Trac issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues2020-06-13T15:45:18Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/31647Should OBSOLETE and ___invisible configuration obtions be available to GETCONF?2020-06-13T15:45:18ZNick MathewsonShould OBSOLETE and ___invisible configuration obtions be available to GETCONF?Right now, you can use GETCONF on the invisible `___UsingTestNetworkDefaults` or the obsolete `DisableIOCP` -- without any complaint from Tor.
Perhaps Tor should complain, or even reject these requests.Right now, you can use GETCONF on the invisible `___UsingTestNetworkDefaults` or the obsolete `DisableIOCP` -- without any complaint from Tor.
Perhaps Tor should complain, or even reject these requests.Tor: unspecifiedhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/2473Develop a design to support multiple bridge authorities2020-06-13T14:08:30ZRoger DingledineDevelop a design to support multiple bridge authoritiesThe main thing blocking multiple bridge directory authorities right now is that we don't have a design for how it would work. For the normal directory authority design, we want all of them to know about all relays. But for bridge authori...The main thing blocking multiple bridge directory authorities right now is that we don't have a design for how it would work. For the normal directory authority design, we want all of them to know about all relays. But for bridge authorities, that would defeat the purpose. So we want some algorithms for distributing bridges over authorities, such that bridge users know where to go to look up a given bridge (probably as a function of its identity fingerprint). Perhaps the algorithm should provide stable answers even as we change the set of bridge authorities, and for clients and bridges running a variety of Tor versions. More generally, we need to figure out what functionality we want and what security properties we should shoot for.
Somebody should start with a proposal, and go from there.Tor: unspecifiedhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/697Wrong DNS configuration could break navigation2020-06-13T14:00:00ZTracWrong DNS configuration could break navigationOn 0.2.0.26rc (add new version on reported version please),
Hello,
i've received one email who alert me.
One user have received OpenDNS pages when he is using tor.
OpenDNS is a company who resolve DNS for the others giving them filt...On 0.2.0.26rc (add new version on reported version please),
Hello,
i've received one email who alert me.
One user have received OpenDNS pages when he is using tor.
OpenDNS is a company who resolve DNS for the others giving them filtering, security, ads, but no privacy.
It appears that some nodes resolving DNS seems to have wrong DNS configured, blocking navigation.
If one router making dns resolution is misconfigured it could break navigation of others.
I think a DNS control need probably to be added making theses routers down.
Perhaps using a downloadable list for phishing.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: d
Date: 2008/6/10 04:22
Subject: Tor exit node policy
Hello,
I was browsing a phishing site using Tor recently and instead of the phish I saw an OpenDNS warning page (and apparently no way to bypass it). Yours was one of the exit nodes that was part of my Tor connection at the time.
I wasn't able to identify exactly which exit node it was.
Do you have Phish Filtering set up on your exit node, and if so is this a deliberate policy? I work in antiphishing and use Tor for some phish sites.
Thank you,
d
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**Trac**:
**Username**: amisTor: unspecified