's broken forever, and maybe the button should be called 'retry now'" or a more serious snowflake bug, "we have a bunch of snowflakes that gave up and we don't know about it". Hopefully the former. :)
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/gettor-project/OnionSproutsBot/-/issues/11
investigate using httpdirfs (mounting remote directories as read-only) instea...
2022-08-19T07:17:01Z
n0toose
investigate using httpdirfs (mounting remote directories as read-only) instead of requests
What if we used https://dist.torproject.org/ instead of fiddling around with the Tor-provided API endpoint for obtaining the download links to new releases and caching downloads temporarily on a local filesystem?
-> Original discussion:...
What if we used https://dist.torproject.org/ instead of fiddling around with the Tor-provided API endpoint for obtaining the download links to new releases and caching downloads temporarily on a local filesystem?
-> Original discussion: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/40683#note_2789962 (@lavamind)
- The interface of the bot is dynamically built on top of a response that the API has sent (`https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/release/downloads.json`) and is designed in a way so that it can instantly apply updates to available platforms and languages. There is a certain structure to the API itself, which abstracts the part where we have to sort of the binaries depending on the platform and the languages. It is possible to dig everything up from the directory listings directly, is it worth it?
- With the locale and the operating system provided, we obtain a download link that we use to define the name of the download file instead. Perhaps we could also use the said file name to dig it up from a read-only "mount" of dist.torproject.org while retaining most of the requests functionality. Otherwise, if we were to completely scrap the requests, we would have to determine all of the available locales and platforms by processing all of the file names (some of which differ slightly, see: spelling in the macOS and the Windows binaries). Won't it be more unstable like that?
I used the API instead of "guessing" the filenames (aka. presuming that the files will always have a specific naming convention attributed to them) and requesting them directly from dist.torproject.org, and using the directory directly makes me think that I would be making the same presumption, but apply it in a reverse manner.
httpdirfs seems like a fancy tool that I really want to use because it straight up looks cool and abstracts a lot of things that are unpleasant to deal with. Implementing it is a big effort, but it could be potentially useful. However, the question is whether there are any advantages to using it.
> For example, we could probably just read-only mount https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/
I am presuming that this is a remote directory and that there is no huge advantage to using it, performance-wise, other than an interface that is easy to manage. The question is, is it?
> It [httpdirfs] even supports caching downloaded files so if the file was retrieved previously, it doesn't have to fetch it from the remote filesystem again and again.
Files that were retrieved previously are already cached on Telegram's servers. This could be potentially useful for an E2EE implementation, that is *not planned*, but this is definitely not a concern right now. The files either have to have a local copy, or they do not. In this case, they do not. This means that the best strategy, especially under a storage constraint, is to get rid of them as soon as possible. If not, the more important question here is when and how can we get rid of them as soon as possible. Does httpdirfs provide any sort of fine-tuned control over that?
Related issue: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/gettor-project/onionsproutsbot/-/issues/5
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/408
CLI: unify, streamline, and refactor listener code
2022-12-18T21:03:06Z
Nick Mathewson
CLI: unify, streamline, and refactor listener code
Right now we have two kinds of listeners: DNS and SOCKS. We should consider simplifying the logic that creates them a lot.
Some goals are:
* [ ] Eliminate duplicate code.
* [ ] Allow multiple listener ports of the same type.
* [ ...
Right now we have two kinds of listeners: DNS and SOCKS. We should consider simplifying the logic that creates them a lot.
Some goals are:
* [ ] Eliminate duplicate code.
* [ ] Allow multiple listener ports of the same type.
* [ ] Allow listening on non-localhost addresses
* [ ] Fail with an error if the port binding fails for some reason other than "we don't support that address family."
Arti 1.0.0: Ready for production use
Ian Jackson
iwj@torproject.org
Ian Jackson
iwj@torproject.org
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/293
Making GitLab more searchable for Tor Log entries
2022-04-28T20:10:32Z
cypherpunks
Making GitLab more searchable for Tor Log entries
Comment on GitLab Layout:
Gitlab issues would be easier to search if the List overview contained a "symptom"-column or a search- & sort-able subtitle that matched the "symptom"s appearing in Tor Log since this is what people would copy/p...
Comment on GitLab Layout:
Gitlab issues would be easier to search if the List overview contained a "symptom"-column or a search- & sort-able subtitle that matched the "symptom"s appearing in Tor Log since this is what people would copy/paste from Tor Log and search for.
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-spec/-/issues/40026
FF99 Audit
2022-10-25T22:48:05Z
aguestuser
FF99 Audit
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java...
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java/Kotlin, and Javascript).
