The Tor Project issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/issues2023-09-05T17:41:54Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40166Clarify that `http` can only be used for 127.0.0.1 for testing2023-09-05T17:41:54ZjugaClarify that `http` can only be used for 127.0.0.1 for testinghttps://tpo.pages.torproject.net/network-health/sbws/man_sbws.ini.html says that both `http` and `https` can be used, as pointed out by https://forum.torproject.org/t/destination-for-sbws-using-http/8692, but it doesn't clarify that it'l...https://tpo.pages.torproject.net/network-health/sbws/man_sbws.ini.html says that both `http` and `https` can be used, as pointed out by https://forum.torproject.org/t/destination-for-sbws-using-http/8692, but it doesn't clarify that it'll only accept `127.0.0.1` with `http`.jugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40844tor 0.4.8.4: two test failures on NetBSD2023-08-30T18:21:26Zwiztor 0.4.8.4: two test failures on NetBSDUpdating tor in pkgsrc to 0.4.8.4 I see two new test failures (compared to 0.4.6 which tested without any errors).
From the `test-suite.log`:
```
FAIL: src/test/test-slow
========================
slow/crypto/s2k_rfc2440: OK
slow/crypto/...Updating tor in pkgsrc to 0.4.8.4 I see two new test failures (compared to 0.4.6 which tested without any errors).
From the `test-suite.log`:
```
FAIL: src/test/test-slow
========================
slow/crypto/s2k_rfc2440: OK
slow/crypto/s2k_pbkdf2: OK
slow/crypto/s2k_rfc2440_general: OK
slow/crypto/s2k_rfc2440_legacy: OK
slow/crypto/s2k_errors: OK
slow/crypto/scrypt_vectors: SKIPPED
slow/crypto/pbkdf2_vectors: OK
slow/crypto/pwbox: OK
slow/crypto/fuzz_donna/ed25519_donna: [forking] OK
slow/crypto/fuzz_donna/ed25519_ref10: [forking] OK
slow/crypto/equix:
FAIL src/test/test_crypto_slow.c:684: assert(result OP_EQ EQUIX_OK): 5 vs 0
[equix FAILED]
slow/process/callbacks: OK
slow/process/callbacks_terminate: OK
slow/process/nonexistent_executable: OK
slow/hs_pow/vectors: OK
slow/prob_distr/stochastic_genpareto: [forking] OK
slow/prob_distr/stochastic_geometric: [forking] OK
slow/prob_distr/stochastic_uniform: [forking] OK
slow/prob_distr/stochastic_logistic: [forking] OK
slow/prob_distr/stochastic_log_logistic: [forking] OK
slow/prob_distr/stochastic_weibull: [forking] OK
slow/ptr/int_voidstar_interop: OK
slow/ptr/uint_voidstar_interop: OK
1/22 TESTS FAILED. (1 skipped)
FAIL src/test/test-slow (exit status: 1)
```
and
```
FAIL: src/test/unittest_part3.sh
================================
...
crypto/validation/ed25519_donna: OK
crypto/validation/ed25519_ref10: OK
crypto/ed25519_storage: OK
crypto/siphash: OK
crypto/blake2b: OK
crypto/hashx:
FAIL src/test/test_crypto.c:3017: assert(retval OP_EQ HASHX_OK): 4 vs 0
[hashx FAILED]
crypto/failure_modes: [forking] OK
crypto/ope/consistency: OK
crypto/ope/oob: OK
crypto/ope/vectors: OK
crypto/openssl/rng_engine: [forking] OK
crypto/openssl/base64_encode_match: [forking] OK
crypto/pem/encode: OK
crypto/pem/decode: OK
crypto/pem/decode_crlf: OK
...
