Trac issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues2020-06-13T18:31:15Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/22369Increase of users in Ukraine due to block of Russia-based services2020-06-13T18:31:15ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgIncrease of users in Ukraine due to block of Russia-based servicesThere was a large and sudden increase in users from Ukraine, both relay and bridge, on 2017-05-16.
It is probably related to a blockage by Ukraine of some Russia-based sites including VKontakte and Mail.ru:
* https://www.rt.com/busines...There was a large and sudden increase in users from Ukraine, both relay and bridge, on 2017-05-16.
It is probably related to a blockage by Ukraine of some Russia-based sites including VKontakte and Mail.ru:
* https://www.rt.com/business/388502-ukraine-bans-vk-yandex/ ([archive link](https://web.archive.org/web/20170524224004/https://www.rt.com/business/388502-ukraine-bans-vk-yandex/))
Other links:
* [reddit post](https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/6c9ig1)
* [tor-talk thread](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2017-May/043205.html)
![userstats-relay-country-ua-2017-05-01-2017-07-06-off.png](uploads/userstats-relay-country-ua-2017-05-01-2017-07-06-off.png)[link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2017-05-01&end=2017-07-06&country=ua&events=off)
![userstats-bridge-country-ua-2017-05-01-2017-07-06.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-country-ua-2017-05-01-2017-07-06.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2017-05-01&end=2017-07-06&country=ua&events=off)
![userstats-bridge-combined-ua-2017-05-01-2017-07-06.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-combined-ua-2017-05-01-2017-07-06.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2017-05-01&end=2017-07-06&country=ua&events=off)
There was also a spike in Tor Browser downloads for the en-US and ru locales.
![webstats-tb-locale-2017-05-01-2017-07-06.png](uploads/webstats-tb-locale-2017-05-01-2017-07-06.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/webstats-tb-locale.html?start=2017-05-01&end=2017-07-06)https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/21628Merhabalar2020-06-13T18:31:13ZTracMerhabalar(Kotegorilerde bana göre bir sorun bulamadım :( )
Merhabalar Ben Türkiyede Yaşıyorum.
Orbot Ülkemizde kullanamıyorum bende köprü yoluyla deneyim dedim ama olmuyor malesef tor vpnsine bağlanamıyorum :(
sadece başka bir vpn le girdiğim ...(Kotegorilerde bana göre bir sorun bulamadım :( )
Merhabalar Ben Türkiyede Yaşıyorum.
Orbot Ülkemizde kullanamıyorum bende köprü yoluyla deneyim dedim ama olmuyor malesef tor vpnsine bağlanamıyorum :(
sadece başka bir vpn le girdiğim zaman tor vpni çalıştırabiliyorum.
Lütfen napmam lazım yardım edin
English Speak:
I live in Turkey.
Orbot I can not use in our country, I said through the bridge experience but it does not malesef tor vpn I can not connect :(
I just run another vpn le when i enter torp vpni
Your Bridges Are Not Working
**Trac**:
**Username**: WolfCyberhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/21014Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-122021-03-27T04:55:11ZNima FatemiTurkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12Turkey Blocks article: https://turkeyblocks.org/2016/12/18/tor-blocked-in-turkey-vpn-ban/
After getting some reports on twitter about Tor being blocked in Turkey and some chat on IRC, <bypassemall> aka <trdpi> aka <kzdpi> ran some tests...Turkey Blocks article: https://turkeyblocks.org/2016/12/18/tor-blocked-in-turkey-vpn-ban/
After getting some reports on twitter about Tor being blocked in Turkey and some chat on IRC, <bypassemall> aka <trdpi> aka <kzdpi> ran some tests and found some interesting information about how Turkey is blocking vanilla Tor connections. I paste their findings here:
```
16:48 < trdpi> 10 connections died in state handshaking (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE
16:48 < trdpi> after less than 10 seconds
...
