Merge branch 'debian-merge' into debian (d2294341) · Commits · jarl / tor

ChangeLog

+145 −0

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		Changes in version 0.2.2.23-alpha - 2011-03-08
		Tor 0.2.2.23-alpha lets relays record their bandwidth history so when
		they restart they don't lose their bandwidth capacity estimate. This
		release also fixes a diverse set of user-facing bugs, ranging from
		relays overrunning their rate limiting to clients falsely warning about
		clock skew to bridge descriptor leaks by our bridge directory authority.

		o Major bugfixes:
		- Stop sending a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever
		we fetch directory information from a relay that has a wrong clock.
		Instead, only inform the controller when it's a trusted authority
		that claims our clock is wrong. Bugfix on 0.1.2.6-alpha; fixes
		the rest of bug 1074.
		- Fix an assert in parsing router descriptors containing IPv6
		addresses. This one took down the directory authorities when
		somebody tried some experimental code. Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
		- Make the bridge directory authority refuse to answer directory
		requests for "all" descriptors. It used to include bridge
		descriptors in its answer, which was a major information leak.
		Found by "piebeer". Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
		- If relays set RelayBandwidthBurst but not RelayBandwidthRate,
		Tor would ignore their RelayBandwidthBurst setting,
		potentially using more bandwidth than expected. Bugfix on
		0.2.0.1-alpha. Reported by Paul Wouters. Fixes bug 2470.
		- Ignore and warn if the user mistakenly sets "PublishServerDescriptor
		hidserv" in her torrc. The 'hidserv' argument never controlled
		publication of hidden service descriptors. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.

		o Major features:
		- Relays now save observed peak bandwidth throughput rates to their
		state file (along with total usage, which was already saved)
		so that they can determine their correct estimated bandwidth on
		restart. Resolves bug 1863, where Tor relays would reset their
		estimated bandwidth to 0 after restarting.
		- Directory authorities now take changes in router IP address and
		ORPort into account when determining router stability. Previously,
		if a router changed its IP or ORPort, the authorities would not
		treat it as having any downtime for the purposes of stability
		calculation, whereas clients would experience downtime since the
		change could take a while to propagate to them. Resolves issue 1035.
		- Enable Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution
		Prevention (DEP) by default on Windows to make it harder for
		attackers to exploit vulnerabilities. Patch from John Brooks.

		o Minor bugfixes (on 0.2.1.x and earlier):
		- Fix a rare crash bug that could occur when a client was configured
		with a large number of bridges. Fixes bug 2629; bugfix on
		0.2.1.2-alpha. Bugfix by trac user "shitlei".
		- Avoid a double mark-for-free warning when failing to attach a
		transparent proxy connection. Bugfix on 0.1.2.1-alpha. Fixes
		bug 2279.
		- Correctly detect failure to allocate an OpenSSL BIO. Fixes bug 2378;
		found by "cypherpunks". This bug was introduced before the first
		Tor release, in svn commit r110.
		- Country codes aren't supported in EntryNodes until 0.2.3.x, so
		don't mention them in the manpage. Fixes bug 2450; issue
		spotted by keb and G-Lo.
		- Fix a bug in bandwidth history state parsing that could have been
		triggered if a future version of Tor ever changed the timing
		granularity at which bandwidth history is measured. Bugfix on
		Tor 0.1.1.11-alpha.
		- When a relay decides that its DNS is too broken for it to serve
		as an exit server, it advertised itself as a non-exit, but
		continued to act as an exit. This could create accidental
		partitioning opportunities for users. Instead, if a relay is
		going to advertise reject : as its exit policy, it should
		really act with exit policy "reject :". Fixes bug 2366.
		Bugfix on Tor 0.1.2.5-alpha. Bugfix by user "postman" on trac.
		- In the special case where you configure a public exit relay as your
		bridge, Tor would be willing to use that exit relay as the last
		hop in your circuit as well. Now we fail that circuit instead.
		Bugfix on 0.2.0.12-alpha. Fixes bug 2403. Reported by "piebeer".
		- Fix a bug with our locking implementation on Windows that couldn't
		correctly detect when a file was already locked. Fixes bug 2504,
		bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha.
		- Fix IPv6-related connect() failures on some platforms (BSD, OS X).
		Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha; fixes first part of bug 2660. Patch by
		"piebeer".
		- Set target port in get_interface_address6() correctly. Bugfix
		on 0.1.1.4-alpha and 0.2.0.3-alpha; fixes second part of bug 2660.
		- Directory authorities are now more robust to hops back in time
		when calculating router stability. Previously, if a run of uptime
		or downtime appeared to be negative, the calculation could give
		incorrect results. Bugfix on 0.2.0.6-alpha; noticed when fixing
		bug 1035.
		- Fix an assert that got triggered when using the TestingTorNetwork
		configuration option and then issuing a GETINFO config-text control
		command. Fixes bug 2250; bugfix on 0.2.1.2-alpha.