```Micah Elizabeth ScottMicah Elizabeth Scotthttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40843tor 0.4.8.4: compilation error on NetBSD2023-08-30T18:21:26Zwiztor 0.4.8.4: compilation error on NetBSDI tried updating the pkgsrc package from the 0.4.7 branch to 0.4.8.4, but got an error:
```
--- src/ext/equix/hashx/src/libhashx_a-virtual_memory.o ---
src/ext/equix/hashx/src/virtual_memory.c: In function 'hashx_vm_alloc_huge':
src/ext/...I tried updating the pkgsrc package from the 0.4.7 branch to 0.4.8.4, but got an error:
```
--- src/ext/equix/hashx/src/libhashx_a-virtual_memory.o ---
src/ext/equix/hashx/src/virtual_memory.c: In function 'hashx_vm_alloc_huge':
src/ext/equix/hashx/src/virtual_memory.c:113:5: error: 'MAP_HUGETLB' undeclared (first use in this function)
113 | | MAP_HUGETLB | MAP_POPULATE, -1, 0);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
src/ext/equix/hashx/src/virtual_memory.c:113:5: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
src/ext/equix/hashx/src/virtual_memory.c:113:19: error: 'MAP_POPULATE' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'MAP_PRIVATE'?
113 | | MAP_HUGETLB | MAP_POPULATE, -1, 0);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
| MAP_PRIVATE
```
These defines do not exist on NetBSD (and I suspect on other BSDs neither, e.g. FreeBSD doesn't mention it in https://man.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=mmap&apropos=0&sektion=0&manpath=FreeBSD+13.2-RELEASE+and+Ports&arch=default&format=html).
Please make the code conditional on these defines existing.Micah Elizabeth ScottMicah Elizabeth Scotthttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40842Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_f...2023-12-06T16:54:59ZPeter GerberNon-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565### Summary
Since I upgraded to 0.4.8.4 (from 0.4.8.3-rc) I've been seeing the following error:
```
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0)...### Summary
Since I upgraded to 0.4.8.4 (from 0.4.8.3-rc) I've been seeing the following error:
```
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19cb16) [0x5853d2ba0b16] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19d004) [0x5853d2ba1004] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19cb16) [0x5853d2ba0b16] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19d004) [0x5853d2ba1004] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x578c64619d97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x578c64624ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x578c646b666e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x578c646bc08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x578c645c4bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x578c645c6bd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x578c646d31f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19cb16) [0x578c646cbb16] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x578c6459f359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x708318e9e585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x708318e9ec1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x578c645a0661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x578c6459bf95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x578c64598319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x578c64597ed9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x70831858a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x70831858a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x578c64597f21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x578c64619d97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x578c64624ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x578c646b666e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x578c646bc08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x578c645c4bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x578c645c6bd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x578c646d31f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19d004) [0x578c646cc004] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x578c6459f359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x708318e9e585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x708318e9ec1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x578c645a0661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x578c6459bf95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x578c64598319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x578c64597ed9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x70831858a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x70831858a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x578c64597f21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
```
### Environment
- Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302
- Debian 12 "bookworm"
- Compiled from sourceTor: 0.4.8.x-post-stableMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42047Remove layout hacks from tor browser preferences2023-10-03T13:27:46ZhenryRemove layout hacks from tor browser preferencesWe have some sizing hacks from https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41044 which we can clean up.We have some sizing hacks from https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41044 which we can clean up.henryhenryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42046Remove XUL layout hacks from base browser2023-10-03T15:37:58ZhenryRemove XUL layout hacks from base browserIn relation to https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41812, we want to remove some known XUL layout hacks that are no longer needed in base browser.In relation to https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/41812, we want to remove some known XUL layout hacks that are no longer needed in base browser.henryhenryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionperf/-/issues/40069Plan for conflux onionperfs2023-10-31T17:12:27ZMike PerryPlan for conflux onionperfsNow that 0.4.8 is stable, we should figure out a way to switch to it, and what to do about existing onionperfs.
I think the plan that makes the most sense is:
1. Deprecate the op-*6a instances
2. Remove the NL instance
3. Run two sets o...Now that 0.4.8 is stable, we should figure out a way to switch to it, and what to do about existing onionperfs.
I think the plan that makes the most sense is:
1. Deprecate the op-*6a instances
2. Remove the NL instance
3. Run two sets of 0.4.8 Tor for HK, DE, and US. One with `ConfluxEnabled 0` one as-is.
The `ConfluxEnabled 0` runners will only use congestion control, and be used for https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/313 data.
