Trac issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues2015-04-19T13:48:02Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2251QT warning with TBB on Gnu/Linux2015-04-19T13:48:02ZcypherpunksQT warning with TBB on Gnu/LinuxUsing fully patched Ubuntu maverick and 64bit TBB (http://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-1.0.17-dev-en-US.tar.gz).
When I start the browser bundle, I get the following warning:
"Qt: Session manage...Using fully patched Ubuntu maverick and 64bit TBB (http://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-1.0.17-dev-en-US.tar.gz).
When I start the browser bundle, I get the following warning:
"Qt: Session management error: None of the authentication protocols specified are supported"
Everything appears to work properly and I am filing this bug report with TBB. Good job!Erinn ClarkErinn Clarkhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2871Patches for Firefox/Tor Browser2020-06-13T00:30:05ZMike PerryPatches for Firefox/Tor BrowserWe're going to need to create and maintain a series of patches for Firefox 4 for use in our Tor Browser Bundles. Hopefully this is a short-term thing, and we'll get most of these merged into upstream Firefox for FF5. It will probably be ...We're going to need to create and maintain a series of patches for Firefox 4 for use in our Tor Browser Bundles. Hopefully this is a short-term thing, and we'll get most of these merged into upstream Firefox for FF5. It will probably be easier to track most of these in our own bug tracker for now. This is going to be the parent ticket for that.
[[TicketQuery(parent=#2871,format=table,col=component|owner|summary|priority|points,order=priority)]]Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2872Limit the fonts available in TorBrowser2020-06-15T23:38:50ZMike PerryLimit the fonts available in TorBrowserAccording to the Panopticlick data set, the font list (which they obtained through plugins) was the second most identifiable chunk of data they saw, behind plugins themselves. We block plugins, but fonts are still available through CSS.
...According to the Panopticlick data set, the font list (which they obtained through plugins) was the second most identifiable chunk of data they saw, behind plugins themselves. We block plugins, but fonts are still available through CSS.
There are seemingly two potential ways to solve this:
1. Ship with a fixed set of fonts in TorBrowser
2. Limit the number of fonts that can be loaded on a single page
Because of the wide variety of languages we support, and because we'd like this feature merged upstream in Firefox, I think the way to do this is is #2. The maximum number of fonts per page should be governed by an about:config setting.TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stableMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2873Block Components.lookupMethod in TorBrowser2020-06-13T00:10:44ZMike PerryBlock Components.lookupMethod in TorBrowserIt appears that EMCAScript 5 added official support for hooking JS objects for protection against XSS. However Firefox seems to have left a backdoor to undo these hooks in the form of Components.lookupMethod, which is marked "unconfigura...It appears that EMCAScript 5 added official support for hooking JS objects for protection against XSS. However Firefox seems to have left a backdoor to undo these hooks in the form of Components.lookupMethod, which is marked "unconfigurable" (which means it cannot be hooked).
We should remove this bit, and/or neuter this API in TorBrowser. This should allow us to safely write JS hooks to deal with fingerprinting issues in the window object and the DOM.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2874Block access to Components.interfaces from content script2022-11-09T16:43:54ZMike PerryBlock access to Components.interfaces from content scriptComponents.interfaces can be used to fingerprint browser user agent down to OS and minor version. This might not be a lot of data for fingerprinting (depending on how well we keep users upgraded), but it certainly is a concern for target...Components.interfaces can be used to fingerprint browser user agent down to OS and minor version. This might not be a lot of data for fingerprinting (depending on how well we keep users upgraded), but it certainly is a concern for targeting exploit payloads against a particular OS and version combo.
Here's an (outdated) PoC: http://pseudo-flaw.net/tor/torbutton/fingerprint-firefox.html
Here's the Firefox bug for this: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=429070Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2875Spoof Desktop Resolution in TorBrowser2022-06-16T02:51:54ZMike PerrySpoof Desktop Resolution in TorBrowserWe currently have Javascript hooks in Torbutton to spoof our desktop resolution, but this information is now available due to CSS3 media queries. We need to patch Firefox at a deeper level to prevent any pieces of it from obtaining valid...We currently have Javascript hooks in Torbutton to spoof our desktop resolution, but this information is now available due to CSS3 media queries. We need to patch Firefox at a deeper level to prevent any pieces of it from obtaining valid desktop resolution information.
