Anti-censorship issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/issues2021-10-28T16:35:01Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40039probetest is spinning with 100% CPU2021-10-28T16:35:01ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgprobetest is spinning with 100% CPUI just now (2021-04-05 16:22:49) noticed that probetest (#40013) on the broker is using 100% CPU:
```
PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND
1486 root 20 0 765744 239348 9832 S 98.3 5.9...I just now (2021-04-05 16:22:49) noticed that probetest (#40013) on the broker is using 100% CPU:
```
PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND
1486 root 20 0 765744 239348 9832 S 98.3 5.9 91550:09 probetest
```
Judging by the CPU time of 91500 minutes and 9 seconds, it has been like this for about (91550 * 60 + 9) / 3600. / 24 = 63 days.meskiomeskio@torproject.orgmeskiomeskio@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40153probetest misbehaving2022-07-17T15:19:39ZMarkCprobetest misbehavingprobetest has been throwing errors for a day or so:
_error polling probe: http2: timeout awaiting response headers_
just ran _./proxy -nat-retest-interval 1m -verbose_ and its continuing ad infinitum
still seeing traffic throughput th...probetest has been throwing errors for a day or so:
_error polling probe: http2: timeout awaiting response headers_
just ran _./proxy -nat-retest-interval 1m -verbose_ and its continuing ad infinitum
still seeing traffic throughput tho
@meskio @shelikhoo thought you might want to know
update: one successful probe in a 15 minute periodhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/meek/-/issues/26891Problem running meek server without CDN, stuck at Performing bandwidth self-t...2023-08-01T19:36:47ZTracProblem running meek server without CDN, stuck at Performing bandwidth self-test...done**I am trying to run a meek server, and this is what I have done for the test:**
I have a domain (for example, call it example.com) and I manually applied for Let's Encrypt SSL certificate, so I can visit the website through https://exa...**I am trying to run a meek server, and this is what I have done for the test:**
I have a domain (for example, call it example.com) and I manually applied for Let's Encrypt SSL certificate, so I can visit the website through https://example.com.
**Here is the torrc:**
BridgeRelay 1
ORPort 9001
ExtORPort auto
SocksPort 0
ExitPolicy reject *:*
ServerTransportListenAddr meek 0.0.0.0:443
ServerTransportPlugin meek exec /usr/local/bin/meek-server --cert /etc/letsencrypt/live/example.com/fullchain.pem --key /etc/letsencrypt/live/example.com/privkey.pem --log /var/log/tor/meek-server.log
**However, when I enter "tor -f torrc", it stuck here:**
Jul 20 15:29:53.566 [notice] Tor 0.3.2.10 (git-0edaa32732ec8930) running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2g, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.2, and Libzstd 1.3.1.
Jul 20 15:29:53.567 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
Jul 20 15:29:53.567 [notice] Read configuration file "/xxx/torrc".
Jul 20 15:29:53.574 [notice] Your ContactInfo config option is not set. Please consider setting it, so we can contact you if your server is misconfigured or something else goes wrong.
Jul 20 15:29:53.574 [notice] Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 739 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand.
Jul 20 15:29:53.576 [notice] Scheduler type KIST has been enabled.
Jul 20 15:29:53.576 [notice] Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:9001
Jul 20 15:29:53.576 [notice] Opening Extended OR listener on 127.0.0.1:0
Jul 20 15:29:53.577 [notice] Extended OR listener listening on port 40651.
Jul 20 15:29:54.000 [warn] Failed to open GEOIP file /usr/share/tor/geoip. We've been configured to see which countries can access us as a bridge, and we need GEOIP information to tell which countries clients are in. Do you have the tor-geoipdb package installed?
Jul 20 15:29:54.000 [warn] Failed to open GEOIP file /usr/share/tor/geoip6. We've been configured to see which countries can access us as a bridge, and we need GEOIP information to tell which countries clients are in. Do you have the tor-geoipdb package installed?
Jul 20 15:29:54.000 [notice] Configured to measure directory request statistics, but no GeoIP database found. Please specify a GeoIP database using the GeoIPFile option.
Jul 20 15:29:54.000 [warn] You are running Tor as root. You don't need to, and you probably shouldn't.
