Fix some leaks/missed checks in the unit tests (119896cd) · Commits · jarl / tor

ChangeLog

+11 −11

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		Changes in version 0.2.5.3-alpha - 2014-03-??

		o Major features:
		o Major features (security, DoS-resistance):
		- Also consider stream buffer sizes when calculating OOM
		conditions. Rename MaxMemInCellQueues to MaxMemInQueues. Fixes
		bug 10169.
		- Avoid hash-flooding denial-of-service attacks by using the secure
		SipHash-2-4 hash function for our hashtables. Without this
		feature, an attacker could degrade performance of a targeted
		client or server by flooding their data structures with a large
		number of data entries all calculated to be stored at the same
		hash table position, thereby degrading hash table
		performance. With this feature, hash table positions are derived
		from a randomized cryptographic key using SipHash-2-4, and an
		attacker cannot predict which entries will collide.
		Closes ticket 4900.

		o Minor features:
		- Bridges write the SHA1 digest of their identity key fingerprint to
		@@ -23,16 +33,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.3-alpha - 2014-03-??
		database.
		- Decrease the lower limit of MaxMemInQueues to 256 MBytes, to
		appease raspberry pi users. Fixes bug 9686.
		- Avoid hash-flooding denial-of-service attacks by using the secure
		SipHash-2-4 hash function for our hashtables. Without this
		feature, an attacker could degrade performance of a targeted
		client or server by flooding their data structures with a large
		number of data entries all calculated to be stored at the same
		hash table position, thereby degrading hash table
		performance. With this feature, hash table positions are derived
		from a randomized cryptographic key using SipHash-2-4, and an
		attacker cannot predict which entries will collide.
		Closes ticket 4900.
		- Made PREDICTED_CIRCS_RELEVANCE_TIME configurable from config
		file with a new option, PredictedPortsRelevanceTime. Implements
		ticket #9176. Patch by unixninja92.

src/common/sandbox.c

+1 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ sigsys_debugging(int nr, siginfo_t info, void void_context)
		if (!ctx)
		return;

		syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
		syscall = (int) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];

		format_dec_number_sigsafe(syscall, number, sizeof(number));
		tor_log_err_sigsafe("(Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall ",

src/test/test.c

+22 −16

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -671,6 +671,7 @@ test_policies(void)
		config_line_t line;
		smartlist_t *sm = NULL;
		char *policy_str = NULL;
		short_policy_t *short_parsed = NULL;

		policy = smartlist_new();

		@@ -858,24 +859,28 @@ test_policies(void)
		test_short_policy_parse("reject ,1-10,,,,30-40", "reject 1-10,30-40");

		/* Try parsing various broken short policies */
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 200-199"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy(""));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("rejekt 1,2,3"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("reject "));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("reject"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("rej"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3,100000"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3x,4"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3x,4"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2-"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2-x"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 1-,3"));
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 1-,3"));
		#define TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY(s) \
		do { \
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, (short_parsed = parse_short_policy((s)))); \
		} while (0)
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 200-199");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("rejekt 1,2,3");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("reject ");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("reject");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("rej");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3,100000");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3x,4");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3x,4");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2-");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2-x");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 1-,3");
		TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 1-,3");

		/* Test a too-long policy. */
		{
		int i;
		char *policy = NULL;
		short_policy_t *parsed;
		smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
		smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("accept "));
		for (i=1; i<10000; ++i)
		@@ -884,9 +889,9 @@ test_policies(void)
		policy = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
		SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, ch, tor_free(ch));
		smartlist_free(chunks);
		parsed = parse_short_policy(policy);/* shouldn't be accepted */
		short_parsed = parse_short_policy(policy);/* shouldn't be accepted */
		tor_free(policy);
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parsed);
		tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, short_parsed);
		}

		/* truncation ports */
		@@ -927,6 +932,7 @@ test_policies(void)
		SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sm, char *, s, tor_free(s));
		smartlist_free(sm);
		}
		short_policy_free(short_parsed);
		}

		/** Test encoding and parsing of rendezvous service descriptors. */

src/test/test_routerkeys.c

+1 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ test_routerkeys_write_fingerprint(void *arg)
		set_server_identity_key(key);
		set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(key));

		check_private_dir(ddir, CPD_CREATE, NULL);
		tt_int_op(0, ==, check_private_dir(ddir, CPD_CREATE, NULL));
		tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_server_identity_key(),key),==,0);

		/* Write fingerprint file */