The other runners will be Conflux.
This leaves us with the same number of onionperfs, all running the same version. We should name them more clearly:
* op-de-cc
* op-de-cfx
* op-hk-cc
* op-hk-cfx
* op-us-cc
* op-us-cfx
How does this sound?HiroHirohttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42045Circuit panel overflows with long ipv6 addresses2023-10-03T13:27:48ZhenryCircuit panel overflows with long ipv6 addresseswith esr115, some ip addresses in the circuit panel now overflow the panel width, without growing the panel as expected.
This is a regression from moving to esr115 since the moz-box layout now uses the flex layout.with esr115, some ip addresses in the circuit panel now overflow the panel width, without growing the panel as expected.
This is a regression from moving to esr115 since the moz-box layout now uses the flex layout.henryhenryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/tpo/-/issues/386Rewrite rules for YEC 20232023-10-16T14:06:36Zal smithRewrite rules for YEC 2023We need to re-implement these rewrite rules we used last year for the YEC. You can see all of the rewrite rules we used here: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/tpo/-/blob/main/assets/.htaccess#L113.
Purpose: knowing where people are...We need to re-implement these rewrite rules we used last year for the YEC. You can see all of the rewrite rules we used here: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/tpo/-/blob/main/assets/.htaccess#L113.
Purpose: knowing where people are coming from when they click on donate.torproject.org helps us understand which tactics are successful.Year End Campaign 20232023-09-30https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/tor-weather/-/issues/74Dependency Dashboard2023-09-13T08:25:07ZRenovate BotDependency DashboardThis issue lists Renovate updates and detected dependencies. Read the [Dependency Dashboard](https://docs.renovatebot.com/key-concepts/dashboard/) docs to learn more.
## Open
These updates have all been created already. Click a checkbo...This issue lists Renovate updates and detected dependencies. Read the [Dependency Dashboard](https://docs.renovatebot.com/key-concepts/dashboard/) docs to learn more.
## Open
These updates have all been created already. Click a checkbox below to force a retry/rebase of any.
- [x] <!-- rebase-branch=renovate/djlint-1.x-lockfile -->[chore(deps): update dependency djlint to v1.32.1](!103)
## Detected dependencies
<details><summary>gitlabci</summary>
<blockquote>
<details><summary>.gitlab-ci.yml</summary>
</details>
</blockquote>
</details>
<details><summary>poetry</summary>
<blockquote>
<details><summary>pyproject.toml</summary>
- `python-dotenv *`
- `requests *`
- `psycopg2-binary *`
- `flask-assets *`
- `glob2 *`
- `pyscss *`
- `pyjwt *`
- `bcrypt *`
- `cryptography *`
- `flask *`
- `flask-restx *`
- `werkzeug *`
- `flask-sqlalchemy *`
- `flask-login *`
- `flask-migrate ^4.0.4`
- `black *`
- `flake8 *`
- `mypy *`
- `pytest *`
- `pytest-cov *`
- `isort *`
- `bandit *`
- `djlint *`
</details>
</blockquote>
</details>Renovate BotRenovate Bothttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/ux/design/-/issues/60Update switch style in the design system2023-08-25T13:16:55ZJag TalonUpdate switch style in the design system- [Current design components](https://www.figma.com/file/RtZ0fqkNMRc7GOjK3FLclz/Tor-Browser-for-Desktop?type=design&node-id=0-1&mode=design)
- New Firefox switch: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/merge_request...- [Current design components](https://www.figma.com/file/RtZ0fqkNMRc7GOjK3FLclz/Tor-Browser-for-Desktop?type=design&node-id=0-1&mode=design)
- New Firefox switch: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/merge_requests/741#note_2935059Jag TalonJag Talonhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40841conflux_validate_legs(): Bug: Number of legs is above maximum of 2 allowed: 3...2023-08-30T18:21:26ZMike Perryconflux_validate_legs(): Bug: Number of legs is above maximum of 2 allowed: 3#012 (on Tor 0.4.8.3-rc-dev )A cypherpunks user reported some logspam due to this BUG check as a random comment in https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40834#note_2935264. Initially, this looks like a rogue Tor client hitting this check. This has neve...A cypherpunks user reported some logspam due to this BUG check as a random comment in https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40834#note_2935264. Initially, this looks like a rogue Tor client hitting this check. This has never happened in a Shadow run.