Jul 20 15:29:56.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'Unnamed E8094BFxxxxxxxxxx5C1E'
Jul 20 15:29:56.000 [notice] Your Tor bridge's hashed identity key fingerprint is 'Unnamed BBAA6xxxxxxxxxAA811B'
Jul 20 15:29:56.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
Jul 20 15:30:03.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
Jul 20 15:30:03.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
Jul 20 15:30:03.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
Jul 20 15:30:04.000 [warn] Server managed proxy encountered a method error. (meek listen tcp 0.0.0.0:443: bind: address already in use)
Jul 20 15:30:04.000 [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/meek-server' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed.
Jul 20 15:30:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
Jul 20 15:30:06.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working.
Jul 20 15:30:06.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
Jul 20 15:30:06.000 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort 45.xxx.xxx.xxx:9001 is reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating success)
Jul 20 15:30:09.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor.
Jul 20 15:31:14.000 [notice] Your network connection speed appears to have changed. Resetting timeout to 60s after 18 timeouts and 442 buildtimes.
Jul 20 15:31:20.000 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done.
**And then it has no output and seems not working. Besides the above one, once I also got the output:**
...
Jul 20 08:24:27.000 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done.
Jul 20 09:23:17.000 [notice] No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit 30 (a Measuring circuit timeout 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to 60000ms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway.
**What's wrong with my steps in setting the meek server? What should I do next to set up a meek server, either for use or for test?
Must I use CDN to domain fronting it?**
By the way, is it possible to use meek without domain fronting if the domain has not been filtered?
May be I misunderstood something in https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek#Howtorunameek-serverbridge and meek's README and I am sorry for that.
**Trac**:
**Username**: weiruoDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/docker-snowflake-proxy/-/issues/2Problem with docker-compose on Raspberry Pi 3B+2022-03-01T17:55:27ZrichysProblem with docker-compose on Raspberry Pi 3B+Hi, I'm testing SNOWFLAKE on docker, and it's giving me an error that never finishes booting. Attached records.
Tutorial:
[view](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home#option-3-stan...Hi, I'm testing SNOWFLAKE on docker, and it's giving me an error that never finishes booting. Attached records.
Tutorial:
[view](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home#option-3-standalone)
Docker version on Raspberry Pi 3B +: docker-compose version 1.25.0, build unknown.
Logs:
```
docker-compose logs -f snowflake-proxy
Attaching to snowflake-proxy
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go:219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy exited with code 1
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go:219: exec user process caused: exec format error
```
You can review it, I am interested in putting it on my RP3, I currently have it in the Firefox Browser, but I would like to have it in docker.
Best regardshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40078Problem with docker-compose on Raspberry Pi 3B+2021-11-09T20:35:46ZrichysProblem with docker-compose on Raspberry Pi 3B+Hi, I'm testing SNOWFLAKE on docker, and it's giving me an error that never finishes booting. Attached records.
Tutorial:
[view](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home#option-3-stan...Hi, I'm testing SNOWFLAKE on docker, and it's giving me an error that never finishes booting. Attached records.
Tutorial:
[view](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home#option-3-standalone)
Docker version on Raspberry Pi 3B +: docker-compose version 1.25.0, build unknown.
Logs:
```
docker-compose logs -f snowflake-proxy
Attaching to snowflake-proxy
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go: 219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go:219: exec user process caused: exec format error
snowflake-proxy exited with code 1
snowflake-proxy | standard_init_linux.go:219: exec user process caused: exec format error
```
You can review it, I am interested in putting it on my RP3, I currently have it in the Firefox Browser, but I would like to have it in docker.
Best regardshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/bridgedb/-/issues/9264Problem with transport lines in BridgeDB's bridge pool assignment files2020-06-27T13:43:22ZKarsten LoesingProblem with transport lines in BridgeDB's bridge pool assignment filesThere seems to be a problem with BridgeDB writing transport lines to its bridge pool assignment files:
```
$ grep -c transport *
2013-07-13-00-01-22:123
2013-07-13-00-30-22:200
2013-07-13-01-00-23:275
2013-07-13-01-30-22:44
2013-07-13-0...There seems to be a problem with BridgeDB writing transport lines to its bridge pool assignment files:
```
$ grep -c transport *
2013-07-13-00-01-22:123
2013-07-13-00-30-22:200
2013-07-13-01-00-23:275
2013-07-13-01-30-22:44
2013-07-13-02-00-25:121
2013-07-13-02-30-27:198
2013-07-13-03-00-33:281
2013-07-13-03-30-29:73
```
Numbers shouldn't go up and down so fast.
