The Tor Project issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/issues2020-06-27T14:41:19Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14255Conduct periodic regression tests of nsTransferable selection caching2020-06-27T14:41:19ZTracConduct periodic regression tests of nsTransferable selection cachingTo ensure correct operation of selection caching over time, implement automated tests validating requirements from legacy/trac#9701.
**Trac**:
**Username**: michaelTo ensure correct operation of selection caching over time, implement automated tests validating requirements from legacy/trac#9701.
**Trac**:
**Username**: michaelhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14253Closing a window while importing bookmarks crashes Tor Browser2020-06-27T14:41:19ZGeorg KoppenClosing a window while importing bookmarks crashes Tor BrowserIf one closes a window (e.g. the browser console) while bookmarks are imported the browser crashes. This does not only happen with chrome windows. A window opened by a content script causes the same (although that is of not so big concer...If one closes a window (e.g. the browser console) while bookmarks are imported the browser crashes. This does not only happen with chrome windows. A window opened by a content script causes the same (although that is of not so big concern right now as we open it in a new tab automatically).
This is no genuine Tor Browser bug but is visible in the latest Firefox Nightly as well.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14246Can't book room in Hotel Valencia Center with Tor Browser2021-07-13T19:42:48ZGeorg KoppenCan't book room in Hotel Valencia Center with Tor BrowserGo to http://www.valenciacenterhotel.com/, click on "Book Now", select a room and click on "Book". Nothing happens apart from highlighting the rooms drop down boxes red for a short time. Tested with Tor Browser 4.5a3 and 4.5-alpha-2 in d...Go to http://www.valenciacenterhotel.com/, click on "Book Now", select a room and click on "Book". Nothing happens apart from highlighting the rooms drop down boxes red for a short time. Tested with Tor Browser 4.5a3 and 4.5-alpha-2 in default mode. This is no problem in Iceweasel.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14221mkbundle-*.sh does not update correctly the $TORBROWSER_VERSION -> $TORBROWSE...2020-06-27T14:41:20Zboklmmkbundle-*.sh does not update correctly the $TORBROWSER_VERSION -> $TORBROWSER_BUILDDIR symlink at the end of the buildAt the end of a build, mkbundle-*.sh should update a symlink $TORBROWSER_VERSION -> $TORBROWSER_BUILDDIR.
If the symlink already exists it does not update it correctly. This is because the ln command is missing a -T option.
I'm attachi...At the end of a build, mkbundle-*.sh should update a symlink $TORBROWSER_VERSION -> $TORBROWSER_BUILDDIR.
If the symlink already exists it does not update it correctly. This is because the ln command is missing a -T option.
I'm attaching a patch to fix that.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14212Update ReleaseProcess after #13015 changes2020-06-27T14:41:20ZboklmUpdate ReleaseProcess after #13015 changesI'm attaching a patch to update the release process after the legacy/trac#13015 changes.I'm attaching a patch to update the release process after the legacy/trac#13015 changes.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14205Closely review all uses of IsCallerChrome() for e10s2022-06-15T00:46:15ZMike PerryClosely review all uses of IsCallerChrome() for e10sA lot of our fingerprinting patches depend upon the accuracy is nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome() to determine if it is content window or browser chrome accessing fingerprinting information.
IsCallerChrome() kind of scares me, and has h...A lot of our fingerprinting patches depend upon the accuracy is nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome() to determine if it is content window or browser chrome accessing fingerprinting information.
IsCallerChrome() kind of scares me, and has had issues for unexpected contexts like WebWorkers (See legacy/trac#13027).
We should keep a close eye on this as we transition to e10s support post FF38, as who knows that the child/parent context relationship changes may do to various codepaths.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14199Tor Browser 4.0.3 can't access a particular site anymore2022-03-29T20:46:34ZTracTor Browser 4.0.3 can't access a particular site anymoreHi,
I'm using Tor Browser 4.0.2 to access a specific live show that's available only to Spain residents (I happen to be spanish, just living in another country at the moment).
