Trac issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues2020-06-15T23:01:45Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34104Tor Browser installer on Windows is blurry2020-06-15T23:01:45ZGeorg KoppenTor Browser installer on Windows is blurryI happen to get my hands on a new Windows 10 powered laptop and I realized that our Windows installer looks actually quite blurry. I guess we'd need some update for our NSIS script to fix that.I happen to get my hands on a new Windows 10 powered laptop and I realized that our Windows installer looks actually quite blurry. I guess we'd need some update for our NSIS script to fix that.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34103Stop rounding y axis labels with units2020-06-13T18:15:35ZKarsten LoesingStop rounding y axis labels with unitsThe [Time to download files over Tor graph](https://metrics.torproject.org/torperf.html) now displays the following labels, all using seconds as units: 0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2. Better labels would be 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5.
Similarly, th...The [Time to download files over Tor graph](https://metrics.torproject.org/torperf.html) now displays the following labels, all using seconds as units: 0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2. Better labels would be 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5.
Similarly, the [Advertised bandwidth distribution graph](https://metrics.torproject.org/advbwdist-perc.html?start=2015-01-19&end=2020-04-18&p=50) showing the median displays the following labels, all using Gbit/s: 0.00, 0.02, 0.05, 0.08. Better labels would be 0.000, 0.025, 0.050, 0.075.
The underlying issue, which we didn't fix in #33933 nor in #33066, is that we have to pick a number of digits for a graph which then needs to work for whichever scale is being displayed. In some cases this is difficult to do right (first graph above with measurements apparently getting faster over time), in other cases it's impossible (second graph above with 1st and 99th percentile having different orders of magnitude).
The fix is to stop using the `unit_format` function from the somewhat outdated `scales` package that we're using and instead write our own function for formatting labels with units.
I'm going to attach two example graphs where this went wrong plus a patch that I'll review more carefully tomorrow before I deploy it on the server.Karsten LoesingKarsten Loesinghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34102default browser2020-06-16T01:12:53ZTracdefault browserI can't put the Tor brower as default browser in Windows. I click, I click but nothing changes. Firefox always remains as default brower and in Firefox self I can't change anything too.
How to do ?
Thanks
**Trac**:
**Username**: del...I can't put the Tor brower as default browser in Windows. I click, I click but nothing changes. Firefox always remains as default brower and in Firefox self I can't change anything too.
How to do ?
Thanks
**Trac**:
**Username**: deleitohttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34101Add tor-browser-build project for application-services2020-06-16T01:26:23ZGeorg KoppenAdd tor-browser-build project for application-servicesUnless we rip out all of the `application-services` (which I currently don't think we'll do) we need to have a project for it in `tor-browser-build`.
This will be a fun one to build. See the `lib` dir for some build scripts and [the meg...Unless we rip out all of the `application-services` (which I currently don't think we'll do) we need to have a project for it in `tor-browser-build`.
This will be a fun one to build. See the `lib` dir for some build scripts and [the megazord design](https://github.com/mozilla/application-services/blob/master/docs/design/megazords.md).Georg KoppenGeorg Koppenhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34100Any page can maximize Tor Browser window2020-06-16T01:12:53ZcypherpunksAny page can maximize Tor Browser windowAny page can maximize Tor Browser window to get user screen resolution to identify user.Any page can maximize Tor Browser window to get user screen resolution to identify user.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34099Git: Too many unreachable loose objects2020-06-13T17:02:01ZMatthew FinkelGit: Too many unreachable loose objectsWhile pushing a new branch to git-rw I received:
```
remote: Resolving deltas: 100% (2093/2093), completed with 683 local objects.
remote: Checking connectivity: 3049, done.
remote: via /srv/git.torproject.org/git-helpers/post-receive-di...While pushing a new branch to git-rw I received:
```
remote: Resolving deltas: 100% (2093/2093), completed with 683 local objects.