This could work as an about:config approach that tells the patch to either spoof the next largest common desktop size that is bigger than the window, or to a specific fixed size, or to the size of the content window (as if the content window only was the entire desktop).
We'll also want to try to remap mouse event coordinates back to this spoofed desktop:
https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/Event/UIEvent/MouseEvent
Spoofing the content window to the desktop size is the cleanest approach that leaks the least information, but the Panopticlick test makes people believe that they are always unique because this is such a rare thing to do relative to the rest of the web, so people are always wrongly complaining we don't defend against Panopticlick :/TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stableMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2876Enable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowser2020-06-15T23:13:11ZMike PerryEnable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowserApparently firms are using typing cadence to fingerprint users:
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/02/firm-uses-typing-cadence-to-finger-unauthorized-users.ars
At first, I thought we wanted to solve this by providing randomize...Apparently firms are using typing cadence to fingerprint users:
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/02/firm-uses-typing-cadence-to-finger-unauthorized-users.ars
At first, I thought we wanted to solve this by providing randomized high-res timing information to JS Date() because this would also help against fingerprinting the computational resources of a user, but I've since come to my senses. This will likely break the web all over the place (online video buffering, seek, and playback, synchronized animation, online games). Also, computational fingerprinting can be amortized over long periods of time in the background using WebThreads. There's not much we can do about that.
So instead, let's focus on what the fingerprinting firms are focusing on. Let's alter Firefox keypress event delivery so that the DOM does not get any keypress information for a randomized jitter of something like 0-500ms. Since most users type on the order of 2-4 characters per second (20-40WPM), an avg of 250ms delay should be sufficient to obfuscate this.
However, we need to think carefully about the distribution of this delay: uniform may be good enough, but is a shape-shifting meta-distribution better?
Also, we should think at which level we want to introduce this delay. It could just be delay to the DOM, so the user does not even notice it while using forms, but this may introduce a way for AJAX sites to repeatedly submit their forms in the background to measure how many characters tend to be accumulating per second.
Based on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keystroke_dynamics, it sounds like the key properties we need to obscure is flight time and dwell time, and that character rate of formfill won't be as useful.
However, if we can also handle formfill it without impacting user experience, maybe we should.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2950Make Permissions-Manager memory-only in TorBrowser2022-06-16T03:55:29ZMike PerryMake Permissions-Manager memory-only in TorBrowserBy default, the new Firefox 4 permissions manager should be memory-only. This will also solve the STS problem, which stores its state in the permissions manager.By default, the new Firefox 4 permissions manager should be memory-only. This will also solve the STS problem, which stores its state in the permissions manager.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2951Review permissions manager and certdb source2011-05-02T05:21:22ZMike PerryReview permissions manager and certdb sourceIn order to estimate time for #2949 and #2950, we need to review the source code of the relevant components to see how hard it is to make them exist only in memory. I think it is simple for the permissions manager, but unknown for the in...In order to estimate time for #2949 and #2950, we need to review the source code of the relevant components to see how hard it is to make them exist only in memory. I think it is simple for the permissions manager, but unknown for the intermediate cert store.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3060Review JonDos Design + Profile2011-05-31T00:55:06ZMike PerryReview JonDos Design + ProfileWe need to review the JonDos Firefox profile and work with them towards a shared web fingerprint.We need to review the JonDos Firefox profile and work with them towards a shared web fingerprint.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3229Make content pref service memory-only + clearable2022-06-16T00:22:07ZMike PerryMake content pref service memory-only + clearableOur current blanket disable of site-specific zoom has very annoying effects on pages like wikipedia. If you zoom to view the text and then click on an anchor link, the zoom gets reset because it is not stored.
We should make this memory...Our current blanket disable of site-specific zoom has very annoying effects on pages like wikipedia. If you zoom to view the text and then click on an anchor link, the zoom gets reset because it is not stored.
We should make this memory only and clearable via an observer or pref.TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stableMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3247Fix SOCKS Timeout2011-09-06T21:50:09ZMike PerryFix SOCKS TimeoutWe've already done this, but I decided to create a ticket for the patch so we have it in trac.