16:55 < trdpi> this isp injects rst it seems
16:56 < trdpi> to both side, as i got 2 rst one legit and 2 not
16:57 < mrphs> oh apparently today is an special day in turkey
...
17:00 < trdpi> telneting to or port, no rsts. it triggered by something more than ip:port connection
17:01 < trdpi> yay, window trick for split req works for tr
17:02 < trdpi> magic tool allows to bypass vanilla tor censorship
17:04 < trdpi> so it's about ciphersuits or something
17:07 < trdpi> it's like kz, but obfs4 works
17:07 < trdpi> and kz do not rsts
17:07 < trdpi> it controlls connection
17:07 < trdpi> and tr like do not controlls and to inject fraud only
```https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/21013We need a platform for users to report censorship events2020-06-13T18:31:11ZNima FatemiWe need a platform for users to report censorship eventsUsers often have to rely on random Tor developers on Twitter, IRC or other social medias to let us know when there's a censorship happening somewhere and Tor isn't working as it should. And not always it's in perfect English.
So I think...Users often have to rely on random Tor developers on Twitter, IRC or other social medias to let us know when there's a censorship happening somewhere and Tor isn't working as it should. And not always it's in perfect English.
So I think we need a platform either in one of these forms:
A) An extension or button in the Launcher Menu and in Tor Browser to report when Tor fails to connect or is slow.
This tool could potentially run some tiny (OONI) tests, but I think a much simpler one to just collect ASNumber and a couple of questions user could answer very quickly. Think a survey like tool.
B) Same thing but in form of a website. But obviously needs some domain-fronting or needs to be hosted on Google forms or github pages or similar.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/20907Blocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-012020-06-13T18:31:10ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgBlocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-01Direct users decreased from 5,500 to 3,000 over a few days starting on November 30 or December 1. Bridge users simultaneously increased, from 250 to 2,000.
OONI blog post: [urandom.pcap: Belarus (finally) bans Tor](https://ooni.torproje...Direct users decreased from 5,500 to 3,000 over a few days starting on November 30 or December 1. Bridge users simultaneously increased, from 250 to 2,000.
OONI blog post: [urandom.pcap: Belarus (finally) bans Tor](https://ooni.torproject.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/):
> 1. Tor directory authorities are not blocked
> 2. Public onion routers have their ORPort blocked by TCP RST injection
> 3. The onion routers’ DirPort is not blocked
> 4. Plain-old non-obfuscated Tor Bridges from BridgeDB circumvent the interference
> 5. Beltelecom (or its upstream) has strange configuration of the networking gear injecting reset packets
![userstats-relay-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11-off.png](uploads/userstats-relay-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11-off.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-11&country=by&events=off)
![userstats-bridge-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-11&country=by)
![userstats-bridge-combined-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-combined-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-11&country=by)https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/20785Block of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-202020-06-13T18:31:09ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgBlock of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-20On 2016-11-20, the number of direct users dropped from about 8000 to about 5500. There was a simultaneous increase in bridge users (mostly obfs4) from about 500 to over 1200.
One month later, on 2016-12-22, the number of bridge users dr...On 2016-11-20, the number of direct users dropped from about 8000 to about 5500. There was a simultaneous increase in bridge users (mostly obfs4) from about 500 to over 1200.
One month later, on 2016-12-22, the number of bridge users dropped again, almost back to where it was before.
![userstats-relay-country-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01-off.png](uploads/userstats-relay-country-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01-off.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-08-28&end=2017-06-01&country=sa&events=off)
![userstats-bridge-country-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-country-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2016-08-28&end=2017-06-01&country=sa)
![userstats-bridge-combined-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-combined-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2017-06-01&end=2016-11-26&country=sa)https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/20495Unexplained drop in meek users, 2016-10-19 to 2016-11-102020-06-13T18:31:08ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgUnexplained drop in meek users, 2016-10-19 to 2016-11-10There was a drop in bridge users on October 19 or 20, 2016:
![userstats-bridge-country-cn-2016-07-30-2016-10-28.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-country-cn-2016-07-30-2016-10-28.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-co...There was a drop in bridge users on October 19 or 20, 2016:
![userstats-bridge-country-cn-2016-07-30-2016-10-28.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-country-cn-2016-07-30-2016-10-28.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2016-07-30&end=2016-10-28&country=cn)
The by-transport graph shows that almost all meek users disappeared:
![userstats-bridge-combined-cn-2016-07-30-2016-10-28.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-combined-cn-2016-07-30-2016-10-28.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2016-07-30&end=2016-10-28&country=cn)https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/20419iran has banned tor successfully2020-06-13T18:31:07ZTraciran has banned tor successfully
using tor in iran in these days is impossible.
