The Tor Project issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/issues2023-01-05T16:36:11Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30209logins.json data is added unencrypted, maybe that's why people have problems ...2023-01-05T16:36:11ZTraclogins.json data is added unencrypted, maybe that's why people have problems with saved login data1)
install TB
disable always private surfing
enable saving login data
open a page with login form, logon and accept saving login data
data is being added to logins.json in unencrypted form
so far all seems right, but you will not be able...1)
install TB
disable always private surfing
enable saving login data
open a page with login form, logon and accept saving login data
data is being added to logins.json in unencrypted form
so far all seems right, but you will not be able to USE the saved logins
2)
go options again, set master pass, apply
add another login (go logon somewhere and save)
data is STILL being added to logins.json in UNENCRYPTED form (and unencrypted is not being encrypted)
STILL not able to use the saved data
3)
copy over old logins.json and key4.db
voila, you can use it...
again try to add a new login to the old data -> same as 1) and 2) applies
implies the mechanism is broken
i can not find a fix
**Trac**:
**Username**: sashamanhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/29886NoScript icon is still visible in context menu after the fix for #25658 landed2023-11-27T12:07:07ZGeorg KoppenNoScript icon is still visible in context menu after the fix for #25658 landedA user on the blog noticed that we removed the NoScript toolbar icon but the one in the context menu is still visible. (see: https://blog.torproject.org/comment/280411#comment-280411). Moreover, clicking on it results in an error:
```
Ty...A user on the blog noticed that we removed the NoScript toolbar icon but the one in the context menu is still visible. (see: https://blog.torproject.org/comment/280411#comment-280411). Moreover, clicking on it results in an error:
```
TypeError: this.getPlacementOfWidget(...) is null[Learn More] CustomizableUI.jsm:1638:18
```Sponsor 131 - Phase 2 - Privacy Browserhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/29630TorBrowser creates empty directory in "/tmp"2022-11-29T15:16:51ZTracTorBrowser creates empty directory in "/tmp"I'm using the latest TBB on Linux.
After I start TorBrowser, the directory is created in temporary direcrory (in my case /tmp)
drwx------ 2 user user 4096 Mar 1 12:34 Temp-41d8a42b-5545-4af5-89c2-be2502af95c7
The directory is empt...I'm using the latest TBB on Linux.
After I start TorBrowser, the directory is created in temporary direcrory (in my case /tmp)
drwx------ 2 user user 4096 Mar 1 12:34 Temp-41d8a42b-5545-4af5-89c2-be2502af95c7
The directory is empty. After I close the TBB, this directory disappears. Not sure if it's OK behavior or not.
**Trac**:
**Username**: AxelFhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28201about:support help link directs to Firefox's support rather than Tor Browser's2023-01-05T16:35:22Ztraumschuleabout:support help link directs to Firefox's support rather than Tor Browser'stested in 11.5a13 still going to the Firefox domain (but the in-page branding is correct now)tested in 11.5a13 still going to the Firefox domain (but the in-page branding is correct now)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/27483Onboarding: dialog closure is effectively treated as "read", causing screen a...2023-01-05T17:28:35ZdmrOnboarding: dialog closure is effectively treated as "read", causing screen advancementFor the first few screens in Onboarding:
Clicking anything outside the box in Onboarding closes the box //AND appears to mark the current screen as "read"//, thus changing the Onboarding experience to pop up the next screen when someone ...For the first few screens in Onboarding:
Clicking anything outside the box in Onboarding closes the box //AND appears to mark the current screen as "read"//, thus changing the Onboarding experience to pop up the next screen when someone opens it again. //This could be bad if the user doesn't actually read the screen before that, and doesn't recognize the Onboarding flow and go back to that screen.//
This seems to stop at "Circuit Display", probably because the "(not really) Next" button there does something other than advance the Onboarding screen.
Or maybe, alternatively, the first few screens are just auto-marked as "read". If that's the case, consider changing that to happen on button click / navigation.
