The Tor Project issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/issues2023-11-02T18:19:51Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40185New release 1.8.12023-11-02T18:19:51ZjugaNew release 1.8.1sbws: 1.8.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40183Create new Debian release 1.9.02024-02-05T18:29:35ZjugaCreate new Debian release 1.9.0sbws: 1.9.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40182Create new release 1.9.02024-01-10T16:28:46ZjugaCreate new release 1.9.0sbws: 1.9.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40180Remove EOL Python 3.7 from CI2023-11-02T18:20:44ZjugaRemove EOL Python 3.7 from CIsbws: 1.8.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40179Bandwidth files in v3bw dir can't be read by a different user other than sbws...2023-11-13T15:35:49ZjugaBandwidth files in v3bw dir can't be read by a different user other than sbws userFiles inside `v3bw` have perimssions `600` and are owned by `sbws` user.
Directory `v3bw` have permissions `700` and is owned by `sbws` user.
The files in `v3bw` directory needs to be readable by either a `tor` or `rsync` users.
This is...Files inside `v3bw` have perimssions `600` and are owned by `sbws` user.
Directory `v3bw` have permissions `700` and is owned by `sbws` user.
The files in `v3bw` directory needs to be readable by either a `tor` or `rsync` users.
This issue was introduced by #40162 (pen-torproject#2)sbws: 1.8.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40178Check and document how to send email notifications when debian systemd timers...2024-02-05T18:28:27ZjugaCheck and document how to send email notifications when debian systemd timers failsbws: 1.9.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40871Tor incorrectly stores stats on incoming PT connections2023-12-10T21:38:18ZAlexander Færøyahf@torproject.orgTor incorrectly stores stats on incoming PT connections@trinity-1686a and @dcf discussed this issue on tor-dev@ in https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2023-October/014858.html
It seems like we have a bug after we updated our connectiong tracking code to track incoming connections...@trinity-1686a and @dcf discussed this issue on tor-dev@ in https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2023-October/014858.html
It seems like we have a bug after we updated our connectiong tracking code to track incoming connections earlier. We don't handle the transport name parameter of our eager call to `geoip_note_client_seen()`.
@trinity-1686a may potentially have a patch for this. I think it would be good if we could get some testing on this before we merge it.
Would you be up for running your Tor instance with a patch that potentially fixes this issue, @dcf ?Tor: 0.4.8.x-post-stabletrinity-1686atrinity-1686ahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/1053HsDesc revision counters need to survive restarts2023-11-16T21:07:21ZNick MathewsonHsDesc revision counters need to survive restartsRemembered this requirement while writing a changelog: we'll need to make sure that our revision counters are montonically increasing for any single `HsBlindId`, even if Arti restarts during the time period where that ID is active.
One ...Remembered this requirement while writing a changelog: we'll need to make sure that our revision counters are montonically increasing for any single `HsBlindId`, even if Arti restarts during the time period where that ID is active.
One solution here is to persist the IDs to disk. A _bad_ solution is to use the current time offset within the time period. A better solution (which C tor uses) is to use an order-preserving-encryption scheme to ensure that the revision counter increases deterministically every second, without actually leaking the view of current time.
See appendix F for more background here.
I can hack up the OPE scheme from C tor if we go that way.