The URL for the show is here : http://www.atresplayer.com/d...Hi,
I'm using Tor Browser 4.0.2 to access a specific live show that's available only to Spain residents (I happen to be spanish, just living in another country at the moment).
The URL for the show is here : http://www.atresplayer.com/directos/television/neox-g/
I have modified my torrc file by adding the following code : ExitNodes {ES}
The exit node is now always located in Spain, as confirmed by the attached screen cap : !http://i61.tinypic.com/9jzn0y.jpg
I believe I was able to access the live streaming at least once or twice after the installation of Tor Browser, about 2 weeks ago.
However, I now consistently obtain the following error message : !http://i61.tinypic.com/2rlzryu.jpg
It basically says (error code 301) that the streaming video isn't available, but I really believe it is. I've been obtaining the same error for more than 10 days now, and the error isn't specific to the particular live show I'm looking for, but to any program aired by this site.
So, can somebody help me with this ? Is this a bug from Tor Browser ? A new type of protection by the site that detects that I'm not really from Spain and acts accordingly ? Something else ?
Thanks in advance for your help.
**Trac**:
**Username**: Jose Hidalgohttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14187use OpenPGP notations to sign the names of files to prevent file name tampering2022-06-15T00:39:42Zproperuse OpenPGP notations to sign the names of files to prevent file name tamperingSince 'GPG signatures do not authenticate filenames' (legacy/trac#2340), consider using OpenPGP notations to embed the name of the file within the gpg signature.
Try this:
```
echo "test" > x
gpg --armor --set-notation file@name="x" --...Since 'GPG signatures do not authenticate filenames' (legacy/trac#2340), consider using OpenPGP notations to embed the name of the file within the gpg signature.
Try this:
```
echo "test" > x
gpg --armor --set-notation file@name="x" --detach-sign x
gpg --verify-options show-notations --verify x.asc
```
Example output:
```
~ $ echo "test" > x
~ $ gpg --armor --set-notation file@name="x" --detach-sign x
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Patrick Schleizer <adrelanos@riseup.net>"
4096-bit RSA key, ID 77BB3C48, created 2014-01-16 (main key ID 2EEACCDA)
~ $ gpg --verify-options show-notations --verify x.asc
gpg: Signature made Mon 12 Jan 2015 11:13:19 PM UTC using RSA key ID 77BB3C48
gpg: Good signature from "Patrick Schleizer <adrelanos@riseup.net>" [ultimate]
gpg: Signature notation: issuer-fpr@notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=6E979B28A6F37C43BE30AFA1CB8D50BB77BB3C48
gpg: Signature notation: file@name=x
~ $
```
You could then consider telling users in [verification documentation](https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en) to add `--verify-options show-notations` to their `gpg --verify` command to verify file names.
Not a perfect solution, but a lightweight one. Could be the first step to something better. Can be easily done and automated by a signature creation shell script, that you might already have?
(Asked about this on the [gnupg-users mailing list](http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2015-January/052191.html) by the way.)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14183TOR Network Error Message in Browser - Now Getting "Unable to Connect" Message2020-06-27T14:41:20ZTracTOR Network Error Message in Browser - Now Getting "Unable to Connect" MessageToday, I attempted to use my TOR browser and discovered I am now "Unable to Connect." Did a re-install of the latest version of TOR but this did not help.
TOR Browser Ver 4.0.2.
At this point, I cannot track the error to any particul...Today, I attempted to use my TOR browser and discovered I am now "Unable to Connect." Did a re-install of the latest version of TOR but this did not help.
TOR Browser Ver 4.0.2.
At this point, I cannot track the error to any particular action. No changes have been made to the Firewall (Kaspersky Pure 3.0). Regular Firefox browser and all others work perfectly. Networking within my home system is unimpeded and working normally. Strange thing about this is that it seemed to occur for no reason. Please let me know if you want a log report, et al.