(Encountered in TB 8.0)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/26607subpixels: scroll properties leak entropy2023-11-04T00:26:47ZMark Smithsubpixels: scroll properties leak entropyAs of Firefox 55, the `window.pageYOffset`, `pageXOffset`, `scrollX`, and `scrollY` properties now return data with subpixel accuracy. We think this means "half pixels on a macOS Retina or other high resolution display." We should deter...As of Firefox 55, the `window.pageYOffset`, `pageXOffset`, `scrollX`, and `scrollY` properties now return data with subpixel accuracy. We think this means "half pixels on a macOS Retina or other high resolution display." We should determine if this adds any fingerprinting risks (and whether the values returned are already rounded when `privacy.resistFingerprinting` is set to `true`). See:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1151421https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/26557Regression in keyboard fingerprinting2022-11-30T16:51:48ZTracRegression in keyboard fingerprintingI just compared fingerprinting protection between 8.0a8 and 8.0a9. There appears to be a regression when it comes to key combination with AtlGraph.
My system:
OS: Whonix 14 (Debian stretch) on Qubes OS 4.0
Keyboard layout: Neo (https:/...I just compared fingerprinting protection between 8.0a8 and 8.0a9. There appears to be a regression when it comes to key combination with AtlGraph.
My system:
OS: Whonix 14 (Debian stretch) on Qubes OS 4.0
Keyboard layout: Neo (https://neo-layout.org/index_en.html)
For testing I used https://arthuredelstein.github.io/tordemos/keyboard.html.
There are several keys that have regressed:
== Numbers
When typing the number 0 using the key pad on layer 4 ('<' + space) I observe this differences:
8.0a8: code: Digit0, modifierState: empty
8.0a9: code: Space, modifierState: AltGraph
Similarly, other numbers, when typing using the number pad on layer 4, show the actual key that was pressed (KeyM, KeyJ, KeyU, …) instead of DigitX.
== Navigation Keys
Arrow up:
8.0a8: code: ArrowUp, modifierState: empty
8.0a9: code: ArrowUp, modifierState: AltGraph
The modifier leaks with many of the keys on layer 4. Including, all arrow keys, escape, home, end, delete, back and comma. Interestingly, period and colon don't leak the modifier.
I also noticed that colon is recognized as semicolon (on all layers) but that's also the case in older Tor Browser version.
**Trac**:
**Username**: pegehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/26404Fixup commits for unused symbols2023-01-05T15:48:14ZMatthew FinkelFixup commits for unused symbolsSome Tor Browser patches result in unreachable and/or unused code. This isn't a problem, in general, but when Firefox is built with `-Werror`, this causes a compile-time build failure. I'd like to fix these failures in our tree so we can...Some Tor Browser patches result in unreachable and/or unused code. This isn't a problem, in general, but when Firefox is built with `-Werror`, this causes a compile-time build failure. I'd like to fix these failures in our tree so we can begin pushing Try builds for our entire patchset.
This is step 0 on the larger/grander path of running the entire Firefox test suite against Tor Browser. Currently, too many unit tests fail when run on Tor Browser's patches, so this will not be useful (by itself) right now.
To be clear, I'm not sure if we should patch every unit test failure or if we should write a script that fetches the results and tells us if any failures were not expected - but this is a different topic.Sponsor 131 - Phase 2 - Privacy Browserhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/25872When Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the buttons a...2022-11-30T16:39:10ZTracWhen Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the buttons are cut offWhen Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the buttons are cut off.
1. go to http://sik5nlgfc5qylnnsr57qrbm64zbdx6t4lreyhpon3ychmxmiem7tioad.onion
2. click the "!" next to the URL and click ">" then click more inform...When Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the buttons are cut off.
1. go to http://sik5nlgfc5qylnnsr57qrbm64zbdx6t4lreyhpon3ychmxmiem7tioad.onion
2. click the "!" next to the URL and click ">" then click more information.
3.The "View cookies" and "View saved passwords" buttons are cut off.
I attached a photo showing the buttons cut off.