cc @gabi-250Arti: Onion service supportgabi-250gabi-250https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40177Add KeyValue to the Bandwidth file with the name of the dirauth that is runni...2023-12-11T09:58:30ZjugaAdd KeyValue to the Bandwidth file with the name of the dirauth that is running the scannerThis is similar to tpo/network-health/onbasca#53. For tpo/network-health/team#313 and other past and current issues, it'd be great to be able to filter by dirauth. Currently, this can be done by looking at the `software_version`, `scanne...This is similar to tpo/network-health/onbasca#53. For tpo/network-health/team#313 and other past and current issues, it'd be great to be able to filter by dirauth. Currently, this can be done by looking at the `software_version`, `scanner_country` and `destinations_countries` KeyValues, but it's quite complicates as they change overtime and this is only registered at [Bandwidth authorities timeline wiki](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/bandwidth-authorities/-/wikis/bandwidth%20authorities%20timeline)sbws: 1.9.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40859Cleanup ci-driver.sh after 0.4.3 and 0.4.5 is a thing of the past2023-09-21T13:03:17ZAlexander Færøyahf@torproject.orgCleanup ci-driver.sh after 0.4.3 and 0.4.5 is a thing of the pastThis is a placeholder ticket for !586 which does some general clean-up of our CI driver script.This is a placeholder ticket for !586 which does some general clean-up of our CI driver script.Tor: 0.4.7.x-post-stableAlexander Færøyahf@torproject.orgAlexander Færøyahf@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/1033Preferred way to string-encode encode an address that could be a sockaddr_in,...2024-01-22T17:43:20ZNick MathewsonPreferred way to string-encode encode an address that could be a sockaddr_in, sockaddr_in6, or sockaddr_un for ProxyTargetFor hsproxy's `ProxyTarget`, we want a way to write al element in our configuration file that includes an encapsulation method (eg "direct"/"pnat" or "hsrproxy") and a target address (eg "/var/run/my_service/PORT" or "127.0.0.1:9999"). ...For hsproxy's `ProxyTarget`, we want a way to write al element in our configuration file that includes an encapsulation method (eg "direct"/"pnat" or "hsrproxy") and a target address (eg "/var/run/my_service/PORT" or "127.0.0.1:9999"). @diziet offered to figure out what the preferred way to encode the latter is.
We definitely want to be able to represent inet addresses in their usual format ("127.0.0.1:9999", "[::1]:9999") and possibly a tagged format too ("inet:127.0.1.9999"? "tcp:[::1]:9999"?). We probably want to allow tagged unix addresses like "unix:/home/foo/port"; we _may_ want to allow untagged addresses if they start with a `/`.
If there's a standard or a best practice here, let's adopt it.Arti: Onion service supportIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orgIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/sbws/-/issues/40167Create new release 1.8.02023-10-09T11:02:03ZjugaCreate new release 1.8.0Since we have `minor` changes from last 1.7.0 release.Since we have `minor` changes from last 1.7.0 release.sbws: 1.8.x-finaljugajugahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40842Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_f...2023-12-06T16:54:59ZPeter GerberNon-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565### Summary
Since I upgraded to 0.4.8.4 (from 0.4.8.3-rc) I've been seeing the following error:
```
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0)...### Summary
Since I upgraded to 0.4.8.4 (from 0.4.8.3-rc) I've been seeing the following error:
```
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19cb16) [0x5853d2ba0b16] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19d004) [0x5853d2ba1004] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 36ED52A99B9B1D95: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 01:43:21 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19cb16) [0x5853d2ba0b16] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x5853d2aeed97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x5853d2af9ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5853d2b8b66e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x5853d2b9108d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x5853d2a99bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x5853d2a9bbd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x5853d2ba81f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19d004) [0x5853d2ba1004] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x5853d2a74359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x7e2bdb469585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x7e2bdb469c1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x5853d2a75661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x5853d2a70f95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x5853d2a6d319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5853d2a6ced9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x7e2bdab6a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x7e2bdab6a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x5853d2a6cf21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux A9C38A44F68539F0: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 17:43:02 host Tor-relay0[1977034]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x578c64619d97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x578c64624ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x578c646b666e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x578c646bc08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x578c645c4bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x578c645c6bd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x578c646d31f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19cb16) [0x578c646cbb16] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x578c6459f359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x708318e9e585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x708318e9ec1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x578c645a0661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x578c6459bf95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x578c64598319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x578c64597ed9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x70831858a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x70831858a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x578c64597f21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.4 (git-6d6bd21b9d364302): Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x57) [0x578c64619d97] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x169) [0x578c64624ce9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x578c646b666e] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x3d) [0x578c646bc08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x95bd7) [0x578c645c4bd7] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa1) [0x578c645c6bd1] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x66) [0x578c646d31f6] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x19d004) [0x578c646cc004] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x70359) [0x578c6459f359] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x21585) [0x708318e9e585] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x49f) [0x708318e9ec1f] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xf1) [0x578c645a0661] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1e5) [0x578c6459bf95] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x59) [0x578c64598319] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x578c64597ed9] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x271ca) [0x70831858a1ca] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x85) [0x70831858a285] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x21) [0x578c64597f21] (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 5AC0CD28AE0575FA: 0 linked, 0 launched (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
Aug 24 18:47:09 host Tor-relay1[1977028]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302)
```
### Environment
- Tor 0.4.8.4 6d6bd21b9d364302
- Debian 12 "bookworm"
- Compiled from sourceTor: 0.4.8.x-post-stableMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/41304install new servers: tb-build-02 and tb-build-032023-10-23T14:46:11Zanarcatinstall new servers: tb-build-02 and tb-build-03to resolve disk space issues with tb-build-04 and -05 (#40964), configure two new machines in the gnt-dal cluster.