This is harmless, but noisy. It is also at warn and not protocol warn.
We could remove the BUG() and demote to ProtocolWarn, but should have a look through the client codepaths for cases that could somehow spawn 3 legs instead of 2, just in case.Tor: 0.4.8.x-stableMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/41305renew harica TLS domains2023-08-30T17:36:25Zanarcatrenew harica TLS domainswe have been warned about the upcoming expiry of this domain:
DN: CN=yoaenchicimox2qdc47p36zm3cuclq7s7qxx6kvxqaxjodigfifljqqd.onion Serial: 74E8331B8C649B33777B816FD876553A
it expires on september 6th.
let's see if i can follow th...we have been warned about the upcoming expiry of this domain:
DN: CN=yoaenchicimox2qdc47p36zm3cuclq7s7qxx6kvxqaxjodigfifljqqd.onion Serial: 74E8331B8C649B33777B816FD876553A
it expires on september 6th.
let's see if i can follow the renewal procedure successfully. ideally, we'd automate this a little more...Jérôme Charaouilavamind@torproject.orgJérôme Charaouilavamind@torproject.org2023-09-06https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/325Set guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use=22023-10-19T17:02:35ZMike PerrySet guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use=2As per Prop#344 Section 1.3.1 (https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/main/proposals/344-protocol-info-leaks.txt#L657), the use of 3 directory guards is a highly unique fingerprint that can be used to track Tor users as th...As per Prop#344 Section 1.3.1 (https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/main/proposals/344-protocol-info-leaks.txt#L657), the use of 3 directory guards is a highly unique fingerprint that can be used to track Tor users as they move from network to network.
Lowering this param to 2 improves the situation somewhat.Georg KoppenGeorg Koppenhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/41304install new servers: tb-build-02 and tb-build-032023-10-23T14:46:11Zanarcatinstall new servers: tb-build-02 and tb-build-03to resolve disk space issues with tb-build-04 and -05 (#40964), configure two new machines in the gnt-dal cluster.
- [x] OOB access
- [x] network configuration (had to swap ports 3 and 4 on both hosts)
- [x] BIOS configuration
- [x] t...to resolve disk space issues with tb-build-04 and -05 (#40964), configure two new machines in the gnt-dal cluster.
- [x] OOB access
- [x] network configuration (had to swap ports 3 and 4 on both hosts)
- [x] BIOS configuration
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] IPMI password reset
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] grml boot
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] add to inventory
- [x] burn-in
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] basic Debian install
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] mandos
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] /srv RAID array
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] hand-off to team
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03(next) cluster scalinganarcatanarcat2023-09-06https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/323Fix gitweb links in stem and do a 1.8.3 point release2024-03-11T12:14:54ZGeorg KoppenFix gitweb links in stem and do a 1.8.3 point release@atagar notified me that DocTor and other tools rely on `stem`'s `Directory.from_remote()` which relies on Gitweb which goes away [soon-ish](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/41180).
It seems the issue got filed on [Gi...@atagar notified me that DocTor and other tools rely on `stem`'s `Directory.from_remote()` which relies on Gitweb which goes away [soon-ish](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/41180).
It seems the issue got filed on [Github](https://github.com/torproject/stem/issues/134) as well and `master` already has a fix we could backport. (yay!)
Maybe, picking `f07b581a4aadb9858156f0e8fc96762d79760331` is worth it, too, while we are at it, not sure.jugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40839MetricsPort Counter for "Bug" Events2024-03-26T07:07:34Zapplied_privacyMetricsPort Counter for "Bug" Events### Summary
Allow relay operators to monitor bug events via a MetricsPort counter
### What is the expected behavior?
Every time tor writes a block of "Bug: ..." log lines the counter should increase by 1.
