* Detects the presence of a censor that injects forged DNS replies when it detects an blacklisted domain name
* Detects the presence of a censor that injects forged DNS replies when it detects an blacklisted domain name
'''Inputs'''
**Inputs**
* A list of domain names.
* A list of domain names.
* A non-existent DNS resolver(such as 8.8.8.1), which should be queried through a DNS injector(such as Great Firewall of China).
* A non-existent DNS resolver(such as 8.8.8.1), which should be queried through a DNS injector(such as Great Firewall of China).
'''Experiment'''
**Experiment**
* From inside the censored network(prober), send DNS queries with the domain names to a non-existent DNS servers, going through the DNS injector(such as GFW) .
* From inside the censored network(prober), send DNS queries with the domain names to a non-existent DNS servers, going through the DNS injector(such as GFW) .
'''Control'''
**Control**
* If, for a domain name, the prober gets a DNS reply, then this domain name is supposed to be injected.
* If, for a domain name, the prober gets a DNS reply, then this domain name is supposed to be injected.
* Otherwise ( the query timeout), this domain name is not injected.
* Otherwise ( the query timeout), this domain name is not injected.
'''Output'''
**Output**
* A list of domain names injected(blocked).
* A list of domain names injected(blocked).
'''Notes'''
**Notes**
This is the kind of censorship that is happening in china as illustrated in this paper: http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2012/paper/ccr-paper266.pdf
This is the kind of censorship that is happening in china as illustrated in this paper: http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2012/paper/ccr-paper266.pdf