Tor Browser 7.5.3
**Trac**:
**Username**: Dbryrtfbcbhgfhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/24950"Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data" enabled = disables exc...2022-11-29T14:24:57ZTrac"Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data" enabled = disables exceptions list for popupsOptions -> Privacy -> Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data
When enabled, popup blocker ignores exceptions list and blocks popups from all websites.
**Trac**:
**Username**: vanowmOptions -> Privacy -> Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data
When enabled, popup blocker ignores exceptions list and blocks popups from all websites.
**Trac**:
**Username**: vanowmSponsor 131 - Phase 5 - Ongoing Maintenancehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/23660Handle exceptions in content sandboxing code for Tor Browser on Windows properly2022-11-30T14:58:29ZGeorg KoppenHandle exceptions in content sandboxing code for Tor Browser on Windows properlyAt the moment we just rip out the SEH parts of the content sandboxing code as mingw-w64 has trouble handling it. We should provide a proper fix for it, though.At the moment we just rip out the SEH parts of the content sandboxing code as mingw-w64 has trouble handling it. We should provide a proper fix for it, though.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/23263Rip out startup GfxSanityTest entirely2022-11-30T16:50:26ZcypherpunksRip out startup GfxSanityTest entirelyMozilla understood it's a Windows-only "feature" in FF54 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1339432, but Tor Browser doesn't need that trash.Mozilla understood it's a Windows-only "feature" in FF54 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1339432, but Tor Browser doesn't need that trash.Sponsor 131 - Phase 5 - Ongoing Maintenancehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22584More RWX memory pages for TBB on some Windows versions2022-11-30T16:58:09ZArthur EdelsteinMore RWX memory pages for TBB on some Windows versionsA cypherpunk has reported some RWX memory pages were observed for Tor Browser on Windows 7 and Windows 10. See:
* ticket:21617#comment:4
* ticket:21617#comment:7
* ticket:21617#comment:14A cypherpunk has reported some RWX memory pages were observed for Tor Browser on Windows 7 and Windows 10. See:
* ticket:21617#comment:4
* ticket:21617#comment:7
* ticket:21617#comment:14Sponsor 131 - Phase 5 - Ongoing Maintenancehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/21657Test to make sure we isolate or disable all speculative connects2023-01-05T17:16:53ZArthur EdelsteinTest to make sure we isolate or disable all speculative connectsThere are a variety of "resource hint" features in Tor Browser that we want to make sure are isolated by first-party or disabled. These include
```
link rel=preconnect
link rel=prefetch
link rel=prerender
```
and possibly more.
We ...There are a variety of "resource hint" features in Tor Browser that we want to make sure are isolated by first-party or disabled. These include
```
link rel=preconnect
link rel=prefetch
link rel=prerender
```
and possibly more.
We should test this for the ESR45 and ESR52 versions of Tor Browser, because isolation will have different mechanisms.
See https://w3c.github.io/resource-hints/
We should also look into "SpeculativeConnect" code in Firefox to make sure there aren't any other cases of non-first-party isolated connections.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/21610Hide about:profiles2023-11-27T09:35:33ZGeorg KoppenHide about:profiles`about:profiles` allows user things like creating new profiles or restarting with extensions disabled. This might lead to weird errors and there is probably no real use case in a Tor Browser context for that. We should hide it ideally wi...`about:profiles` allows user things like creating new profiles or restarting with extensions disabled. This might lead to weird errors and there is probably no real use case in a Tor Browser context for that. We should hide it ideally with an option to make it visible again if it is indeed needed for some reason.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/21455newwin: Inconsistent New Window height on multiple monitors (Windows)2024-03-12T09:04:47ZTracnewwin: Inconsistent New Window height on multiple monitors (Windows)(1) "New Window" or Ctrl+N creates a new window slightly offset from the current window, but the size of the new window is determined by the primary display (instead of the display the window is on).
If the primary display is larger, th...(1) "New Window" or Ctrl+N creates a new window slightly offset from the current window, but the size of the new window is determined by the primary display (instead of the display the window is on).
If the primary display is larger, this can push part of the window off the top of the display (e.g. primary 1920x1200, secondary 1280x1024: New Window on secondary display gets pushed off the top so only half the URL bar is visible).