**Trac**:
**Username**: taarnahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14178fteproxy and obfsproxy fails to run on windows in torbrowser 4.0.22020-06-27T14:41:20Zcypherpunksfteproxy and obfsproxy fails to run on windows in torbrowser 4.0.2familiar to ticket legacy/trac#11286
When running fteproxy.exe from the command-line, the following is encountered:
```
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "fteproxy", line 14, in <module>
File "fteproxy\__init__.pyc", line 13, ...familiar to ticket legacy/trac#11286
When running fteproxy.exe from the command-line, the following is encountered:
```
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "fteproxy", line 14, in <module>
File "fteproxy\__init__.pyc", line 13, in <module>
File "fteproxy\record_layer.pyc", line 6, in <module>
File "fte\encoder.pyc", line 11, in <module>
File "fte\dfa.pyc", line 6, in <module>
File "fte\cDFA.pyc", line 12, in <module>
File "fte\cDFA.pyc", line 10, in __load
ImportError: DLL load failed: The specified module could not be found.
```
When running obfsproxy.exe from the command-line, the following is encountered:
```
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "obfsproxy", line 15, in <module>
File "obfsproxy\pyobfsproxy.pyc", line 12, in <module>
File "obfsproxy\network\launch_transport.pyc", line 2, in <module>
File "obfsproxy\transports\transports.pyc", line 6, in <module>
File "obfsproxy\transports\scramblesuit\scramblesuit.pyc", line 20, in <module
>
File "obfsproxy\transports\scramblesuit\mycrypto.pyc", line 9, in <module>
File "Crypto\Hash\HMAC.pyc", line 66, in <module>
File "Crypto\Util\strxor.pyc", line 12, in <module>
File "Crypto\Util\strxor.pyc", line 10, in __load
ImportError: DLL load failed: Invalid access to memory location.
```https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14172duckduckgo search engine advertises download to non-official tor browser2020-06-27T14:41:20Zcypherpunksduckduckgo search engine advertises download to non-official tor browserthis is what i just reported as security related bug to duckduckgo:
When searching for "Tor Browser", a sponsored link appears right on top: "tor.download-start.com", the real link goes to: "http://1671744.r.msn.com/?ld=d ... ctY46YrS1i...this is what i just reported as security related bug to duckduckgo:
When searching for "Tor Browser", a sponsored link appears right on top: "tor.download-start.com", the real link goes to: "http://1671744.r.msn.com/?ld=d ... ctY46YrS1i2LYbzI&u=download-start.com%2fdownloads%2f104543"
It then offers to download an .exe, which is not the original torbrowser, but contains some adware, maybe serious malware.
This is an immense security thread to tor users, as they are seeking safety and privacy.
Please remove the link, and please don't longer make business with these spammers.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14168Add password manager/generator into TBB2022-06-15T00:35:25ZcypherpunksAdd password manager/generator into TBBHello. I think you should include a reviewed password manager/generator in TBB.Hello. I think you should include a reviewed password manager/generator in TBB.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14157Tor Browser: Unsolved DNS of a website or HS result in 100% CPU usage2020-06-27T14:41:21ZTracTor Browser: Unsolved DNS of a website or HS result in 100% CPU usage
I've been observing this behavior for a while. Tor browser taking 100% CPU for few seconds if it DNS resolver fails for a website and HS is not reachable.
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44...
I've been observing this behavior for a while. Tor browser taking 100% CPU for few seconds if it DNS resolver fails for a website and HS is not reachable.