remote: Checking connectivity: 3049, done.
remote: via /srv/git.torproject.org/git-helpers/post-receive-diff
remote: == 00-sync-to-mirror ==
remote: == commit-mail ==
remote: [hooks/post-receive] Warning: creation or deletion of branches not supported
remote: == github-push ==
remote: == gitlab-push ==
remote: == irc-message ==
remote: == per-repo-hook ==
remote: == xx-jenkins-trigger ==
remote: [hook[9828]] Triggering jenkins build for (https://git.torproject.org/tor-browser.git, tor-browser-68.8.0esr-9.5-1, 2394f6fb251e34668c302191a8bdebf8e487775b).
remote: No git jobs using repository: https://git.torproject.org/tor-browser.git and branches: tor-browser-68.8.0esr-9.5-1
remote: No Git consumers using SCM API plugin for: https://git.torproject.org/tor-browser.git
remote: [hook[9828]] Jenkins triggers done.
remote: error: The last gc run reported the following. Please correct the root cause
remote: and remove gc.log.
remote: Automatic cleanup will not be performed until the file is removed.
remote:
remote: warning: There are too many unreachable loose objects; run 'git prune' to remove them.
remote:
```
`error` was colored red, and `warning` was colored yellow, so this seems mildly important?https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34098crm-int-01 running out of disk space2020-06-13T17:02:01Zanarcatcrm-int-01 running out of disk spaceWe're at 92% disk use on crm-int-01 suddenly... It seems that disk usage grew suddenly three days ago:
https://grafana.torproject.org/d/ER3U2cqmk/node-exporter-server-metrics?panelId=31&fullscreen&orgId=1&var-node=crm-ext-01.torproject....We're at 92% disk use on crm-int-01 suddenly... It seems that disk usage grew suddenly three days ago:
https://grafana.torproject.org/d/ER3U2cqmk/node-exporter-server-metrics?panelId=31&fullscreen&orgId=1&var-node=crm-ext-01.torproject.org:9100&var-node=crm-int-01.torproject.org:9100&from=1585834161059&to=1588426161060
The mariadb server was stopped this morning as well. It seems innodb crashes with the following assertion:
```
2020-05-02 9:08:31 41 [ERROR] InnoDB: preallocating 65536 bytes for file ./torcrm_prod/civicrm_acl_contact_cache.ibd failed with error 28
2020-05-02 9:08:31 41 [Warning] InnoDB: Cannot create table `torcrm_prod`.`civicrm_acl_contact_cache` because tablespace full
2020-05-02 09:08:31 0x7f6c50252700 InnoDB: Assertion failure in file /build/mariadb-10.3-qB78gy/mariadb-10.3-10.3.22/storage/innobase/dict/dict0dict.cc line 491
```
There are also warnings on startup:
```
2020-05-02 13:23:17 0 [Note] InnoDB: Ignoring data file './torcrm_prod/#sql-ib1158381.ibd' with space ID 1137566. Another data file called ./torcrm_prod/civicrm_acl_contact_cache.ibd exists with the same space ID.
2020-05-02 13:23:17 0 [Note] InnoDB: Ignoring data file './torcrm_prod/civicrm_acl_contact_cache.ibd' with space ID 1137566. Another data file called ./torcrm_prod/#sql-ib1158381.ibd exists with the same space ID.