(2) Dragging a tab out of a window with multiple tabs creates a new window sized differently than "New Window", this new window is sized according to the display it is on.
This is in 6.5 and 7.0a1 but not 6.08
**Trac**:
**Username**: pjw0https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/21347Retrying a download breaks URL bar domain isolation2023-08-28T16:05:46ZGeorg KoppenRetrying a download breaks URL bar domain isolationIf a download fails and one tries to restart it via the `about:downloads` page the resumption goes over the catch-all circuit. It would be more intuitive is we could use the circuit previously used (if it is still available).
Reported o...If a download fails and one tries to restart it via the `about:downloads` page the resumption goes over the catch-all circuit. It would be more intuitive is we could use the circuit previously used (if it is still available).
Reported on our blog: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-70a1-released#comment-233304https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/20772src="data:&lt;;base64 images rendered when "Show images"="Blocked"2023-01-05T17:04:10Zcypherpunkssrc="data:<;base64 images rendered when "Show images"="Blocked"Any webpages (e.g. ht tp://defensivepatentlicense.org/) that use base64 encoding thwart people's disabling of images.
Due to there not being enough software writers to go around, TBB and its derivatives e.f. Orfox(ht tps://dev.guardianpr...Any webpages (e.g. ht tp://defensivepatentlicense.org/) that use base64 encoding thwart people's disabling of images.
Due to there not being enough software writers to go around, TBB and its derivatives e.f. Orfox(ht tps://dev.guardianproject.info/issues/8039) often leave remote code execution vulnerabilities in the image parser.
Disabling images would protect against this vector of infection, but they can't be disabled. Due to the almost identical codebase for everything but the menus and window borders, I think that this is likely a bug in the TBb source code rather than in the tiny delta that is Orfox.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/19741favicon in searchbar popup uses catchall circuit2023-01-05T17:03:13ZArthur Edelsteinfavicon in searchbar popup uses catchall circuitTo reproduce:
* Set "torbutton.loglevel" to 3.
* Enter the word "test" in the searchbar. Click on the DuckDuckGo icon in the popup menu below to cause a search for "test" to be performed on DuckDuckGo. After the search is performed, a g...To reproduce:
* Set "torbutton.loglevel" to 3.
* Enter the word "test" in the searchbar. Click on the DuckDuckGo icon in the popup menu below to cause a search for "test" to be performed on DuckDuckGo. After the search is performed, a green "plus" symbol appears on the searchbar magnifying glass icon.
* Open the browser console, and clear it.
* Click on the searchbar again. An additional menu item appears, which contains the text `Add "DuckDuckGo (HTML)"` and a DuckDuckGo favicon.
* Examine the browser console. Log messages should appear as follows:
```
[07-22 22:38:01] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS: http://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion/favicon.ico via --NoFirstPartyHost-chrome-browser.xul--:9bb8a61534faf1f952647a3537560fb0
GET
http://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion/favicon.ico [HTTP/1.1 200 OK 0ms]
getFirstPartyURI failed for chrome://browser/content/browser.xul: 0x80070057
[07-22 22:38:02] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 264 NEW 0 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion:80 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:52895 PURPOSE=USER
[07-22 22:38:02] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 264 SENTCONNECT 15 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion:80
getFirstPartyURI failed for chrome://browser/content/browser.xul: 0x80070057
[07-22 22:38:02] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 264 SUCCEEDED 15 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion:80
```
should be visible. I believe these messages are caused by
So it appears that the favicon display inside "add-engines" vbox of the search popup is being sent over the catchall circuit.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/18866Rip mozTCPSocket out of Tor Browser2023-01-05T16:06:48ZGeorg KoppenRip mozTCPSocket out of Tor BrowserIn legacy/trac#18863 we disabled the usage of mozTCPSocket per preference. We might want to rip out that code as a defense in depth.In legacy/trac#18863 we disabled the usage of mozTCPSocket per preference. We might want to rip out that code as a defense in depth.