look likes gov finally find the way to block all tor traffic in iran.
even bridges are not working.
**Trac**:
**Username**: ufd33
using tor in iran in these days is impossible.
look likes gov finally find the way to block all tor traffic in iran.
even bridges are not working.
**Trac**:
**Username**: ufd33https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/20348Allot Communications blocking of vanilla Tor, obfs4, and meek in Kazakhstan, ...2021-03-27T04:55:11ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgAllot Communications blocking of vanilla Tor, obfs4, and meek in Kazakhstan, starting 2016-06At the beginning of June 2016, direct users in Kazakhstan fell, while bridge users simultaneously rose. Thereafter, bridge users slowly declined.
![userstats-relay-country-kz-2016-01-01-2016-10-12-off.png](uploads/userstats-relay-count...At the beginning of June 2016, direct users in Kazakhstan fell, while bridge users simultaneously rose. Thereafter, bridge users slowly declined.
![userstats-relay-country-kz-2016-01-01-2016-10-12-off.png](uploads/userstats-relay-country-kz-2016-01-01-2016-10-12-off.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-01-01&end=2016-10-12&country=kz&events=off)
![userstats-bridge-country-kz-2016-01-01-2016-10-12.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-country-kz-2016-01-01-2016-10-12.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2016-01-01&end=2016-10-12&country=kz)
The mainly used transport was obfs4.
![userstats-bridge-combined-kz-2016-01-01-2016-10-12.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-combined-kz-2016-01-01-2016-10-12.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2016-01-01&end=2016-10-12&country=kz)
The dip in bridge users during September was likely not related to anything happening in Kazakhstan, but is an artifact of the changeover of bridge authorities. See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-team/2016-September/000217.html.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/20216Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-092020-06-13T18:31:00ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.orgIran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
Direct users in Iran dropped from 8,000 to 2,000 between 2016-08-20 and 2016-08-23. The numbers recovered to 4,000, then crashed to 400 on 2016-09-03 and 2016-09-04.
![userstats-relay-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22-off.png](uploads/...
Direct users in Iran dropped from 8,000 to 2,000 between 2016-08-20 and 2016-08-23. The numbers recovered to 4,000, then crashed to 400 on 2016-09-03 and 2016-09-04.
![userstats-relay-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22-off.png](uploads/userstats-relay-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22-off.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-06-24&end=2016-09-22&country=ir&events=off)
_Edit 2016-10-04: the bridge changes below, on further investigation, appear to be unrelated to anything done by Iran._
Looking at bridge users, there is an increase right around 2016-08-20, the time of the first blocking, then an abrupt return to previous levels around 2016-09-03, the time of the second blocking.
![userstats-bridge-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2016-06-24&end=2016-09-22&country=ir)
Looking at the graph of bridge users by transport, obfs4 continued working while obfs3 and vanilla were blocked.
![userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png](uploads/userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png) [link](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2016-06-24&end=2016-09-22&country=ir)https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/18285Etisalat (UAE ISP) requiring users to use certain routers (was: The Arab Gulf...2020-06-13T18:30:58ZcypherpunksEtisalat (UAE ISP) requiring users to use certain routers (was: The Arab Gulf Governments Surveillance Project)The ISP called Etisalat which is located in UAE (United Arab Emirates) , they are using new strategy of forcing their surveillance on ppl, and they have used trick to lie on ppl, which is:-
they are calling & sending messages to UAE ppl...The ISP called Etisalat which is located in UAE (United Arab Emirates) , they are using new strategy of forcing their surveillance on ppl, and they have used trick to lie on ppl, which is:-
they are calling & sending messages to UAE ppl , and telling them you can upgrade your internet speed from X megabits to 20 megabits with free router and wireless-telephone and Tv-satellite or receiver.
now is this problem? no , but here is the deception inside this:-
they will force you to use their router because there will be no internet connection from your own router. and their router is D-Link DIR 850L6 (some got another models but as i know all of them are from D-Link company) with Etisalat firmware (not the original D-Link firmware).
their firmware has a backdoor inside it , which give the ability to any Etisalat employee accessing the router and do/change whatever they like inside it. not to mention the firmware is closed source for sure, and MAYBE contain malicious programs inside it like e.g spyware or ..etc.or executable programs which can attack targeted OS for e.g Windows/Android/IOS...etc
but what is for sure now the firmware has a backdoor inside it.
and also you CANT go back to the original speed that you were using + your own router. and also adding fees about 200$ if will cancel the internet.and if you will use another firmware like the original firmware of from D-Link company or an open source firmware you will loose the internet connection, and you cant download Etisalat firmware and install it again (because the firmware is not available for users) so they will give you a new router & charge you the corrupted router price. (about 50$ to 100$)
and if you ask them why are you doing this? their answer is:-
"we want to serve our customers as we can give them full support when having a problem regarding connectivity with routers."
(as you see very cheap excuse (the perfect bad word for it = bullshit) in order to kill your freedom of choice on routers with high security levels and surfing the internet freely as you like.and)
so the good question would be:-
- can that effect Tor security/connectivity?
- how can someone help Tor community to understand the risk on Tor users from this privacy attack? (i know ooni project , but it seems complicated and not really much active)
Notes:-
1- i have sent this message to tor project emails the English and the Arabic one = sadly no response till now from over a month or so.
2- this surveillance project not just in UAE , even in Saudia Arabia and so one..
3- i didnt know which categories (Type,Priority,Severity...etc) i should choose for this topic , so i just put anything randomly
lastly i say , hope Tor community/developers/news warn the poor ppl inside these countries by spreading this article (or any similar to it if available) so that (i hope) those ppl will be aware from these attempts and look for themselves to have a good solution for this problem.
Thanks.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/18034the five manipulation eyes (theoretical anonymity enhancement)2020-06-13T18:30:58ZTracthe five manipulation eyes (theoretical anonymity enhancement)Note:- maybe you need to have knowledge about Qubes or multiple isolated VM concept to get what i mean (but not necessarily).
i was thinking of a theoretical protection against the ISP sniffing or reduce the attacking threat of the ISP ...Note:- maybe you need to have knowledge about Qubes or multiple isolated VM concept to get what i mean (but not necessarily).
i was thinking of a theoretical protection against the ISP sniffing or reduce the attacking threat of the ISP to my connection. so i have an idea but i dont know if its going to work , but here it is:-
the idea needs Qubes OS , TorVM and/or Whonix
if we can have more than one Tor connection on a different VMs inside Qubes let say five , which r all opened together at the same time or gradually (1 then 2 then 3 ...) and including my connection among one of them. in another word:-
1- Tor VM (not mine)
2- Tor VM (not mine)
3- Tor VM (my connection)
4- Tor VM (not mine)
5- Tor VM (not mine)
wouldnt that increase our anonymity by increasing the surface of connectors/connection points to Tor? (which for sure one of these connections r my real connection but i dont have one connection only , instead i have five and im only using one).
to make this more efficient to use theory:-
1- the manipulated virtualmachines are not in a true storage , but they only need a fixed storage which mean we need only a disposable non-persistent storage (amnesic VM and Qubes provide this type of VM).
