* backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Conflict with old libssls.

tor (0.1.2.19-3) unstableunreleased; urgency=low

tor (0.1.2.19-3) unstable; urgency=critical

  * It's 2008.  Now is the time to add copyright statements for 2007.

  * Work around fig2dev failing to build the images on all archs -

    backport from 0.2.0.22-rc-1 (re #457568).

 -- Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org>  Wed, 14 May 2008 15:00:47 +0200

  * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Conflict with old libssls.

  * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: On upgrading from versions prior to,

    including, 0.1.2.19-2 if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys

    directory)

    - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way.

    - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way.

    - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was

      created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad

      libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable.

  * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Add a NEWS file explaining this change.

 -- Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org>  Wed, 14 May 2008 15:05:47 +0200

tor (0.1.2.19-2) unstable; urgency=low

Package: tor

Architecture: any

Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, adduser, tsocks

Conflicts: libssl0.9.8 (<< 0.9.8g-9)

Recommends: privoxy | polipo (>= 1), socat

Suggests: mixmaster, mixminion, anon-proxy

Description: anonymizing overlay network for TCP

tor (0.2.0.26-rc-1) experimental; urgency=critical

  * weak cryptographic keys

    It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's

    openssl package is predictable.  This is caused by an incorrect

    Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166).  As a

    result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.

    See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:

    http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html

    If you run a Tor server using this package please see

    /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY

 -- Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org>  Tue, 13 May 2008 12:49:05 +0200

    fi

fi

move_away_keys=0

if [ "$1" = "configure" ] &&

   [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys ] &&

   [ ! -z "$2" ]; then

	if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.1.2.19-2; then

		move_away_keys=1

	fi

fi

if [ "$move_away_keys" = "1" ]; then

	echo "Retiring possibly compromised keys.  See /usr/share/doc/tor/NEWS.Debian.gz"

	echo "and /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY for"

	echo "further information."

	if ! [ -d /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package ]; then

		mkdir /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package

		cat > /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY << EOF

It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's

openssl package is predictable.  This is caused by an incorrect

Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166).  As a

result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.

See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:

http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html

The Debian package for Tor has moved away the onion keys upon package

upgrade, and it will have moved away your identity key if it was created

in the affected timeframe.  There is no sure way to automatically tell

if your key was created with an affected openssl library, so this move

is done unconditionally.

If you have restarted Tor since this change (and the package probably

did that for you already unless you configured your system differently)

then the Tor daemon already created new keys for itself and in all

likelyhood is already working just fine with new keys.

If you are absolutely certain that your identity key was created with

a non-affected version of openssl and for some reason you have to retain

the old identity, then you can move back the copy of secret_id_key to

/var/lib/tor/keys.  Do not move back the onion keys, they were created

only recently since they are temporary keys with a lifetime of only a few

days anyway.

Sincerely,

Peter Palfrader, Tue, 13 May 2008 13:32:23 +0200

EOF

	fi

	for f in secret_onion_key secret_onion_key.old; do

		if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" ]; then

			mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/"$f"

		fi

	done

	if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key ]; then

		id_mtime=`/usr/bin/stat -c %Y /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key`

		sept=`date -d '2006-09-10' +%s`

		if [ "$id_mtime" -gt "$sept" ] ; then

			mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/secret_id_key

		fi

	fi

fi

#DEBHELPER#

exit 0