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44b071d in poll () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:81
#1 0x00007f05b56ace60 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b16346 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b167d4 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44b071d in poll () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:81
#1 0x00007f05b56ace60 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b16346 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b167d4 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b53cdb8b in __libc_recv (fd=71, buf=0x7f057a040f20, n=5, flags=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/recv.c:33
#1 0x00007f05b56abf36 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b5cb61 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b5ccec in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b5cd47 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0b14426 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0b16899 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#13 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#14 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#15 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
[root@NoNameForHost Downloads]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44b071d in poll () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:81
#1 0x00007f05b56ace60 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b16346 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b167d4 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
**Trac**:
**Username**: Sasihttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14156Tor Browser: Unsolved DNS of a website or HS result in 100% CPU usage2020-06-27T14:41:21ZTracTor Browser: Unsolved DNS of a website or HS result in 100% CPU usage
I've been observing this behavior for a while. Tor browser taking 100% CPU for few seconds if it DNS resolver fails for a website and HS is not reachable.
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44...
I've been observing this behavior for a while. Tor browser taking 100% CPU for few seconds if it DNS resolver fails for a website and HS is not reachable.
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44b071d in poll () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:81
#1 0x00007f05b56ace60 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b16346 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b167d4 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44b071d in poll () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:81
#1 0x00007f05b56ace60 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b16346 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b167d4 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
[Sasi@NoNameForHost ~]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b53cdb8b in __libc_recv (fd=71, buf=0x7f057a040f20, n=5, flags=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/recv.c:33
#1 0x00007f05b56abf36 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b5cb61 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b5ccec in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b5cd47 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0b14426 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0b16899 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#13 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#14 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#15 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
[root@NoNameForHost Downloads]# pstack 19469
Thread 1 (process 19469):
#0 0x00007f05b44b071d in poll () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:81
#1 0x00007f05b56ace60 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#2 0x00007f05b0b16346 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#3 0x00007f05b0b167d4 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#4 0x00007f05b0b16bb8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#5 0x00007f05b0ae4e95 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#6 0x00007f05b0aa12f2 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#7 0x00007f05b0c5de74 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#8 0x00007f05b0c442eb in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#9 0x00007f05b0ae57e1 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so
legacy/trac#10 0x00007f05b56aeff8 in ?? () from /home/Sasi/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so
legacy/trac#11 0x00007f05b53c6ee5 in start_thread (arg=0x7f05997ff700) at pthread_create.c:309
legacy/trac#12 0x00007f05b44bab8d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
**Trac**:
**Username**: Sasihttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14131Canvas Fingerprinting - default2020-06-27T14:41:21ZcypherpunksCanvas Fingerprinting - defaultSuggestion for when Canvas Fingerprinting is attempted by a web page:
options to
-return a default 'fingerprint' which would be the same for all users
-return a random 'fingerprint'
ThanksSuggestion for when Canvas Fingerprinting is attempted by a web page:
options to
-return a default 'fingerprint' which would be the same for all users
-return a random 'fingerprint'
Thankshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14122add environment variable to hide TBB's logo2020-06-27T14:41:21Zproperadd environment variable to hide TBB's logoSpeaking as a user of Tails and a maintainer of Whonix, I want to point out, that showing the [Tor Browser Bundle](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git/blob/HEAD:/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.png) Logo when using tor-launcher only...Speaking as a user of Tails and a maintainer of Whonix, I want to point out, that showing the [Tor Browser Bundle](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git/blob/HEAD:/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.png) Logo when using tor-launcher only for configuring Tor without TBB is inappropriate and confusing. It should not be shown in that mode.
Could you please add an environment variable such as `TOR_HIDE_LOGO`?
That would also be useful to avoid [trademark issues](https://www.torproject.org/docs/trademark-faq.html.en) when redistributing original, unmodified TBB in (linux) distributions.
Related:
* legacy/trac#14121
* legacy/trac#12451https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14121make TBB usable as "system Tor"2022-06-15T00:32:42Zpropermake TBB usable as "system Tor"# TLDR
We would like to use TBB as "system Tor".
# Long
## Why?
* Most, latest technology for censorship circumvention, i.e. pluggable transports such as meek, scamblesuite, fte, etc. will not be packaged for Debian anytime soon.