- [x] OOB access
- [x] network configuration (had to swap ports 3 and 4 on both hosts)
- [x] BIOS configuration
- [x] t...to resolve disk space issues with tb-build-04 and -05 (#40964), configure two new machines in the gnt-dal cluster.
- [x] OOB access
- [x] network configuration (had to swap ports 3 and 4 on both hosts)
- [x] BIOS configuration
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] IPMI password reset
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] grml boot
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] add to inventory
- [x] burn-in
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] basic Debian install
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] mandos
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] /srv RAID array
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03
- [x] hand-off to team
- [x] tb-build-02
- [x] tb-build-03(next) cluster scalinganarcatanarcat2023-09-06https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/lox/-/issues/28Set daily max bucket distribution and adjust other settings for production2024-02-15T16:52:09ZonyinyangSet daily max bucket distribution and adjust other settings for productionWe likely need to decide on an upper bound of buckets that can be distributed each day so that we don't run out of open invitation buckets. We currently have buckets being distributed to k users before a new bucket is used but if buckets...We likely need to decide on an upper bound of buckets that can be distributed each day so that we don't run out of open invitation buckets. We currently have buckets being distributed to k users before a new bucket is used but if buckets are continuously requested, we will eventually run out of buckets each day. These variables should be part of a configuration file for Lox.Lox Ready for Open Testing Callonyinyangonyinyanghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40832Memory consumption of Tor client is becoming difficult under iOS 50 MB RAM li...2023-10-09T15:34:54ZtlaMemory consumption of Tor client is becoming difficult under iOS 50 MB RAM limitation esp. during startup and with cached info### Summary
Evidence is gathering, that Tor under iOS' network extension memory limitation has trouble building circuits.
See https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot-apple/issues/71#issuecomment-1666818716 and comments before.
I'm pl...### Summary
Evidence is gathering, that Tor under iOS' network extension memory limitation has trouble building circuits.
See https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot-apple/issues/71#issuecomment-1666818716 and comments before.
I'm playing around with `MaxMemInQueues`, but as soon as I uppen it just a little from the 5MB we currently use, Jetsam starts to kill the Network Extension during startup circuit building. (At least in my Austrian environment.)
Starting with cashed information seems to become more and more difficult, too. I already had to put a "clear cache" button at the main screen, because people started to complain so much.
I witness this too, now, more and more often.
Do you see any possibility to reduce non-file-backed memory consumption during the startup phase?
If this continues to worsen, it will render Orbot iOS unusable.
I'm not sure if this is happening due to changes in the network or due to changes in the client code.
If this doesn't get better I will need to consider downgrading Tor to older versions again.
Esp. since I currently released Onion Browser version 3, which now relies on Orbot iOS completely and which currently makes a lot of users unhappy.
There's certain loopholes to the memory accounting in iOS. In this older article I wrote, there's some background to the Jetsam memory accounting:
https://benjaminerhart.com/2018/03/state-of-the-onion-ios/
Esp. helpful might be these:
- Use file-backed memory / operate on/stream files directly instead of loading everything and juggling that data around a lot. (Maybe we can do that in callbacks we can implement with Objective-C to make use of `NSCache`/`NSPurgableData` objects.)