This will allow us to monito...### Summary
Allow relay operators to monitor bug events via a MetricsPort counter
### What is the expected behavior?
Every time tor writes a block of "Bug: ..." log lines the counter should increase by 1.
This will allow us to monitor for such events using prometheus/alertmanager and report such events earlier.trinity-1686atrinity-1686ahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42038TBA Alpha - inscriptions Tor Browser Alpha and FireFox Browser simultaneously...2023-10-03T13:27:51ZninaTBA Alpha - inscriptions Tor Browser Alpha and FireFox Browser simultaneously on the start screen![tbabug](/uploads/324fb20033428c231b06a91304567511/tbabug.jpeg)
Reported by the user and was reproduced on my device![tbabug](/uploads/324fb20033428c231b06a91304567511/tbabug.jpeg)
Reported by the user and was reproduced on my deviceDan BallardDan Ballardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42037Disable about:firefoxview2023-10-03T15:37:48ZrichardDisable about:firefoxview@cypherpunks1 disabled the button from appearing in the toolbar, but we should also completely remove the about:firefoxview page in `base-browser`@cypherpunks1 disabled the button from appearing in the toolbar, but we should also completely remove the about:firefoxview page in `base-browser`richardrichardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40165TOR-028 pen-project#28: sbws - HTTPS Downgrade Attack via HTTP redirects2023-10-19T15:42:58ZjugaTOR-028 pen-project#28: sbws - HTTPS Downgrade Attack via HTTP redirectsTechnical Description
The sbws scanner command builds circuits and measures relays' bandwidth by downloading/uploading data from destination entries in the config. However, multiple destinations can be defined, including services offeri...Technical Description
The sbws scanner command builds circuits and measures relays' bandwidth by downloading/uploading data from destination entries in the config. However, multiple destinations can be defined, including services offering download files. To perform a measurement, the function `timed_recv_from_server` is used to download a file from a destination and to track the elapsed time. The corresponding HTTP client was previously created using the `make_session` function and utilizes the `requests` library. However, this library follows HTTP redirects by default, which allows a malicious destination to redirect the client to another host and downgrade from HTTPS to HTTP.
For example, an attacker could downgrade another destination from HTTPS to HTTP while measuring the malicious destination. Each connection passes through Tor, allowing malicious exit-node operators to perform a man-in-the-middle attack between the exit node and the redirected destination because of the downgrade. This is especially critical if, for example, API tokens or other secret HTTP request headers are configured only for specific destinations. In the worst case, this can lead to leaked secrets and thus form the basis for further attacks.
**tpo/network-health/sbws/core/scanner.py**
```python
def timed_recv_from_server(session, dest, byte_range):
start_time = time.monotonic()
HTTP_GET_HEADERS["Range"] = byte_range
try:
session.get(dest.url, headers=HTTP_GET_HEADERS, verify=dest.verify)
```
**tpo/network-health/sbws/util/requests.py**
```python
class TimedSession(requests.Session):
def get(self, url, **kwargs):
return super().get(
url, timeout=getattr(self, "_timeout", None, ), **kwargs
)
def make_session(controller, timeout):
s = TimedSession()
socks_info = stem_utils.get_socks_info(controller)
s.proxies = {
"http": "socks5h://{}:{}".format(*socks_info),
"https": "socks5h://{}:{}".format(*socks_info),
}
s._timeout = timeout
s.headers = settings.HTTP_HEADERS
return s
```
Impact
Attackers controlling a destination could perform an HTTPS downgrade attack on HTTP, potentially allowing malicious exit nodes (the attacker) to leak secret tokens configured only for specific destinations. However, when writing this report, all destinations are treated equally, not giving attackers a significant advantage. But this may change in the future as this project evolves.
Recommendation
It is recommended to follow redirects only if desired and to ignore a redirect from HTTPS to HTTP.
Type
CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')jugajuga2023-09-21