		o Minor bugfixes (on 0.2.2.x):
		- Clients should not weight BadExit nodes as Exits in their node
		selection. Similarly, directory authorities should not count BadExit
		bandwidth as Exit bandwidth when computing bandwidth-weights.
		Bugfix on 0.2.2.10-alpha; fixes bug 2203.
		- Correctly clear our dir_read/dir_write history when there is an
		error parsing any bw history value from the state file. Bugfix on
		Tor 0.2.2.15-alpha.
		- Resolve a bug in verifying signatures of directory objects
		with digests longer than SHA1. Bugfix on 0.2.2.20-alpha.
		Fixes bug 2409. Found by "piebeer".
		- Bridge authorities no longer crash on SIGHUP when they try to
		publish their relay descriptor to themselves. Fixes bug 2572. Bugfix
		on 0.2.2.22-alpha.

		o Minor features:
		- Log less aggressively about circuit timeout changes, and improve
		some other circuit timeout messages. Resolves bug 2004.
		- Log a little more clearly about the times at which we're no longer
		accepting new connections. Resolves bug 2181.
		- Reject attempts at the client side to open connections to private
		IP addresses (like 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1, and so on) with
		a randomly chosen exit node. Attempts to do so are always
		ill-defined, generally prevented by exit policies, and usually
		in error. This will also help to detect loops in transparent
		proxy configurations. You can disable this feature by setting
		"ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0" in your torrc.
		- Always treat failure to allocate an RSA key as an unrecoverable
		allocation error.
		- Update to the March 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.

		o Minor features (log subsystem):
		- Add documentation for configuring logging at different severities in
		different log domains. We've had this feature since 0.2.1.1-alpha,
		but for some reason it never made it into the manpage. Fixes
		bug 2215.
		- Make it simpler to specify "All log domains except for A and B".
		Previously you needed to say "[*,~A,~B]". Now you can just say
		"[~A,~B]".
		- Add a "LogMessageDomains 1" option to include the domains of log
		messages along with the messages. Without this, there's no way
		to use log domains without reading the source or doing a lot
		of guessing.

		o Packaging changes:
		- Stop shipping the Tor specs files and development proposal documents
		in the tarball. They are now in a separate git repository at
		git://git.torproject.org/torspec.git


		Changes in version 0.2.2.22-alpha - 2011-01-25
		Tor 0.2.2.22-alpha fixes a few more less-critical security issues. The
		main other change is a slight tweak to Tor's TLS handshake that makes
		relays and bridges that run this new version reachable from Iran again.
		We don't expect this tweak will win the arms race long-term, but it
		will buy us a bit more time until we roll out a better solution.

		o Major bugfixes:
		- Fix a bounds-checking error that could allow an attacker to
		remotely crash a directory authority. Bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.

configure.in

+16 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2008, The Tor Project, Inc.
		dnl See LICENSE for licensing information

		AC_INIT
		AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.2.22-alpha)
		AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.2.23-alpha)
		AM_CONFIG_HEADER(orconfig.h)

		AC_CANONICAL_HOST
		@@ -848,6 +848,20 @@ AC_SUBST(BINDIR)
		LOCALSTATEDIR=`eval echo $localstatedir`
		AC_SUBST(LOCALSTATEDIR)

		if test "$bwin32" = true; then
		# Test if the linker supports the --nxcompat and --dynamicbase options
		# for Windows
		save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
		LDFLAGS="-Wl,--nxcompat -Wl,--dynamicbase"
		AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether the linker supports DllCharacteristics])
		AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([])],
		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])]
		[save_LDFLAGS="$save_LDFLAGS $LDFLAGS"],
		[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
		)
		LDFLAGS="$save_LDFLAGS"
		fi

		# Set CFLAGS _after_ all the above checks, since our warnings are stricter
		# than autoconf's macros like.
		if test "$GCC" = yes; then
		@@ -932,7 +946,7 @@ fi

		CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $TOR_CPPFLAGS_libevent $TOR_CPPFLAGS_openssl $TOR_CPPFLAGS_zlib"

		AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile tor.spec Doxyfile contrib/tor.sh contrib/torctl contrib/torify contrib/tor.logrotate contrib/Makefile src/config/torrc.sample src/Makefile doc/Makefile doc/spec/Makefile src/config/Makefile src/common/Makefile src/or/Makefile src/test/Makefile src/win32/Makefile src/tools/Makefile contrib/suse/Makefile contrib/suse/tor.sh])
		AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile tor.spec Doxyfile contrib/tor.sh contrib/torctl contrib/torify contrib/tor.logrotate contrib/Makefile src/config/torrc.sample src/Makefile doc/Makefile src/config/Makefile src/common/Makefile src/or/Makefile src/test/Makefile src/win32/Makefile src/tools/Makefile contrib/suse/Makefile contrib/suse/tor.sh])
		AC_OUTPUT

		if test -x /usr/bin/perl && test -x ./contrib/updateVersions.pl ; then

contrib/tor-exit-notice.html

+9 −9

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Tor Exit Router</p>
		Most likely you are accessing this website because you had some issue with
		the traffic coming from this IP. This router is part of the <a
		href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor Anonymity Network</a>, which is
		dedicated to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/overview.html">providing
		dedicated to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">providing
		privacy</a> to people who need it most: average computer users. This
		router IP should be generating no other traffic, unless it has been
		compromised.</p>
		@@ -42,19 +42,19 @@ compromised.</p>
		and serve it locally -->

		<p style="text-align:center">
		<a href="https://www.torproject.org/overview.html">
		<a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">
		<img src="https://www.torproject.org/images/how_tor_works_thumb.png" alt="How Tor works" style="border-style:none"/>
		</a></p>

		<p>
		Tor sees use by <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torusers.html">many
		Tor sees use by <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers">many
		important segments of the population</a>, including whistle blowers,
		journalists, Chinese dissidents skirting the Great Firewall and oppressive
		censorship, abuse victims, stalker targets, the US military, and law
		enforcement, just to name a few. While Tor is not designed for malicious
		computer users, it is true that they can use the network for malicious ends.
		In reality however, the actual amount of <a
		href="https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html">abuse</a> is quite low. This
		href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">abuse</a> is quite low. This
		is largely because criminals and hackers have significantly better access to
		privacy and anonymity than do the regular users whom they prey upon. Criminals
		can and do <a
		@@ -108,15 +108,15 @@ equipment, in accordance with <a
		href="http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode17/usc_sec_17_00000512----000-.html">DMCA
		"safe harbor" provisions</a>. In other words, you will have just as much luck
		sending a takedown notice to the Internet backbone providers. Please consult
		<a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response.html">EFF's prepared
		<a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response">EFF's prepared
		response</a> for more information on this matter.</p>

		<p>For more information, please consult the following documentation:</p>

		<ol>
		<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/overview.html">Tor Overview</a></li>
		<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html">Tor Abuse FAQ</a></li>
		<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html">Tor Legal FAQ</a></li>
		<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">Tor Overview</a></li>
		<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">Tor Abuse FAQ</a></li>
		<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq">Tor Legal FAQ</a></li>
		</ol>

		<p>
		@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ the Tor network if you so desire. The Tor project provides a <a
		href="https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py">web service</a>
		to fetch a list of all IP addresses of Tor exit nodes that allow exiting to a
		specified IP:port combination, and an official <a
		href="https://www.torproject.org/tordnsel/">DNSRBL</a> is also available to
		href="https://www.torproject.org/tordnsel/dist/">DNSRBL</a> is also available to
		determine if a given IP address is actually a Tor exit server. Please
		be considerate
		when using these options. It would be unfortunate to deny all Tor users access

contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in

+1 −1

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		@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
		!include "LogicLib.nsh"
		!include "FileFunc.nsh"
		!insertmacro GetParameters
		!define VERSION "0.2.2.22-alpha"
		!define VERSION "0.2.2.23-alpha"
		!define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe"
		!define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/"
		!define LICENSE "LICENSE"

debian/changelog

+9 −0

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		tor (0.2.2.23-alpha-1) experimental; urgency=low

		* New upstream version.
		* The tor specification files are no longer shipped in the tarball,
		so /usr/share/doc/tor/spec is no more. They can be found online
		at <URL:https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree>.

		-- Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org> Wed, 09 Mar 2011 14:40:16 +0100

		tor (0.2.2.22-alpha-1) experimental; urgency=low

		* New upstream version.