Commit 1108358e authored by Roger Dingledine's avatar Roger Dingledine
Browse files

let people test the RefuseUnknownExits idea

parent 2d29c7be
Changes in version 0.2.2.11-alpha - 2010-03-??
o Minor features:
- Experiment with a more aggressive approach to preventing clients
from making one-hop exit streams. Exit relays who want to try it
out can set "RefuseUnknownExits 1" in their torrc, and then look
for "Attempt by %s to open a stream" log messages. Let us know
how it goes!
o Minor bugfixes:
- When we cleaned up the contrib/tor-exit-notice.html file, we left
out some key text. Fixes bug 1295.
......
......@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(RecommendedClientVersions, LINELIST, NULL),
V(RecommendedServerVersions, LINELIST, NULL),
OBSOLETE("RedirectExit"),
V(RefuseUnknownExits, BOOL, "0"),
V(RejectPlaintextPorts, CSV, ""),
V(RelayBandwidthBurst, MEMUNIT, "0"),
V(RelayBandwidthRate, MEMUNIT, "0"),
......
......@@ -2505,16 +2505,28 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
tor_free(address);
return 0;
}
if (or_circ && or_circ->is_first_hop &&
!get_options()->AllowSingleHopExits) {
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_conn && !get_options()->AllowSingleHopExits &&
(or_circ->is_first_hop ||
(!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
or_circ->p_conn->identity_digest) &&
// XXX022 commented out so we can test it first in 0.2.2.11 -RD
// networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1)))) {
get_options()->RefuseUnknownExits))) {
/* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user
* has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
* has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
* and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies.
*/
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Attempt to open a stream on first hop of circuit. Closing.");
// log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
log_notice(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.",
safe_str(or_circ->p_conn->_base.address),
or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" :
"from unknown relay");
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL, NULL);
or_circ->is_first_hop ?
END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL :
END_STREAM_REASON_MISC,
NULL);
tor_free(address);
return 0;
}
......
......@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
/** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
* currently or recently running relay. Otherwise return 0. */
static int
int
connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest)
{
if (router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id_digest))
......
......@@ -2462,6 +2462,11 @@ typedef struct {
int ConstrainedSockets; /**< Shrink xmit and recv socket buffers. */
uint64_t ConstrainedSockSize; /**< Size of constrained buffers. */
/** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know
* are relays. XXX022 In here for 0.2.2.11 as a temporary test before
* we switch over to putting it in consensusparams. -RD */
int RefuseUnknownExits;
/** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient
* uptime. */
smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts;
......@@ -3532,6 +3537,7 @@ int connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest);
void connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn,
int reason, const char *msg);
......
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