Skip to content

GitLab

  • Projects
  • Groups
  • Snippets
  • Help
    • Loading...
  • Help
    • Help
    • Support
    • Community forum
    • Submit feedback
    • Contribute to GitLab
  • Sign in
Trac
Trac
  • Project overview
    • Project overview
    • Details
    • Activity
  • Issues 246
    • Issues 246
    • List
    • Boards
    • Labels
    • Service Desk
    • Milestones
  • Operations
    • Operations
    • Metrics
    • Incidents
  • Analytics
    • Analytics
    • Value Stream
  • Wiki
    • Wiki
  • Members
    • Members
  • Collapse sidebar
  • Activity
  • Create a new issue
  • Issue Boards

GitLab is used only for code review, issue tracking and project management. Canonical locations for source code are still https://gitweb.torproject.org/ https://git.torproject.org/ and git-rw.torproject.org.

  • Legacy
  • TracTrac
  • Issues
  • #17591

Closed (moved)
Open
Opened Nov 12, 2015 by Mike Perry@mikeperry

Use channel padding to obscure circuit setup

We could use the code from #16861 (moved) to pad more often during circuit setup to defend against circuit fingerprinting by someone who is watching the guard node. This would be somewhat complicated, as it would need special timers that could be called more often than once per second (or could chain off eachother), but it could be done.

On the client side, it could be done from any of the onionskin or circuit launching calls. On the relay side, we probably would need some logic around padding more often so long as we're still getting RELAY_EARLY cells, or similar.

It's also debatable in general as to if circuit fingerprinting is still successful if you're just watching the guard. If it's not, this may not be worth doing (since it won't protect anyone from a malicious or compromised guard).

To upload designs, you'll need to enable LFS and have admin enable hashed storage. More information
Assignee
Assign to
Tor: unspecified
Milestone
Tor: unspecified
Assign milestone
Time tracking
None
Due date
None
Reference: legacy/trac#17591