2- these manipulated virtualmachines WONT be useable by human. they are there just for the sake of its purpose. which will give us the opportunity to put these virtualmachines in the lowest consuming resources (RAM , Processor ...etc) so no files or media players or ...etc (so even low storage).
3- to harden these virtualmachines we can make the design of whonix as a mini-whonixes to be used from these VMs:-
Note:- we can use this design in case that just opening Tor wont manipulate anything , but if we open Tor + TBB and surfing X or Y website then we will have this method/theory to work.
(X , Y , Z ,V = just random websites.)
1- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + X website) (disposable VM)
2- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + Y website) (disposable VM)
3- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + my surfing) (normal VM)
4- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + Z website) (disposable VM)
5- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + V website) (disposable VM)
.....etc from hardening things we can put inside this theory. but i dont know if its going to be effective or not , and what will the ISP see when we apply this.
**Trac**:
**Username**: bo0odhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/17112GoAgent and Shadowsocks got deleted2020-06-13T18:30:57ZTracGoAgent and Shadowsocks got deletedNot really tor related but since these were the bigest censorship circumvention tools in china i think its worth thinking bout what this means for tor.
did tor get more traffic from china?
are there alternatives forks spreading?
what ha...Not really tor related but since these were the bigest censorship circumvention tools in china i think its worth thinking bout what this means for tor.
did tor get more traffic from china?
are there alternatives forks spreading?
what happened to the developers?
how did they get caught?
why were they so more popular than tor. was it only speed or is there sometinhg that could be useful for tor beyond what meek implemented?
what are the reactions of people from china?
even if that was in china could something similar happen to the tor project? there is clearly a change in attitude in the goverment and china could have indirect power over developers or hosters.
**Trac**:
**Username**: elypterhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/16969An "anti-virus" for the bad nodes that intentionally block and slow down the ...2020-06-13T18:30:57ZTracAn "anti-virus" for the bad nodes that intentionally block and slow down the network?It would be very useful for the relay workers to find somewhere a daily updated raw list (separated by comma) of the known bad nodes and network IPs that intentionally attack the TOR network by blocking it and killing the traffic by dark...It would be very useful for the relay workers to find somewhere a daily updated raw list (separated by comma) of the known bad nodes and network IPs that intentionally attack the TOR network by blocking it and killing the traffic by dark manoeuvres.
Since I put in my torrc a list of bad nodes found by chance, I have the feeling the things go faster. It's time for the TOR people to develop their own "anti-virus".
**Trac**:
**Username**: TORquesTor: unspecifiedhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/16772Google's reCAPTCHA Tor Censorship !?2020-06-13T18:30:56ZcypherpunksGoogle's reCAPTCHA Tor Censorship !?This week, everytime I've encountered a reCAPTCHA from Google, I was completely unable to solve the CAPTCHA's, see attached image with my CAPTCHA solutions.
Also, from since last week, I encountered Google displaying no CAPTCHA image, b...This week, everytime I've encountered a reCAPTCHA from Google, I was completely unable to solve the CAPTCHA's, see attached image with my CAPTCHA solutions.
Also, from since last week, I encountered Google displaying no CAPTCHA image, but an error, that Google wants to protect it's users from automated requests or something like that.
Sorry, If there are some errors in my CAPTCHA solutions.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/15198Cyberoam blocking connections to Tor2020-06-13T18:30:56ZJacob AppelbaumCyberoam blocking connections to TorI'm currently in Istanbul, Turkey at a local university. The network blocks connections to the Tor network (using Tails) with a layered approach to censorship, I suspect.
I've tried to configure regular bridges, obfs2,3,scramblesuit PT ...I'm currently in Istanbul, Turkey at a local university. The network blocks connections to the Tor network (using Tails) with a layered approach to censorship, I suspect.
I've tried to configure regular bridges, obfs2,3,scramblesuit PT and direct connections. None appear to function. I am able to ssh out - so I can connect to Tor by binding a local SOCKS proxy and configuring Tor to connect over a SOCKS proxy. That is how I've filed this bug report.