Also, I saw Isis mention this the other day, but I'm not sure if there's already a ticket for it:
```
1093d197b5eab404f30806948367483ad5c7482e email ip=4 flag=stable
112f02b648f19502831103fa50715ce31f8a4a2e email ip=4 flag=stable port=443
112f02b648f19502831103fa50715ce31f8a4a2e email ip=4 flag=stable port=443 transport=obfs3,obfs2
11b3a235c05843fbc57f29a848dee6dc6a6be118 unallocated
```
Note the duplicate entry for `112f02b648f19502831103fa50715ce31f8a4a2e`. The first line shouldn't be there, I guess.
Setting priority to major, because the currently produced bridge pool assignments won't be useful for analysis.Isis LovecruftIsis Lovecrufthttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/docker-obfs4-bridge/-/issues/13problems on Orange Pi Zero 22022-04-07T15:32:49Zhufhendrproblems on Orange Pi Zero 2New Docker image 0.10 (latest) has problems on Orange Pi Zero 2 Armbian 21.08.6 Buster.
`standard_init_linux.go:228: exec user process caused: exec format error`
If I run the older 0.9.1, it boots normally. Please fix this. Thank you
...New Docker image 0.10 (latest) has problems on Orange Pi Zero 2 Armbian 21.08.6 Buster.
`standard_init_linux.go:228: exec user process caused: exec format error`
If I run the older 0.9.1, it boots normally. Please fix this. Thank you
PS. at the same time please address issue #11, Orange Pi Zero 2 does not have the power to run at full speed for a long timehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40086Profile snowflake-server and attempt to reduce CPU and heap usage2023-03-10T22:01:48ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgProfile snowflake-server and attempt to reduce CPU and heap usageThe snowflake-server process on the bridge uses 4 to 8 times the CPU of the tor process. It would be nice to see if there are low-effort ways to reduce the CPU usage.
Cf. #40085, which increased the number of CPUs on the bridge server.The snowflake-server process on the bridge uses 4 to 8 times the CPU of the tor process. It would be nice to see if there are low-effort ways to reduce the CPU usage.
Cf. #40085, which increased the number of CPUs on the bridge server.David Fifielddcf@torproject.orgDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/trac/-/issues/8416Programmatize PT bundle building2020-06-27T13:44:05ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgProgrammatize PT bundle buildingWe have good instructions for taking a TBB and turning it into a PT bundle:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/bundle-gnulinux.txt
https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/bundle-macosx.txt
ht...We have good instructions for taking a TBB and turning it into a PT bundle:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/bundle-gnulinux.txt
https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/bundle-macosx.txt
https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/bundle-windows.txt
But the instructions are manual and tedious to follow. They should rather be shell scripts.
The scripts can assume all the necessary components are already in place in some well-known locations. The `torrc` fragments need to be broken out into separate files.
The PT transport bundle is wider than flash proxy, so the build scripts don't really belong in the flash proxy repository. But they can go there for now.David Fifielddcf@torproject.orgDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/gettor-project/OnionSproutsBot/-/issues/35progress bar2022-09-26T10:33:32Zn0tooseprogress barFollow-up for TODO: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/gettor-project/onionsproutsbot/-/blob/6582e2df9b291fa91fbfdcc214dda518b81d8009/OnionSproutsBot/files.py#L28
The progress bar should show the status of the file downlo...Follow-up for TODO: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/gettor-project/onionsproutsbot/-/blob/6582e2df9b291fa91fbfdcc214dda518b81d8009/OnionSproutsBot/files.py#L28
The progress bar should show the status of the file downloads (and subsequent uploads) to Telegram's servers, before they are served to the user. Even if that case scenario in the real-world will only occur rarely, as all files that have been already uploaded to Telegram's servers have been cached, there's a few cases where this could be useful:
- If the bot has a lot of activity, either because of a DoS or an "internet hug of death", it's good to inform the user that their request is being processed. That way, they won't keep repeating their requests over and over again, thus making the problem worse. This actually happened; Our bot made many RPC calls and triggered a ratelimit, which delayed responses a lot, especially as the requests kept increasing exponentially. Users ended up getting responses to their queries after hours. That must've been excessively frustrating. Especially if you were one of the users that ended up spamming the buttons repeatedly, waiting for some sort of a reaction. Some people actually did that, and got responses at completely random times, up to 6 hours later. It got annoying enough to the point where they blocked it. The underlying problem here was the lack of transparency. If transparency had been there from the start, the problem would have likely been much less worse.
