Loading doc/tor-design.tex +20 −23 Changes for doc/tor-design.tex: 20 added lines, 23 removed lines. Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -51,16 +51,14 @@ \begin{abstract} We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication system. Tor is the successor to Onion Routing and addresses various limitations in the original Onion Routing design. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges such as root- or kernel-level access, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable trade-off between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We include a new, more practical design for rendezvous points, and close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication systems today. % Which other innovations from section 1 should we mention in the abstract? system. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design. We add perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, variable exit policies, and a practical design for rendezvous points. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable trade-off between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication systems. \end{abstract} %\begin{center} Loading Loading @@ -109,8 +107,6 @@ As a side benefit, onion replay detection is no longer necessary, and the process of building circuits is more reliable, since the initiator knows when a hop fails and can then try extending to a new node. % Perhaps mention that not all of these are things that we invented. -NM \item \textbf{Separation of protocol cleaning from anonymity:} The original Onion Routing design required a separate ``application proxy'' for each Loading @@ -135,11 +131,12 @@ circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity. \item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band signalling within the circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway down the circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}. Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit. down the circuit. This novel approach allows both for long-range padding to frustrate traffic shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}, and, because circuits are used by more than one application, allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit. \item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving Loading Loading @@ -216,14 +213,14 @@ long-lived ``reply onions'' that could be used to build virtual circuits to a hidden server, but these reply onions did not provide forward security, and would become useless if any node in the path went down or rotated its keys. In Tor's current design, clients negotiate {\it In Tor, clients negotiate {\it rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required. \end{tightlist} We have implemented most of the above features. Our source code is available under a free license, and is not (as far as we can tell) encumbered by patents. We have available under a free license, and we believe it to be unencumbered by patents. We have recently begun deploying a widespread alpha network to test the design in practice, to get more experience with usability and users, and to provide a research platform for experimenting with new ideas. Loading @@ -242,9 +239,9 @@ work for the Onion Routing project in Section~\ref{sec:conclusion}. \Section{Related work} \label{sec:related-work} Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's Mix-Net\cite{chaum-mix} design of 1981. Chaum proposed hiding sender-recipient connections by wrapping messages in layers of public key cryptography, and relaying them Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's Mix-Net\cite{chaum-mix}. Chaum proposed hiding the correspondence between sender and recipient by wrapping messages in layers of public key cryptography, and relaying them through a path composed of ``Mixes.'' These mixes in turn decrypt, delay, and re-order messages, before relaying them along the sender-selected path towards their destinations. Loading Loading
doc/tor-design.tex +20 −23 Changes for doc/tor-design.tex: 20 added lines, 23 removed lines. Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -51,16 +51,14 @@ \begin{abstract} We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication system. Tor is the successor to Onion Routing and addresses various limitations in the original Onion Routing design. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges such as root- or kernel-level access, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable trade-off between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We include a new, more practical design for rendezvous points, and close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication systems today. % Which other innovations from section 1 should we mention in the abstract? system. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design. We add perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, variable exit policies, and a practical design for rendezvous points. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable trade-off between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication systems. \end{abstract} %\begin{center} Loading Loading @@ -109,8 +107,6 @@ As a side benefit, onion replay detection is no longer necessary, and the process of building circuits is more reliable, since the initiator knows when a hop fails and can then try extending to a new node. % Perhaps mention that not all of these are things that we invented. -NM \item \textbf{Separation of protocol cleaning from anonymity:} The original Onion Routing design required a separate ``application proxy'' for each Loading @@ -135,11 +131,12 @@ circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity. \item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band signalling within the circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway down the circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}. Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit. down the circuit. This novel approach allows both for long-range padding to frustrate traffic shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}, and, because circuits are used by more than one application, allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit. \item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving Loading Loading @@ -216,14 +213,14 @@ long-lived ``reply onions'' that could be used to build virtual circuits to a hidden server, but these reply onions did not provide forward security, and would become useless if any node in the path went down or rotated its keys. In Tor's current design, clients negotiate {\it In Tor, clients negotiate {\it rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required. \end{tightlist} We have implemented most of the above features. Our source code is available under a free license, and is not (as far as we can tell) encumbered by patents. We have available under a free license, and we believe it to be unencumbered by patents. We have recently begun deploying a widespread alpha network to test the design in practice, to get more experience with usability and users, and to provide a research platform for experimenting with new ideas. Loading @@ -242,9 +239,9 @@ work for the Onion Routing project in Section~\ref{sec:conclusion}. \Section{Related work} \label{sec:related-work} Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's Mix-Net\cite{chaum-mix} design of 1981. Chaum proposed hiding sender-recipient connections by wrapping messages in layers of public key cryptography, and relaying them Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's Mix-Net\cite{chaum-mix}. Chaum proposed hiding the correspondence between sender and recipient by wrapping messages in layers of public key cryptography, and relaying them through a path composed of ``Mixes.'' These mixes in turn decrypt, delay, and re-order messages, before relaying them along the sender-selected path towards their destinations. Loading