- Provide a method which makes Tor give up unused memory. We could call that from a hook iOS provides.
### Steps to reproduce:
1. Install Orbot iOS
2. Start Orbot
3. Witness Tor protocol using left top button.
4. If under censored environment, Tor might not be able to build usable circuits at all, because `MaxMemInQueues` is set to 5 MByte.
5. Override and increase `MaxMemInQueues` in advanced settings.
6. Witness Network Extension crash during start. (App will show stopped status after a while.)
7. In non-restraint environments, manage a complete start. Confirm by surfing to check.torproject.org.
8. Stop Orbot.
9. Restart Orbot.
10. Restart will fail most of the time until "Clear Cache" is pressed.
### What is the current bug behavior?
### What is the expected behavior?
- Tor limits memory usage during startup phase, so we can increase `MaxMemInQueues`, so constrained environments work, too.
- Tor limits memory usage during loading of cached information, so it doesn't reach the 50 MB memory limit.
### Environment
| | |
|:-------- | --------:|
| tor | 0.4.7.13 |
| libevent | 2.1.12 |
| OpenSSL | 1.1.1u |
| liblzma | 5.4.3 |
iOS 16.6. using [Tor.framework](https://github.com/iCepa/Tor.framework/)
### Relevant logs and/or screenshots
https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot-apple/issues/71#issuecomment-1657738391
https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot-apple/issues/71#issuecomment-1666818716
### Possible fixesTor: 0.4.9.x-freezeAlexander Færøyahf@torproject.orgAlexander Færøyahf@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/986HS client: Never use an unlisted ipt even if found in descriptor2023-07-28T17:55:25ZIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orgHS client: Never use an unlisted ipt even if found in descriptorAs per https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/merge_requests/154#note_2926422 we should not use an introduction point that's not listed in the consensus.
Some details of our response are still TBD, see the discussion there.
S...As per https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/merge_requests/154#note_2926422 we should not use an introduction point that's not listed in the consensus.
Some details of our response are still TBD, see the discussion there.
See also #966 which it will probably be convenient to address at the same time.Arti: Onion service supportIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orgIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/984Concrete implementation of onion service state-management code2024-01-09T16:43:50ZNick MathewsonConcrete implementation of onion service state-management codeWe should make sure that we build onion services by default using persistent on-disk storage for their state.
Part of #729. See also #983We should make sure that we build onion services by default using persistent on-disk storage for their state.
Part of #729. See also #983Arti: Onion service supportIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orgIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/983Abstract version of persistent state for onion services2024-01-09T16:40:10ZNick MathewsonAbstract version of persistent state for onion servicesThis is somewhat underspecified. We'll need a function that lets the api-user of an onion service provide a mechanism for getting and storing the persistent state associated with that onion service, when necessary. This might be as sim...This is somewhat underspecified. We'll need a function that lets the api-user of an onion service provide a mechanism for getting and storing the persistent state associated with that onion service, when necessary. This might be as simple as providing an `impl StateMgr` or (more likely) an `impl StateHandle<HsState>`.
There may or may not be need to integrate with the keymgr code, depending on how hard or easy we think key export should be.
Part of #729.Arti: Onion service supportIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orgIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/issues/967Make introduction points part of an onion service's persistent state2023-12-04T19:24:05ZNick MathewsonMake introduction points part of an onion service's persistent stateIn !1429, @diziet came up with a system that is in many ways better than C tor's approach. Instead of forgetting our intro points on each restart, we'd save them as persistent data.
We are not planning to do this as part of our first i...In !1429, @diziet came up with a system that is in many ways better than C tor's approach. Instead of forgetting our intro points on each restart, we'd save them as persistent data.
We are not planning to do this as part of our first implementation phase, but it might improve reliability. We should see if the ~"Onion Services Coalition" is interested.Arti: Onion service supportIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.orgIan Jacksoniwj@torproject.org