The output includes the entire patch where the new problematic code was introduced. Search for `XXX MATCH XXX` to find the next potential violation.
`code_audit.sh` contains the list of known problematic APIs. New usage of these functions are documented and analyzed in this audit.
## Firefox: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
- Start: `99300ebd4a4a6440b6a11a80108f1ed6d867cdb4` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_99_BASE` )
- End: `cd4dcd48476d8cb29f4770f6fb659e440ff84345` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_100_BASE` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
---
## Application Services: https://github.com/mozilla/application-services.git
- Start: `1fcdb5984be6e0cc460d00cde44c49b7e3ac1ec6` ( `v92.0.0` )
- End: `21f2904245a956366cae798e16035156c8232cad` ( `v93.0.2` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Android Components: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-components.git
- Start: `4154c161f0949fdf3e94780c8b5ac360722e909c` ( `v99.0.0` )
- End: `2cf4dbe50f6810d373aeb550e722fabfc6816f56` ( `v99.0.10` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Fenix: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix.git
- Start: `f4a5a4e471d17be791d73fddc63ebdfb734368e4` ( `v99.0.0-beta.1` )
- End: `2421d3731e49faf5e2b9d3d4aa41bdbf3e81459a` ( `releases_v99.0.0` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Ticket Review ##
### 99 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=99%20Branch&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1755354 @dan https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41138
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1637922 @richard https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41139
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1751366 @ma1 https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41140
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1675054 @dan https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41141
Nothing of interest (manual inspection)
**OR** (foreach)**
### foreach PROBLEMATIC_TICKET:
#### $(PROBLEMATIC_TICKET)
- Summary
- Review Result: (SAFE|BAD)
## Regression/Prior Vuln Review ##
Review proxy bypass bugs; check for new vectors to look for:
- https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/applications/-/issues?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&label_name[]=Proxy%20Bypass
- Look for new features like these. Especially external app launch vectors
## Export
- [ ] Export Report and save to `tor-browser-spec/audits`
Sponsor 131 - Phase 3 - Major ESR 102 Migration
richard
richard
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-spec/-/issues/40025
FF98 Audit
2022-10-24T20:33:26Z
aguestuser
FF98 Audit
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java...
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java/Kotlin, and Javascript).
The output includes the entire patch where the new problematic code was introduced. Search for `XXX MATCH XXX` to find the next potential violation.
`code_audit.sh` contains the list of known problematic APIs. New usage of these functions are documented and analyzed in this audit.
## Firefox: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
- Start: `82764d45153d175f4686ead7aac977810fe1fd1b` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_BASE` )
- End: `99300ebd4a4a6440b6a11a80108f1ed6d867cdb4` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_99_BASE` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
---
## Application Services: https://github.com/mozilla/application-services.git
- Start: `17942945873cdb8be56a9316d3cb8a611b3ef321` ( `v91.1.0` )
- End: `1fcdb5984be6e0cc460d00cde44c49b7e3ac1ec6` ( `v92.0.0` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Android Components: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-components.git
- Start: `6f6ed0ca80410e42e8781bcf856e686ecbff2f63` ( `v98.0.0` )
- End: `a31f2c481a7e220ca87affd8cd88fcb42b1624c1` ( `v98.0.13` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Fenix: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix.git
- Start: `6c290430adc9af36e5123a78360a602bb5509c6c` ( `v98.0.0-beta.1` )
- End: `0df2c648ab38682569e823b2140b945a0d7d6a9b` ( `releases_v98.0.0` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Ticket Review ##
### 98 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=98%20Branch&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1749501 : @ma1 https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41134
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1749323 : @dan https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41135
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1749635 : @pierov https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41136
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1751170 : @pierov https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41137
Nothing of interest (manual inspection)
**OR** (foreach)**
### foreach PROBLEMATIC_TICKET:
#### $(PROBLEMATIC_TICKET)
- Summary
- Review Result: (SAFE|BAD)
## Regression/Prior Vuln Review ##
Review proxy bypass bugs; check for new vectors to look for:
- https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/applications/-/issues?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&label_name[]=Proxy%20Bypass
- Look for new features like these. Especially external app launch vectors
## Export
- [ ] Export Report and save to `tor-browser-spec/audits`
Sponsor 131 - Phase 3 - Major ESR 102 Migration
richard
richard
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-spec/-/issues/40024
FF96 Audit
2022-10-24T20:28:29Z
aguestuser
FF96 Audit
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java...
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java/Kotlin, and Javascript).
The output includes the entire patch where the new problematic code was introduced. Search for `XXX MATCH XXX` to find the next potential violation.