```
We have ~1.5GB left on the server:
```
Filesystem Size Used Avail Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 20G 18G 1.6G 92% /
```
Most of that 18G is in /var with 5GB split between the two databases:
```
2.4 GiB [##########] /torcrm_prod
2.3 GiB [######### ] /torcrm_staging
```
Here's the top 10 tables in disk usage:
```
528.0 MiB [##########] civicrm_mailing_event_queue.ibd
432.0 MiB [######## ] civicrm_mailing_recipients.ibd
340.0 MiB [###### ] civicrm_activity_contact.ibd
172.0 MiB [### ] civicrm_contact.ibd
168.0 MiB [### ] civicrm_log.ibd
148.0 MiB [## ] civicrm_mailing_event_delivered.ibd
80.0 MiB [# ] civicrm_activity.ibd
60.0 MiB [# ] civicrm_group_contact.ibd
52.0 MiB [ ] civicrm_subscription_history.ibd
52.0 MiB [ ] civicrm_email.ibd
```
Backups take up the most space, however, at about 10GB. I am not familiar with how the backup system works on that host, but there are about 7.5GB of SHA256-* files in there:
```
root@crm-int-01:/var/backups/local/mysql# du -sch SHA256-* | tail -1
7.6G total
```
Some of those are fairly old too:
```
root@crm-int-01:/var/backups/local/mysql# ls -alt SHA256-* | tail -2
-rw-r----- 2 root root 16130992 Feb 8 2019 SHA256-f6810ff0245807455347d88a1a0d7eaf29368e64188e7c1766b64c0cc143570e
-rw-r----- 2 root root 130308 Feb 8 2019 SHA256-c30b262677ed796d892b888f7f417690ca55dd83bf17fa421fdd32438ca2203a
```
It also seems that the database grew quite a bit -- doubled in size -- in the last few months, according to the backup sizes:
```
800.9 MiB [##########] 20200415-190301-torcrm_prod
670.4 MiB [######## ] 20200109-190301-torcrm_prod
398.9 MiB [#### ] 20191002-190301-torcrm_prod
```
Obviously, a database server running out of disk space is an... undesirable condition, to say the least. :) Should we expand the disk usage for that server (which I would rather avoid doing during the weekend) or is there something you can do on your end to clean stuff up?
Alternatively, maybe we should improve the backup system here so it doesn't take up twice as much disk space as the production server. Or, even better, not be on the same partition as the prod...anarcatanarcathttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34097Remove tor-moderators list2020-06-13T17:02:00ZRoger DingledineRemove tor-moderators listThere's a tor-moderators list:
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-moderators
which is completely unused -- no messages ever sent, and nobody ever subscribed. Apparently we made it in #32155.
Let's delete it, so pe...There's a tor-moderators list:
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-moderators
which is completely unused -- no messages ever sent, and nobody ever subscribed. Apparently we made it in #32155.
Let's delete it, so people don't look at it and think there's a sekrit list where people are conspiring.
(Moderators for various Tor services and forums do talk to each other, but clearly they have developed other ways of doing it rather than using this list.)
Thanks!Jens KubiezielJens Kubiezielhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34096delete volunteering list2020-06-13T17:02:00ZRoger Dingledinedelete volunteering listThere is a list called "volunteering":
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volunteering
which has Damian, Matt Pagan, and Moritz on it.
Damian tells me he doesn't know of anything that points to it, and that it isn't g...There is a list called "volunteering":
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volunteering
which has Damian, Matt Pagan, and Moritz on it.
Damian tells me he doesn't know of anything that points to it, and that it isn't getting used.
So we should delete it to remove confusion.
Thanks!Jens KubiezielJens Kubiezielhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34095delete support-team-private list2020-06-13T17:01:59ZRoger Dingledinedelete support-team-private listhttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/support-team-private
It was last used in 2016, and also it has members that I recognize from like eight years ago.
I checked with Gus and he thinks shutting it down is a fine plan.
...https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/support-team-private
It was last used in 2016, and also it has members that I recognize from like eight years ago.
I checked with Gus and he thinks shutting it down is a fine plan.
It has archives (private to only subscribers), and we can delete those.