- If we ever find ourselves in some sort of a catastrophic situation, some additional visual feedback would make pinpointing the cause of that situation much easier (Is Tor's underlying infrastructure experiencing an outage or are we being blocked from uploading things for some reason and not getting clear feedback from the API about it?). It would also be helpful if a user could inform us of the part that they got stuck on directly.
- Another example would be local debugging and development, especially if a developer only has access to a slow Internet connection. However, locally, this can get very confusing: For example, the library `aiohttp` has a default timeout of 5 minutes. If I simulate a DoS attack by flooding the bot with a lot of requests, artificially limit its available bandwidth or just happen to have a slow Internet connection, I would not be able to tell why a request failed. With a progress bar, inferring the root cause ("Did we hit the timeout?", "Did the download never start to begin with?", "Are uploads to Telegram's servers extremely slow/throttled?", etc.) would be much, much easier. Being able to measure the performance of the bot in that context would also be useful when optimizing its performance.
Being a perfectionist can't possibly hurt.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/trac/-/issues/2759Proof of concept transport plugin: http headers2020-06-27T13:44:09ZRoger DingledineProof of concept transport plugin: http headersSteven has been working on a socks proxy that will stick the Tor transport in http headers. It isn't designed to fool a human looking at the traffic, but it seems to fool wireshark.
Its main goal is to act as a proof of concept for our ...Steven has been working on a socks proxy that will stick the Tor transport in http headers. It isn't designed to fool a human looking at the traffic, but it seems to fool wireshark.
Its main goal is to act as a proof of concept for our modular transport proposal (legacy/trac#2758) so we don't have to generalize from zero data points.Deliverable-May2011Steven MurdochSteven Murdochhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/trac/-/issues/2760Proof of concept transport plugin: superencryption2020-06-27T13:44:09ZRoger DingledineProof of concept transport plugin: superencryptionNick started work on a socks proxy that will add its own layer of encryption on top of the Tor transport. The goal is to separate the task of making Tor unrecognizable on the wire from the task of achieving Tor's desired authentication a...Nick started work on a socks proxy that will add its own layer of encryption on top of the Tor transport. The goal is to separate the task of making Tor unrecognizable on the wire from the task of achieving Tor's desired authentication and confidentiality requirements.
I think asn picked it up from there, and it's now called obfsproxy.
One of its goals is to act as a proof of concept for our modular transport proposal (legacy/trac#2758), but I also want to actually ship it with the Tor bundles for users in blocking countries, so they have a chance against the next DPI-using adversary.
What's the current status? Is it ready to get its own Trac component and its own Tor git repository?Deliverable-May2011George KadianakisGeorge Kadianakishttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/conjure/-/issues/27Properly close all SOCKS connection handles2023-10-12T14:34:34ZCecylia BocovichProperly close all SOCKS connection handlesConjure pluggable transport wrapper fails to close the SOCKS connection in the event of a connection error. This will result in a resource leak that could be abused to deplete the connection resource pool and consequently prevent further...Conjure pluggable transport wrapper fails to close the SOCKS connection in the event of a connection error. This will result in a resource leak that could be abused to deplete the connection resource pool and consequently prevent further connections from being established.