The patch lives at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=280661 and also in our torbrowser.git repo.We've already done this, but I decided to create a ticket for the patch so we have it in trac.
The patch lives at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=280661 and also in our torbrowser.git repo.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3328Tor not connecting to hidden services2011-06-02T11:51:20ZTracTor not connecting to hidden servicesI'm using the TOR Browser bundle with Polipo, Vidalia and TorButton in Firefox.
My operating system is Windows 7 Professional (32 bit)
Whenever I try to open a hidden service, I get the following error:
504 Connect to www.onion:80 fail...I'm using the TOR Browser bundle with Polipo, Vidalia and TorButton in Firefox.
My operating system is Windows 7 Professional (32 bit)
Whenever I try to open a hidden service, I get the following error:
504 Connect to www.onion:80 failed: General SOCKS server failure
The following error occurred while trying to access http://www.onion/:
504 Connect to www.onion:80 failed: General SOCKS server failure
This is the Vidalia message log of the failed connection:
Jun 02 01:43:15.204 [Notice] Tor v0.2.1.30. This is experimental software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity. (Running on Very recent version of Windows [major=6,minor=1] Service Pack 1 [workstation] {terminal services, single user})
Jun 02 01:43:15.204 [Notice] Initialized libevent version 2.0.10-stable using method win32. Good.
Jun 02 01:43:15.204 [Notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
Jun 02 01:43:15.204 [Notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051
Jun 02 01:43:15.204 [Notice] Parsing GEOIP file.
Jun 02 01:43:17.763 [Notice] OpenSSL OpenSSL 1.0.0d 8 Feb 2011 looks like version 0.9.8m or later; I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation
Jun 02 01:43:17.763 [Notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits.
Jun 02 01:43:17.763 [Notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network.
Jun 02 01:43:17.763 [Notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop.
Jun 02 01:43:18.090 [Notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit.
Jun 02 01:43:18.636 [Notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working.
Jun 02 01:43:18.636 [Notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done.
Jun 02 01:43:39.510 [Warning] Invalid onion hostname [scrubbed]; rejecting
I'm technically not very sophisticated, so I would greatly appreciate any help/suggestions.
**Trac**:
**Username**: megatrollMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3330Evangelize private browsing improvements2011-06-16T02:10:21ZMike PerryEvangelize private browsing improvementsWe should write a blog post describing our ideal private browsing mode. Along the way, I should add my thoughts about the ThirdParty cookie policy to the Mozilla bugzilla, and also review and comment on their Privacy Roadmap.We should write a blog post describing our ideal private browsing mode. Along the way, I should add my thoughts about the ThirdParty cookie policy to the Mozilla bugzilla, and also review and comment on their Privacy Roadmap.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3331Review Firefox Source for Resolution, Fonts, Timestamps, Site Zoom, Plugin Ma...2011-08-24T03:20:34ZMike PerryReview Firefox Source for Resolution, Fonts, Timestamps, Site Zoom, Plugin Manager, and DOM StorageBugs #3229, #2872, #2875, #3547, #2940, #2934, and #1517 all need some review of the Firefox source before we can estimate how much work they'll be and if they are something we can easily hack ourselves. This bug is to document the resul...Bugs #3229, #2872, #2875, #3547, #2940, #2934, and #1517 all need some review of the Firefox source before we can estimate how much work they'll be and if they are something we can easily hack ourselves. This bug is to document the results of this review and the location of potential hack points.TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stableMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3334Import Bookmarks2013-03-23T03:13:19ZTracImport BookmarksHi,
I'm trying to find a way to import my bookmarks from IExplorer into tor firefox. The Import button is greyed out in firefox. Is there a way to do this?
Is this by design. I've read some rather convoluted mails on google somewhere w...Hi,
I'm trying to find a way to import my bookmarks from IExplorer into tor firefox. The Import button is greyed out in firefox. Is there a way to do this?
Is this by design. I've read some rather convoluted mails on google somewhere who successfully did it.