The Cyberoam device is clearly acting as a MITM - it is highly annoying. It is a captive portal, which is easy to bypass with a login/password (ironically, not deployed with https!), after the captive portal, it filters conections by protocol, ip address and port number - I haven't yet fingerprinted the device upstream but I'll add information as I find it.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/10099wiki: DontBlockMe project / ListOfServicesBlockingTor doc2020-06-13T18:30:54Zcypherpunkswiki: DontBlockMe project / ListOfServicesBlockingTor docThe current meta ticket for these two wiki pages.
DontBlockMe
ListOfServicesBlockingTor
Join related tickets to this parent.The current meta ticket for these two wiki pages.
DontBlockMe
ListOfServicesBlockingTor
Join related tickets to this parent.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/9549Tor hacked when starting up in Aspen, CO, 19AUG20132020-06-13T18:30:53ZTracTor hacked when starting up in Aspen, CO, 19AUG2013This is the first ticket... just wanted to let you guys know I'm, apparently, a COINTELPRO target and have been for a couple of years since I began activating after the oil spill crisis in Louisiana.
I just downloaded Tor last May, an...This is the first ticket... just wanted to let you guys know I'm, apparently, a COINTELPRO target and have been for a couple of years since I began activating after the oil spill crisis in Louisiana.
I just downloaded Tor last May, and it worked without a hitch.
After yesterday's hack-a-thon (as versus a hacktivist-a-thon), I had to reload Tor via Google Chrome a few minutes ago (yuk)since the Tor application files were erased from my harddrive. (This has happened often with Google over the last couple of years...)
Now am having FireFox proxy issues, FYI, and had to use Chrome to send this message... I thought I should let you know what's happened in case security has been breached... if that's possible.
Hope this message isn't a waste of your time.
Best regards,
Elizabeth
aerguyton.wordpress.com
**Trac**:
**Username**: Elizabethhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/8591GFW actively probes obfs2 bridges2020-06-13T18:30:53ZPhilipp Winterphw@torproject.orgGFW actively probes obfs2 bridgesIt looks like the GFW is now actively probing obfs2. After hearing rumours yesterday, I wasn't able to reproduce this. Today, however, I got my private obfs2 bridge probed just milliseconds after my own connection from China. I got hit b...It looks like the GFW is now actively probing obfs2. After hearing rumours yesterday, I wasn't able to reproduce this. Today, however, I got my private obfs2 bridge probed just milliseconds after my own connection from China. I got hit by two random Chinese addresses as we already know it from the Tor probing. After the probing, my obfs2 connection timed out and the SYN/ACK segments from the bridge were dropped when trying to establish a new connection. I could reproduce all of this several times.
I haven't tested obfs3 yet and I suppose we can skip the old looking-for-the-fingerprint game. Depending on what protocols they are trying to detect, they might have to probe several times since it's not clear what's behind all that entropy. It might be obfs2, obfs3 or VPN PSK and perhaps even more protocols.Philipp Winterphw@torproject.orgPhilipp Winterphw@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/8097I think tor is blocked by my internet provider2020-06-13T18:30:52ZTracI think tor is blocked by my internet providerSorry, I'm really new to Tor, and proxies/etc. The other day, I downloaded the Tor Bundle for Mac OS X, and it would get stuck at "Establishing an encrypted directory connection".
I added bridges, tried the "Firewall only connects to cer...Sorry, I'm really new to Tor, and proxies/etc. The other day, I downloaded the Tor Bundle for Mac OS X, and it would get stuck at "Establishing an encrypted directory connection".
I added bridges, tried the "Firewall only connects to certain ports" option, and even redownloaded to the 64-bit version. I'm not sure if I'm doing something wrong or I am somehow blocked from Tor? Also, I live in Japan.
Here is an image of how my message log looks: http://i46.tinypic.com/23u8ole.png
**Trac**:
**Username**: 48ineGeorge KadianakisGeorge Kadianakis