BridgeDB's GnuPG online signing key is expired

The key for bridges email service is expired since the 11th of this month. Please provide a new key.

Trac:
Username: txt.file

added bridgedb-email bridgedb-reportbug component::circumvention/bridgedb isis2014Q3Q4 owner::isis priority::high reporter::txt.file resolution::fixed status::closed type::defect labels

Trac:
Priority: critical to major
Keywords: N/A deleted, bridgedb-email added
Summary: email gpg key is expired to BridgeDB's GnuPG online signing key is expired

Rather, the expirations of the "old" "online" keys, since they were never in use on the live, online server (do to problems with the key usage of the GPGME library in #5463 (moved)) have been updated for one year forward from their original expiration date:

(bdb)∃!isisⒶwintermute:(fix/9380-stem_r6 *$<>)~/code/torproject/bridgedb ∴ gpg2 --list-keys 21B554E95938F4D0
pub   4096R/8DC43A2848821E32 2013-09-11 [expires: 2015-09-11]
      Key fingerprint = DF81 1109 E17C 8BF1 34B5  EEB6 8DC4 3A28 4882 1E32
uid               [ unknown] BridgeDB <bridges@bridges.torproject.org>
sub   4096R/21B554E95938F4D0 2013-09-11 [expires: 2015-09-11]
      Key fingerprint = 9FE3 9D1A 7438 9223 3B3F  66F2 21B5 54E9 5938 F4D0
sub   4096R/E7793047C5B54232 2013-09-11 [expires: 2015-09-11]
      Key fingerprint = CFFB 8469 9048 37E7 8CAE  322C E779 3047 C5B5 4232

If issue is taken with my management of these keys, please reopen this ticket. (I would normally feel a bit squicky about updating key expirations, were it not for the fact that these keys have literally been completely dormant for this period, and thus, hopefully less subject to compromise.)

Trac:
Resolution: N/A to fixed
Status: new to closed

Trac:
Keywords: N/A deleted, Isis2014Q3Q4 added

Trac:
Keywords: Isis2014Q3Q4 deleted, isis2014Q3Q4 added

closed

moved to tpo/anti-censorship/bridgedb#13238 (closed)