`code_audit.sh` contains the list of known problematic APIs. New usage of these functions are documented and analyzed in this audit.
## Firefox: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
- Start: `6a277ae5bdf6554793cd0da292a9c9ea804b4ed9` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_96_BASE` )
- End: `e6b83e1727b7e9a6847e6e15bdb935d9937099e4` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_BASE` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
#### e88ab3dace9ad1c671c6c37a5aa1a3652e754544
- Some windows proxy stuff we need to check
- Review Result: (SAFE|BAD)
---
## Application Services: https://github.com/mozilla/application-services.git
- Start: `5ceeb43598871a7d8550acc574a6a3fb93803ad7` ( `v87.3.0` )
- End: `df53ad867be7d79899e05797533cd624f1eeb2a2` ( `v90.0.1` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Android Components: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-components.git
- Start: `ea5bd2687c9b64245ea8e3cdcb84faa5d87d540a` ( `v96.0.0` )
- End: `0178a6fde98fa8c76885d67a2362f2ca310b67fd` ( `v96.0.15` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
**OR**
## Fenix: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix.git
- Start: `a7afdb776ca202bf5eafc29d6a84f047c1609e0f` ( `v96.0.0-beta.1` )
- End: `abe11c163d14fab17bdcf8aebbef2de2a3360032` ( `releases_v96.0.0` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
**OR**
## Ticket Review ##
### Review List
#### 96 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=96%20Branch&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1740840 : @ma1 https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41129
### foreach PROBLEMATIC_TICKET:
#### $(PROBLEMATIC_TICKET)
- Summary
- Review Result: (SAFE|BAD)
## Regression/Prior Vuln Review ##
Review proxy bypass bugs; check for new vectors to look for:
- https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/applications/-/issues?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&label_name[]=Proxy%20Bypass
- Look for new features like these. Especially external app launch vectors
## Export
- [x] Export Report and save to `tor-browser-spec/audits`
Sponsor 131 - Phase 3 - Major ESR 102 Migration
richard
richard
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-spec/-/issues/40023
FF94 Audit
2022-10-12T20:13:07Z
aguestuser
FF94 Audit
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java...
# General
The audit begins at the commit hash where the previous audit ended. Use code_audit.sh for creating the diff and highlighting potentially problematic code. The audit is scoped to a specific language (currently C/C++, Rust, Java/Kotlin, and Javascript).
The output includes the entire patch where the new problematic code was introduced. Search for `XXX MATCH XXX` to find the next potential violation.
code_audit.sh contains the list of known problematic APIs. New usage of these functions are documented and analyzed in this audit.
## Firefox
### Repo: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
- Start: `5f4358c1c5bc2ca87d60eadebeab439562c90495` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_94_BASE` )
- End: `6c9b6e1483551f220cd409e4e584349bc74a8231` ( `FIREFOX_RELEASE_95_BASE` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
(mostly) only tests triggered matches or false positives
---
## Application Services
### Repo: https://github.com/mozilla/application-services.git
- Start: `b1f371719ca20db642b64a0e860b4ecb0aaf316f` ( v86.1.0 )
- End: `df1a47fde89f49201b1e839f960e8f16eb95a55d` ( v87.1.0 )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
## Android Components
### Repo: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-components.git
- Start: `fce7eb5cff2d56acd3195bf1d9a89386c63dc3d5` ( `v94.0.0` )
- End: `28c1b7db40105dcaea09caa0b5108554a83959cd` ( `v94.0.15` )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Fenix
### Repo: https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix.git
- Start: 54d80751bfc9a4aa4341e78221060940a36e3d17 ( v94.0.0-beta.1 )
- End: cb5708f88847601426833067f93d16d25d36451f ( v94.1.2 )
### Languages:
- [x] java
- [x] cpp
- [x] js
- [x] rust
Nothing of interest (using `code_audit.sh`)
## Ticket Review ##
### Review List
#### 94 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=94%20Branch&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1730418 : @ma1 https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41123
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1732388: @dan https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41124
## Regression/Prior Vuln Review ##
Review proxy bypass bugs; check for new vectors to look for:
- https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/applications/-/issues?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&label_name[]=Proxy%20Bypass
- Look for new features like these. Especially external app launch vectors
Sponsor 131 - Phase 3 - Major ESR 102 Migration
richard
richard
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/onion-services/oniongroove/-/issues/1
Oniongroove deployment research
2024-03-27T21:47:32Z
Silvio Rhatto
Oniongroove deployment research
Research on all relevant deployment technologies (DevOps) for Onion Services: build a first matrix of technologies, recipes and strategies, incorporating it into the specs (onion-support#40).