* P...# TLDR
We would like to use TBB as "system Tor".
# Long
## Why?
* Most, latest technology for censorship circumvention, i.e. pluggable transports such as meek, scamblesuite, fte, etc. will not be packaged for Debian anytime soon.
* Pluggable transports are due to their nature too dynamically evolving. There is a giant gap between availability of a pluggable transports and installability from stable distributions such as Debian.
* Vidalia has been deprecated. There is no nicely looking, maintained way to easily configure Tor and bridges anymore besides the tor-launcher add-on.
* TBB comes with the tor-launcher add-on, which is a well maintained GUI for configuration and troubleshooting of Tor and all sorts of the latest and greatest pluggable transports.
* TBB comes with recent versions of Tor.
* TBB is built reproducibly.
## Current Problem
At the moment, TBB is an integrated browser package. It does not integrate well for use with other applications, with the general system. Because,
* once you close the browser window, no other application can connect.
* it's not possible to just configure and start Tor without opening the browser window
* once Tor is configured, you cannot start Tor without running X server
## Related
It's still an open task how to "Make TIMB and TBB/PTTBB cooperate in a smarter way.":
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10950
Maybe we can think of something to solve both at once.
## Solution
This is one solution that might work. Not necessarily the ultimate one. A rough plan.
A combination of new start scripts + environment variables obeyed by tor-launcher.
* keep ~/tor-browser_en-US/start-tor-browser as is
* add other launcher scripts to the Browser (or so) sub directory to keep your main directory simple
* add ~/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/start-tor-only
* add ~/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/stop-tor-only
* add ~/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/configure-and-start-tor
* add ~/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/configure-tor-only (if that is possible)
* add ~/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/start-browser-only (connect to previously started Tor)
That should suffice making TBB usable as "system Tor".
What do you think?
# Feedback
What do you think about this proposal in general?
Linostar and I have some other solutions involving xul launcher in mind. Maybe you have some other possible solution in mind?
Depending on how much, complex, difficult this task is, linostar might provide a patch to add this feature.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14119Update comment in meek-http-helper-user.js2020-06-27T14:41:21ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgUpdate comment in meek-http-helper-user.jsSince legacy/trac#12674, there's a proxy set even if you somehow start up in safe mode.Since legacy/trac#12674, there's a proxy set even if you somehow start up in safe mode.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14118Holding down SHIFT button while starting Tor Browser starts it in non-Tor mode2022-12-08T15:15:24Zs7rHolding down SHIFT button while starting Tor Browser starts it in non-Tor modeHolding down SHIFT button while starting Tor Browser starts it in non-Tor mode.
Apparently it's a Firefox kind of a safe mode startup, in which all the extensions, addons and plugins are disabled. Obviously, this will prevent Tor launch...Holding down SHIFT button while starting Tor Browser starts it in non-Tor mode.
Apparently it's a Firefox kind of a safe mode startup, in which all the extensions, addons and plugins are disabled. Obviously, this will prevent Tor launcher / Tor button to do their job (starting the background Tor process, etc.).
I think this is a 'feature' we could remove, for the sake of every user category. Holding by mistake the SHIFT key down when clicking to start something is not so hard and could accidentally happen. If this 'feature' does not help Tor Browser in any way and it can be removed without breaking something else, we should remove/disable it?https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14100Toggle NetworkSettings menuitem visibility based on an environment variable2020-06-27T14:41:22ZTracToggle NetworkSettings menuitem visibility based on an environment variableThis is a feature requested by some linux distros, where the "Open Network Settings..." menuitem in TorButton is unneeded. A patch is to be made so this menuitem becomes hidden if a certain environment variable is set.
**Trac**:
**Use...This is a feature requested by some linux distros, where the "Open Network Settings..." menuitem in TorButton is unneeded. A patch is to be made so this menuitem becomes hidden if a certain environment variable is set.
**Trac**:
**Username**: linostar