Commit 666e179d authored by Karsten Loesing's avatar Karsten Loesing
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Proposal 121: Use first part of Diffie-Hellman handshake for replay protection...

Proposal 121: Use first part of Diffie-Hellman handshake for replay protection instead of rendezvous cookie.

svn:r16327
parent 1b2545ff
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+9 −4
Changes for doc/spec/proposals/121-hidden-service-authentication.txt: 9 added lines, 4 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ Change history:
               with Nick
  31-Jul-2008  Limit maximum descriptor size to 20 kilobytes to prevent
               abuse.
  01-Aug-2008  Use first part of Diffie-Hellman handshake for replay
               protection instead of rendezvous cookie.

Overview:

@@ -385,10 +387,13 @@ Details:
  When receiving a v3 INTRODUCE2 cell, Bob checks whether a client has
  provided valid authorization data to him. He also requires that the
  timestamp is no more than 30 minutes in the past or future and that the
  rendezvous cookie has not been used in the past 60 minutes to prevent
  replay attacks by rogue introduction points. If all checks pass, Bob
  builds a circuit to the provided rendezvous point and otherwise drops the
  cell.
  first part of the Diffie-Hellman handshake has not been used in the past
  60 minutes to prevent replay attacks by rogue introduction points. (The
  reason for not using the rendezvous cookie to detect replays---even
  though it is only sent once in the current design---is that it might be
  desirable to re-use rendezvous cookies for multiple introduction requests
  in the future.) If all checks pass, Bob builds a circuit to the provided
  rendezvous point and otherwise drops the cell.

  1.4. Summary of authorization data fields