Research on all relevant deployment technologies (DevOps) for Onion Services: build a first matrix of technologies, recipes and strategies, incorporating it into the specs (onion-support#40).
Oniongroove 0.1.0
Silvio Rhatto
Silvio Rhatto
2024-05-16
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/onion-services/oniongroove/-/issues/2
Oniongroove threat model
2024-03-27T21:47:21Z
Silvio Rhatto
Oniongroove threat model
Write initial version of [Oniongroove](https://gitlab.torproject.org/rhatto/oniongroove) threat model, including:
* [ ] Consider the scenario where someone run more than a single Onionbalance
"frontend" with the same address but w...
Write initial version of [Oniongroove](https://gitlab.torproject.org/rhatto/oniongroove) threat model, including:
* [ ] Consider the scenario where someone run more than a single Onionbalance
"frontend" with the same address but with different backends and uploading
descriptors at different times. Would this:
* Impact the Tor network negativelly?
* Improve load balancing?
* Be an acceptable frontend failover?
Oniongroove 0.1.0
Silvio Rhatto
Silvio Rhatto
2024-05-16
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/gitlab/-/issues/120
some gitlab runner(s?) fail to contact docker and fail jobs intermittently
2023-08-09T13:40:41Z
anarcat
some gitlab runner(s?) fail to contact docker and fail jobs intermittently
sometimes jobs fail with:
```
ERROR: Job failed (system failure): Cannot connect to the Docker daemon at unix:///var/run/docker.sock. Is the docker daemon running? (docker.go:651:120s)
```
example failing job:
https://gitlab.torprojec...
sometimes jobs fail with:
```
ERROR: Job failed (system failure): Cannot connect to the Docker daemon at unix:///var/run/docker.sock. Is the docker daemon running? (docker.go:651:120s)
```
example failing job:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/nickm/arti/-/jobs/105400
another similar failure is:
```
ERROR: Preparation failed: adding cache volume: set volume permissions: create permission container for volume "runner-qlbl8xrr-project-647-concurrent-0-cache-3c3f060a0374fc8bc39395164f415a70": Cannot connect to the Docker daemon at unix:///var/run/docker.sock. Is the docker daemon running? (linux_set.go:95:120s)
```
because of the latter, we originally thought this was related with a permission change on `/var/lib/docker/volumes`, but the permissions on that were restored in `tor-puppet.git` in:
```
commit aa7afc51dfde1daa78f75c1f529a4dade6280567
Author: Antoine Beaupré <anarcat@debian.org>
Date: Mon Feb 28 10:31:52 2022 -0500
fix permissions on docker volumes
This commit created problems on runners:
commit a0c1db6df4b78a149b54b88621d03546143d2184
Author: Antoine Beaupré <anarcat@debian.org>
Date: Wed Feb 23 16:15:45 2022 -0500
fix permissions on docker volumes/images
This was seen on ci-runner-01:
Notice: /Stage[main]/Profile::Docker/File[/var/lib/docker/overlay2]/mode: mode changed '0710' to '0701'
... presumably that would happen any time puppet would run, fighting
with Docker.
It turns out this change was fine for `overlay2` but broke things when
volumes were used. An example failure is this error message:
ERROR: Preparation failed: adding cache volume: set volume permissions: create permission container for volume "runner-qlbl8xrr-project-950-concurrent-0-cache-3c3f060a0374fc8bc39395164f415a70": Cannot connect to the Docker daemon at unix:///var/run/docker.sock. Is the docker daemon running? (linux_set.go:95:120s)
in this job:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/doc/-/jobs/105169
That didn't happen in *all* jobs. That's possibly because some jobs
run as root? Unclear. In any case, those are the permissions on a
non-managed install (my workstation) so they should work better.
diff --git a/modules/profile/manifests/docker.pp b/modules/profile/manifests/docker.pp
index f3b8296e..14190450 100644
--- a/modules/profile/manifests/docker.pp
+++ b/modules/profile/manifests/docker.pp
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ class profile::docker(
}
file { '/var/lib/docker/volumes':
ensure => directory,
- mode => '0710',
+ mode => '0701',
require => Package['docker.io'],
}
file { '/var/lib/docker/overlay2':
```
yet that didn't fix the issue, because the above two jobs failed *after* the above commit was deployed.
upstream has had an issue opened about this for 4 years, but it has seen some recent activity, so this could be a regression upstream:
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-runner/-/issues/2890
it's intermittent, and we don't have a clear root cause or plan of action. keeping this ticket open to track related incidents and keeping our users informed.
anarcat
anarcat