Thanks!Jens KubiezielJens Kubiezielhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34094delete tor-assistants list2020-06-13T17:01:59ZRoger Dingledinedelete tor-assistants listThere is still a tor-assistants list:
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-assistants
but it has a strange group of past people on it, and I don't see anybody successfully using it, except Micah using it in...There is still a tor-assistants list:
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-assistants
but it has a strange group of past people on it, and I don't see anybody successfully using it, except Micah using it in Nov 2019 and Jan 2020 in response to nextcloud password resets, and I have no idea how that happened but it doesn't seem mission-critical. :)
Long ago we used tor-assistants@tpo (not @lists.tpo) for people to help me answer questions from the outside world, but we long ago stopped successfully doing that, and somebody made a mailman list out of it but it never really got off the ground. Now there is tor-team@lists.tpo for a similar but different role.
In any case, this list is not in use, and nobody has been maintaining its subscriber list. It's a good time to clean it up.
Thanks!Jens KubiezielJens Kubiezielhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34093delete gsoc-admin list2020-06-13T17:01:59ZRoger Dingledinedelete gsoc-admin listhttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gsoc-admin
It has me, Damian, and Sebastian on it. I've checked with all three of us and we agree the list has never actually been used.
There is an active alias nam...https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gsoc-admin
It has me, Damian, and Sebastian on it. I've checked with all three of us and we agree the list has never actually been used.
There is an active alias named gso@tpo which is in use and doing fine, so we can drop the (redundant, abandoned) gsoc-admin list.
Thanks!Jens KubiezielJens Kubiezielhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34092Snowflake no longer working on Google Chrome2020-06-13T18:22:01ZcypherpunksSnowflake no longer working on Google ChromeExtension icon disappeared and cannot enable Snowflake in Google Chrome.Extension icon disappeared and cannot enable Snowflake in Google Chrome.https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34091"torrc" error message plus2020-06-16T01:12:52ZTrac"torrc" error message plusI, am doing my best to learn what I can about using Tor, but it is causing problems that knows, now, what ignorant feels like. I, no longer can connect to the Internet with a regular browser, and is necessary for day to day usage utilizi...I, am doing my best to learn what I can about using Tor, but it is causing problems that knows, now, what ignorant feels like. I, no longer can connect to the Internet with a regular browser, and is necessary for day to day usage utilizing bookmarks, and saved passwords for certain accounts. I, do not run Tor when using other browsers, nor do I, want, or can I, use Tor to access sites used on a daily basis. Neither, Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, or Google for that matter will allow me to do _anything_ saying I, am not connected to the Internet, when most definitely, am connected.
I, receive different messages about the DNS, router, or unable to diagnose the problem. The browser opens, but that is as far I, can get. I, cannot even log into my Google account, of which my problems began, meaning when I, logged out of Google everything stopped. Tor was doing the same, opening to the home page, and allowing me to access the blog, and email, only, but using DuckDuckGo returned one message:
"Error 1016 Ray ID: 58cbdadddaeebb46 • 2020-05-01 19:19:35 UTC
Origin DNS error"
and one saying "torrc error." I, cannot recall each error message received, sorry. Apparently, Tor grants me access, now, but when my computer completely shut down, because of an "At Risk" message never, ever seen in my life popped up disabling use, and froze, forcing me to shut my device off. I, realized feeling more vulnerable, now to a virus, malware, etc.
What is going on?
**Trac**:
**Username**: mopzophttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34090qbittorrent2020-06-16T01:12:52ZTracqbittorrentI am completely baffled on how to use BitTorrent for TPB downloads. Anyone with some help, please. Thank you in advance.
**Trac**:
**Username**: rococoI am completely baffled on how to use BitTorrent for TPB downloads. Anyone with some help, please. Thank you in advance.
**Trac**:
**Username**: rococohttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34089Add Apache ProxyPass directive on polyanthum to expose wolpertinger2020-06-13T17:01:59ZPhilipp Winterphw@torproject.orgAdd Apache ProxyPass directive on polyanthum to expose wolpertingerOver at #32740, we are developing a new service that will expose a REST API on polyanthum. OONI (and possibly other censorship measurement tools) will query this API to obtain bridges to test.