If an attacker is capable of triggering this code path, they will be able to instigate a DoS attack and prevent any further client connections from being made by the Tor Browser. Notably, the standard use case in this scenario stipulates that the Tor Browser connects to the pluggable transport wrapper on localhost. As such, an attacker would already have compromised the host to trigger these connections.Cecylia BocovichCecylia Bocovichhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/rdsys/-/issues/137Proposal - to edit message of getbridges bot2023-01-31T15:41:25ZninaProposal - to edit message of getbridges botI want to offer to remove the phrase "Your bridges:" that @GetBridgesBot sends with the list of bridges (or split it into two different messages)
When the users copy the bridges from the message on the smartphone, they have to copy the...I want to offer to remove the phrase "Your bridges:" that @GetBridgesBot sends with the list of bridges (or split it into two different messages)
When the users copy the bridges from the message on the smartphone, they have to copy the whole message with the phrase "Your bridges:" and then remove this piece already in the TBA/Orbot/Onion Browser. So removing these words from the message would make the user experience bettermeskiomeskio@torproject.orgmeskiomeskio@torproject.org2023-01-11https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/trac/-/issues/12125Proposal 232 (TOR_PT_PROXY) support for goptlib2020-06-27T13:43:59ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgProposal 232 (TOR_PT_PROXY) support for goptlibWe should support [proposal 232](https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/23b94e24f3089ba1a4bcafcc5c92c3753df0f17d:/proposals/232-pluggable-transports-through-proxy.txt)/legacy/trac#8402 (TOR_PT_PROXY) in goptlib.We should support [proposal 232](https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/23b94e24f3089ba1a4bcafcc5c92c3753df0f17d:/proposals/232-pluggable-transports-through-proxy.txt)/legacy/trac#8402 (TOR_PT_PROXY) in goptlib.David Fifielddcf@torproject.orgDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/trac/-/issues/2758Proposal for modular transport spec2020-06-27T13:44:10ZRoger DingledineProposal for modular transport specWe're working on a pair of transport proxies for Tor that will make it harder to fingerprint by traffic content. We should generalize the way that Tor launches these proxies, and the way that we describe them in bridge address lines, so ...We're working on a pair of transport proxies for Tor that will make it harder to fingerprint by traffic content. We should generalize the way that Tor launches these proxies, and the way that we describe them in bridge address lines, so other people can make new proxies down the road and Tor will be able to handle them automatically.Deliverable-Mar2011Thomas BenjaminThomas Benjaminhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/bridgestrap/-/issues/30Proposal: HTTP(S) Download Test2022-01-11T15:03:34ZshelikhooProposal: HTTP(S) Download TestBoth [Gettor](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/censorship-analysis/-/issues/40023) and Tor's main website are targets that attract censorship agencies and law enforcement. We should have an automatic way of testing if an...Both [Gettor](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/censorship-analysis/-/issues/40023) and Tor's main website are targets that attract censorship agencies and law enforcement. We should have an automatic way of testing if an HTTP(s) URL is accessible. Given a URL, the probe will download a maximum of `maxFetchSize` bytes of data, calculate its digest, and return the digest if it exists, time in second to complete the download attempt and error if it exists.
## Input
To test an HTTP(S) URL's reachability, send a POST request to
```
https://HOST/http-state
```
with a request body of
```json
{
"url":"http://domain.name/path",
"maxFetchSize":102400
}
```
## Output
```json
{
"error":"error reason",
"sha256":"base64Ofhash",
"downloadSize":102400,
"time":0.123
}
```https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/bridgedb/-/issues/26543Provide a language switcher menu on BridgeDB2021-07-01T17:47:15ZteorProvide a language switcher menu on BridgeDB"As a side note, that page always loads in my native language with no way to switch to English -- pages which do this are the worst. In this case it means I can't usefully copy-paste you the exact error messages that I get."
https://lis..."As a side note, that page always loads in my native language with no way to switch to English -- pages which do this are the worst. In this case it means I can't usefully copy-paste you the exact error messages that I get."
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-June/015512.htmlPhilipp Winterphw@torproject.orgPhilipp Winterphw@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40148provide a library debian package2022-07-07T12:03:41Zmeskiomeskio@torproject.orgprovide a library debian packageOther packages are interested on using the snowflake client library in debian. Let's create a *-dev* package with it.Other packages are interested on using the snowflake client library in debian. Let's create a *-dev* package with it.meskiomeskio@torproject.orgmeskiomeskio@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/29258Provide an IPv6 address for the Snowflake broker2020-07-06T23:50:09ZAlexander Færøyahf@torproject.orgProvide an IPv6 address for the Snowflake brokerWe have a bit of a tendency to forget to test IPv6 solutions properly and in a structured way. We should make sure that IPv6 is working properly with Snowflake.We have a bit of a tendency to forget to test IPv6 solutions properly and in a structured way. We should make sure that IPv6 is working properly with Snowflake.Sponsor 28: Reliable Anonymous Communication Evading Censors and Repressors (RACECAR)David Fifielddcf@torproject.orgDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.org