Z
**Trac**:
**Username**: RootZeroMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3412Reformat and order Tor Browser patches2011-06-22T00:22:31ZMike PerryReformat and order Tor Browser patchesI need to reformat my patches #2871 to match the instructions in:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/docs/HACKINGI need to reformat my patches #2871 to match the instructions in:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/docs/HACKINGMike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3433pages do not load correctly when tor button is enabled2017-12-06T04:45:21ZTracpages do not load correctly when tor button is enabledpages do not load correctly when tor button is enabled installed tor browser but when trying to go to a page the page will not load correctly can only go to pages when tor button is disabled this needs to be fixed. this is like having a ...pages do not load correctly when tor button is enabled installed tor browser but when trying to go to a page the page will not load correctly can only go to pages when tor button is disabled this needs to be fixed. this is like having a web browser that leaves no footprint on computer but does not hide your information like your personal identifiable information
**Trac**:
**Username**: A2Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3461minor tweaks for TBB to reduce data transfer and data leaking2013-03-23T03:08:22ZAndrew Lewmanminor tweaks for TBB to reduce data transfer and data leakingI've noticed the default TBB is quite permissive in its settings. I am concerned that after a few hours of browsing in TBB, a large number of sites can track my current persona and know where I've been on the web, and what I've been doi...I've noticed the default TBB is quite permissive in its settings. I am concerned that after a few hours of browsing in TBB, a large number of sites can track my current persona and know where I've been on the web, and what I've been doing. If I screw up once and login to a website with my real identity, I've just tied anonymous me to real me. I've been looking into the data stored in cache after some simple operations and how it is effected by changing the torbutton and noscript settings. I wish I could export torbutton settings in some simple manner.
I did a simple test this morning.
1. I start up TBB 1.1.11 on linux.
2. I click on the 'the tor blog' bookmark and let the page load.
3. I then click on 'learn more about tor' bookmark and let the page load.
4. On the tor website, I click on Press.
5. Once the page loads, I click on volunteer.
6. After the page loads, I decide to see what the weather is like at the tor office. I enter 'wunderground.com' in the awesome bar and let it load.
7. I enter '02081' in the location and let it load.
8. I click on the radar map and let it load.
Attached are 3 pdfs and 1 text file. Each pdf is named according to what it represents.
1. The file 'default-TBB-settings-cache-data-leaking.pdf' represents the results from 'about:cache' after the eight steps above.
2. I tweak some of the torbutton settings, specifically:
a. Under 'security settings, dynamic content' I check 'Disable updates during Tor usage'.
b. Under 'history', I check all boxes.
c. Under 'forms', I check al boxes.
d. Under 'cache', I check 'clear cookies on tor toggle'
e. Under 'startup', I check 'On normal startup, set Tor state to tor', 'On session restored startup, set tor state to tor', and uncheck the two saving tabs options.
f. Under 'shutdown', I check 'clear cookies during any browser shutdown'.
The file named 'minor-tweaks-TBB-data-leaks.pdf' represents the cache after these changes and following the initial 7 steps.
3. I configure noscript to be slightly more strict in what it allows for javascript and other options. The file 'medium-tweaks-TBB-noscript-settings.txt' are these changes. The file 'medium-tweaks-TBB-data-leaks.pdf' represents the cache after these changes and following the 7 steps.
The result appears to be for the same seven steps, with a tbb restart between each run a dramatic reduction in cached objects.
Default TBB: 442 objects for 2.5MB in cache. Lots of ad networks loaded in cache too.
Minor TBB: 340 objects for 1.5MB in cache. Lots of ad networks loaded in cache too.
Medium TBB: 205 objects for 912KB in cache. 1 Facebook plugin, far few ad networks loaded in cache.Mike PerryMike Perryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/3547Disable all plugins but flash2020-06-15T23:36:31ZMike PerryDisable all plugins but flashWe need to patch Tor Browser to disable all plugins but the flash plugin. The addon manager has the ability to do this, but it is not exported to XPCOM, so we must write a patch in C++.
We should do this instead of mucking with the Fire...We need to patch Tor Browser to disable all plugins but the flash plugin. The addon manager has the ability to do this, but it is not exported to XPCOM, so we must write a patch in C++.
We should do this instead of mucking with the Firefox plugin search paths in Tor Browser.TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stableMike PerryMike Perry