Commit a07acfcd authored by Roger Dingledine's avatar Roger Dingledine
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add another related issue to think about


svn:r5890
parent 9ff4b2cf
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+19 −6
Changes for doc/incentives.txt: 19 added lines, 6 removed lines.
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@@ -53,7 +53,20 @@

3. Related issues we need to keep in mind.

3.1. The network effect: how many nodes will you interact with?
3.1. Relay and exit needs to be easy and usable.

   Implicit in all of the above designs is the need to make it easy to
   run a Tor server out of the box. We need to make it stable on all
   common platforms (including XP), it needs to detect its available
   bandwidth and not overreach that, and it needs to help the operator
   through opening up ports on his firewall. Then we need a slick GUI
   that lets people click a button or two rather than editing text files.

   Once we've done all this, we'll need to face the big question: is
   most of the barrier to growth caused by the unusability of the current
   software? If so, are the rest of these incentive schemes superfluous?

3.2. The network effect: how many nodes will you interact with?

   One of the concerns with pairwise reputation systems is that as the
   network gets thousands of servers, the chance that you're going to
@@ -63,7 +76,7 @@
   means we need to be aware that this is a limitation, and plan in the
   background for what step to take next.

3.2. Guard nodes
3.3. Guard nodes

   As of Tor 0.1.1.11, Tor users pick from a small set of semi-permanent
   "guard nodes" for their first hop of each circuit. This seems to have
@@ -80,13 +93,15 @@
   also through indirect interaction (middle of the circuit). That way
   you can never be sure when your guards are measuring you.

3.3. Restricted topology: benefits and roadmap.
3.4. Restricted topology: benefits and roadmap.

   As the Tor network continues to grow, we will make design changes
   to the network topology so that each node does not need to maintain
   connections to an unbounded number of other nodes.

3.4. Profit-maximizing vs. Altruism.
   A special case here is the social network.

3.5. Profit-maximizing vs. Altruism.

   There are some interesting game theory questions here.

@@ -103,8 +118,6 @@
   for an incentive scheme so effective that it produces thousands of
   new servers.

3.5. Tor design changes that need to happen.

4. Sample designs.

4.1. Two classes of service for circuits.