Please add the following ProxyPass directiv...Over at #32740, we are developing a new service that will expose a REST API on polyanthum. OONI (and possibly other censorship measurement tools) will query this API to obtain bridges to test.
Please add the following ProxyPass directive to polyanthum's Apache config:
```
ProxyPass /wolpertinger/ http://127.0.0.1:5000/
```
(For what it's worth, we've done this before in #30703, where anarcat documented how he went about implementing this.)anarcatanarcathttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34088circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build time2020-06-13T15:53:26Zs7rcircuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build timeI don't think this is HSv3 ONLY related, but I can only make it happen while building large amounts of rendezvous circuits with reasonable concurrency (over 50). I am not assigning the tor-hs keyword for this reason, but sticking it to s...I don't think this is HSv3 ONLY related, but I can only make it happen while building large amounts of rendezvous circuits with reasonable concurrency (over 50). I am not assigning the tor-hs keyword for this reason, but sticking it to same master parent ticket.
All lines are the same. It is seen for like 130-160 times during the build of little over 100.000 rendezvous circuits.
```
Apr 03 04:05:33.000 [warn] circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build time (0). Xm is 20025ms and we've abandoned 0 out of 136 circuits. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 04:05:33.000 [warn] circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build time (0). Xm is 20025ms and we've abandoned 0 out of 137 circuits. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 04:05:33.000 [warn] circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build time (0). Xm is 20025ms and we've abandoned 0 out of 138 circuits. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 04:05:33.000 [warn] circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build time (0). Xm is 20025ms and we've abandoned 0 out of 139 circuits. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 04:05:33.000 [warn] circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build time (0). Xm is 20025ms and we've abandoned 0 out of 140 circuits. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
```
EDIT: All lines are the same except it always abandons 0 out of N circuits and N is always different of course, increasing with +1 most of the times until the Bug warn disappears.Tor: unspecifiedhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34087HSv3: Bug: Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:981: close_or_reextend_intro_circ2020-06-13T15:53:26Zs7rHSv3: Bug: Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:981: close_or_reextend_intro_circClient side HSv3 non fatal bug. It occurs like between ~20 - 30 times in a total of 100.000 built rendezvous circuits:
```
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:981: close_or_reextend_intro_c...Client side HSv3 non fatal bug. It occurs like between ~20 - 30 times in a total of 100.000 built rendezvous circuits:
```
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:981: close_or_reextend_intro_circ: Non-fatal assertion !(desc == NULL) failed. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev: Non-fatal assertion !(desc == NULL) failed in close_or_reextend_intro_circ at ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:981. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x56) [0x55d874ac7ee6] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x16c) [0x55d874ac30ec] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(hs_client_receive_introduce_ack+0x2f5) [0x55d8749cfe95] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(rend_process_relay_cell+0x226) [0x55d874a1e796] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xbe368) [0x55d874966368] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xbf1c5) [0x55d8749671c5] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(circuit_receive_relay_cell+0x2b4) [0x55d874968a44] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(command_process_cell+0x2c8) [0x55d87494b788] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(channel_tls_handle_cell+0x4eb) [0x55d87492af0b] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xac5ca) [0x55d8749545ca] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(connection_handle_read+0xa92) [0x55d8749183a2] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0x75609) [0x55d87491d609] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x229ba) [0x7f1984b569ba] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x5a7) [0x7f1984b57537] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(do_main_loop+0xff) [0x55d87491e88f] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_run_main+0x10b5) [0x55d87490bbc5] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x55d8749092ca] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(main+0x19) [0x55d874908e89] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xeb) [0x7f198443809b] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] Bug: tor(_start+0x2a) [0x55d874908eda] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 11 08:58:25.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:981: close_or_reextend_intro_circ: Non-fatal assertion !(desc == NULL) failed. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
```Tor: 0.4.4.x-finalDavid Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orgDavid Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34086HSv3: Bug Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:776: client_rendezvous_circ_has_...2020-06-13T15:53:25Zs7rHSv3: Bug Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:776: client_rendezvous_circ_has_openedClient side HSv3 non fatal bug. It occurs like between ~50 - 70 times in a total of 100.000 built rendezvous circuits:
```
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:776: client_rendezvous_circ_ha...Client side HSv3 non fatal bug. It occurs like between ~50 - 70 times in a total of 100.000 built rendezvous circuits:
```
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:776: client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened: Non-fatal assertion !(!node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(rp_node)) failed. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev: Non-fatal assertion !(!node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(rp_node)) failed in client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened at ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:776. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x56) [0x55d874ac7ee6] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x16c) [0x55d874ac30ec] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(circuit_has_opened+0x80) [0x55d874947810] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(circuit_send_next_onion_skin+0x2b8) [0x55d874930d38] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xbe4ba) [0x55d8749664ba] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xbf1c5) [0x55d8749671c5] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(circuit_receive_relay_cell+0x2b4) [0x55d874968a44] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(command_process_cell+0x2c8) [0x55d87494b788] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(channel_tls_handle_cell+0x4eb) [0x55d87492af0b] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xac5ca) [0x55d8749545ca] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(connection_handle_read+0xa92) [0x55d8749183a2] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0x75609) [0x55d87491d609] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x229ba) [0x7f1984b569ba] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x5a7) [0x7f1984b57537] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(do_main_loop+0xff) [0x55d87491e88f] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_run_main+0x10b5) [0x55d87490bbc5] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x55d8749092ca] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(main+0x19) [0x55d874908e89] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xeb) [0x7f198443809b] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Apr 03 14:53:04.000 [warn] Bug: tor(_start+0x2a) [0x55d874908eda] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
```Tor: 0.4.4.x-finalDavid Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orgDavid Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/34085HSv3: Bug Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:518: intro_circ_is_ok2020-06-13T15:53:24Zs7rHSv3: Bug Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:518: intro_circ_is_okClient side HSv3 non fatal bug. It occurs like between ~80-120 times in a total of 100.000 built rendezvous circuits:
```
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:518: intro_circ_is_ok: Non-fata...Client side HSv3 non fatal bug. It occurs like between ~80-120 times in a total of 100.000 built rendezvous circuits:
```
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:518: intro_circ_is_ok: Non-fatal assertion !(!hs_ident_intro_circ_is_valid(circ->hs_ident)) failed. (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev: Non-fatal assertion !(!hs_ident_intro_circ_is_valid(circ->hs_ident)) failed in intro_circ_is_ok at ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:518. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x56) [0x55d874ac7ee6] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x16c) [0x55d874ac30ec] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(hs_client_send_introduce1+0x271) [0x55d8749ce5e1] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit+0x3bd) [0x55d874949d5d] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(connection_ap_attach_pending+0x178) [0x55d87494e108] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(circuit_send_next_onion_skin+0x2b8) [0x55d874930d38] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xbe4ba) [0x55d8749664ba] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xbf1c5) [0x55d8749671c5] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(circuit_receive_relay_cell+0x2b4) [0x55d874968a44] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(command_process_cell+0x2c8) [0x55d87494b788] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(channel_tls_handle_cell+0x4eb) [0x55d87492af0b] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0xac5ca) [0x55d8749545ca] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(connection_handle_read+0xa92) [0x55d8749183a2] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(+0x75609) [0x55d87491d609] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x229ba) [0x7f1984b569ba] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x5a7) [0x7f1984b57537] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(do_main_loop+0xff) [0x55d87491e88f] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_run_main+0x10b5) [0x55d87490bbc5] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x55d8749092ca] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(main+0x19) [0x55d874908e89] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xeb) [0x7f198443809b] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
Mar 31 18:44:17.000 [warn] Bug: tor(_start+0x2a) [0x55d874908eda] (on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
```