Commit 0116eae5 authored by Yawning Angel's avatar Yawning Angel
Browse files

Bug19499: Fix GCC warnings when building against bleeding edge OpenSSL. 

The previous version of the new accessors didn't specify const but it
was changed in master.
parent 421a7c8c

changes/bug19499

0 → 100644
+4 −0
Changes for changes/bug19499: 4 added lines, 0 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
  o Minor features (build):

    - Tor now again builds with the recent OpenSSL 1.1 development branch

      (tested against 1.1.0-pre6-dev).

src/common/crypto.c

+12 −12
Changes for src/common/crypto.c: 12 added lines, 12 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ struct crypto_dh_t { 
};



static int setup_openssl_threading(void);

static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn);

static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn);



/** Return the number of bytes added by padding method <b>padding</b>.

 */
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_ok(const crypto_pk_t *k) 
  if (!k || !k->key)

    return 0;



  BIGNUM *p, *q;

  const BIGNUM *p, *q;

  RSA_get0_factors(k->key, &p, &q);

  return p != NULL; /* XXX/yawning: Should we check q? */

#else
@@ -890,10 +890,10 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env) 
  tor_assert(env);

  tor_assert(env->key);



  BIGNUM *e;

  const BIGNUM *e;



#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API

  BIGNUM *n, *d;

  const BIGNUM *n, *d;

  RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d);

#else

  e = env->key->e;
@@ -919,11 +919,11 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b) 
  if (an_argument_is_null)

    return result;



  BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e;

  BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e;

  const BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e;

  const BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e;



#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API

  BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d;

  const BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d;

  RSA_get0_key(a->key, &a_n, &a_e, &a_d);

  RSA_get0_key(b->key, &b_n, &b_e, &b_d);

#else
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env) 
  /* It's so stupid that there's no other way to check that n is valid

   * before calling RSA_bits().

   */

  BIGNUM *n, *e, *d;

  const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d;

  RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d);

  tor_assert(n != NULL);
@@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) 
   * recreating the DH object.  I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness

   * can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure.

   */

  BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;

  const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;

  DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);

  if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) {

    log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid.  I guess once-in-"
@@ -2451,10 +2451,10 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) 
  int bytes;

  tor_assert(dh);



  BIGNUM *dh_pub;

  const BIGNUM *dh_pub;



#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API

  BIGNUM *dh_priv;

  const BIGNUM *dh_priv;

  DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv);

#else

  dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key;
@@ -2493,7 +2493,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) 
 * See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips.

 */

static int

tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn)

tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn)

{

  BIGNUM *x;

  char *s;

src/tools/tor-checkkey.c

+2 −2
Changes for src/tools/tor-checkkey.c: 2 added lines, 2 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ main(int c, char **v) 
  } else {

    rsa = crypto_pk_get_rsa_(env);



    BIGNUM *rsa_n;

    const BIGNUM *rsa_n;

#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API

    BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d;

    const BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d;

    RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);

#else

    rsa_n = rsa->n;