Merge branch 'bug17150_027_extra' into maint-0.2.8 (3f494743) · Commits · Mike Perry / Tor

changes/bug17150

0 → 100644

+7 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		o Minor bugfixes (directory warnings):
		- When fetching extrainfo documents, compare their SHA256 digests
		and Ed25519 signing key certificates
		with the routerinfo that led us to fetch them, rather than
		with the most recent routerinfo. Otherwise we generate many
		spurious warnings about mismatches. Fixes bug 17150; bugfix
		on 0.2.7.2-alpha.

src/or/dirserv.c

+6 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -691,12 +691,14 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t ri, const char msg, const char source)
		static was_router_added_t
		dirserv_add_extrainfo(extrainfo_t ei, const char *msg)
		{
		const routerinfo_t *ri;
		routerinfo_t *ri;
		int r;
		tor_assert(msg);
		*msg = NULL;

		ri = router_get_by_id_digest(ei->cache_info.identity_digest);
		/* Needs to be mutable so routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo
		* can mess with some of the flags in ri->cache_info. */
		ri = router_get_mutable_by_digest(ei->cache_info.identity_digest);
		if (!ri) {
		*msg = "No corresponding router descriptor for extra-info descriptor";
		extrainfo_free(ei);
		@@ -716,7 +718,8 @@ dirserv_add_extrainfo(extrainfo_t ei, const char *msg)
		return ROUTER_BAD_EI;
		}

		if ((r = routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri, ei, NULL, msg))) {
		if ((r = routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
		&ri->cache_info, msg))) {
		extrainfo_free(ei);
		return r < 0 ? ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN : ROUTER_BAD_EI;
		}

src/or/or.h

+8 −4

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -2065,6 +2065,10 @@ typedef struct signed_descriptor_t {
		time_t published_on;
		/** For routerdescs only: digest of the corresponding extrainfo. */
		char extra_info_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
		/** For routerdescs only: A SHA256-digest of the extrainfo (if any) */
		char extra_info_digest256[DIGEST256_LEN];
		/** Certificate for ed25519 signing key. */
		struct tor_cert_st *signing_key_cert;
		/** For routerdescs only: Status of downloading the corresponding
		* extrainfo. */
		download_status_t ei_dl_status;
		@@ -2096,8 +2100,6 @@ typedef int16_t country_t;
		/** Information about another onion router in the network. */
		typedef struct {
		signed_descriptor_t cache_info;
		/** A SHA256-digest of the extrainfo (if any) */
		char extra_info_digest256[DIGEST256_LEN];
		char nickname; /< Human-readable OR name. /

		uint32_t addr; /*< IPv4 address of OR, in host order. /
		@@ -2115,7 +2117,8 @@ typedef struct {
		crypto_pk_t identity_pkey; /< Public RSA key for signing. /
		/** Public curve25519 key for onions */
		curve25519_public_key_t *onion_curve25519_pkey;
		/** Certificate for ed25519 signing key */
		/** Certificate for ed25519 signing key
		* (XXXX duplicated in cache_info.) */
		struct tor_cert_st *signing_key_cert;
		/** What's the earliest expiration time on all the certs in this
		* routerinfo? */
		@@ -2192,7 +2195,8 @@ typedef struct extrainfo_t {
		uint8_t digest256[DIGEST256_LEN];
		/** The router's nickname. */
		char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
		/** Certificate for ed25519 signing key */
		/** Certificate for ed25519 signing key
		* (XXXX duplicated in cache_info.) */
		struct tor_cert_st *signing_key_cert;
		/** True iff we found the right key for this extra-info, verified the
		* signature, and found it to be bad. */

src/or/router.c

+8 −4

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -2037,6 +2037,7 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t r, extrainfo_t e)
		return -1;
		}
		ri->signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
		ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());

		get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
		ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
		@@ -2129,6 +2130,8 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t r, extrainfo_t e)
		strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
		ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
		ei->signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
		ei->cache_info.signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());

		memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
		DIGEST_LEN);
		if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
		@@ -2154,7 +2157,7 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t r, extrainfo_t e)
		memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
		ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
		DIGEST_LEN);
		memcpy(ri->extra_info_digest256,
		memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
		ei->digest256,
		DIGEST256_LEN);
		} else {
		@@ -2195,7 +2198,8 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t r, extrainfo_t e)
		ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);

		if (ei) {
		tor_assert(! routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri, ei, NULL, NULL));
		tor_assert(! routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
		&ri->cache_info, NULL));
		}

		*r = ri;
		@@ -2669,9 +2673,9 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
		char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
		base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
		router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
		if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->extra_info_digest256)) {
		if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256)) {
		char d256_64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
		digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->extra_info_digest256);
		digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256);
		tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s %s\n",
		extra_info_digest, d256_64);
		} else {

src/or/routerlist.c

+23 −14

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -2898,6 +2898,7 @@ routerinfo_free(routerinfo_t *router)
		if (router->identity_pkey)
		crypto_pk_free(router->identity_pkey);
		tor_cert_free(router->signing_key_cert);
		tor_cert_free(router->cache_info.signing_key_cert);
		if (router->declared_family) {
		SMARTLIST_FOREACH(router->declared_family, char *, s, tor_free(s));
		smartlist_free(router->declared_family);
		@@ -2917,6 +2918,7 @@ extrainfo_free(extrainfo_t *extrainfo)
		if (!extrainfo)
		return;
		tor_cert_free(extrainfo->signing_key_cert);
		tor_cert_free(extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert);
		tor_free(extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
		tor_free(extrainfo->pending_sig);

		@@ -3126,7 +3128,7 @@ extrainfo_insert,(routerlist_t rl, extrainfo_t ei, int warn_if_incompatible))
		"Mismatch in digest in extrainfo map.");
		goto done;
		}
		if (routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri, ei, sd,
		if (routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei, sd,
		&compatibility_error_msg)) {
		char d1[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1], d2[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
		r = (ri->cache_info.extrainfo_is_bogus) ?
		@@ -5165,25 +5167,32 @@ router_differences_are_cosmetic(const routerinfo_t r1, const routerinfo_t r2)
		return 1;
		}

		/** Check whether <b>ri</b> (a.k.a. sd) is a router compatible with the
		* extrainfo document
		* <b>ei</b>. If no router is compatible with <b>ei</b>, <b>ei</b> should be
		/** Check whether <b>sd</b> describes a router descriptor compatible with the
		* extrainfo document <b>ei</b>.
		*
		* <b>identity_pkey</b> (which must also be provided) is RSA1024 identity key
		* for the router. We use it to check the signature of the extrainfo document,
		* if it has not already been checked.
		*
		* If no router is compatible with <b>ei</b>, <b>ei</b> should be
		* dropped. Return 0 for "compatible", return 1 for "reject, and inform
		* whoever uploaded <b>ei</b>, and return -1 for "reject silently.". If
		* <b>msg</b> is present, set *<b>msg</b> to a description of the
		* incompatibility (if any).
		*
		* Set the extrainfo_is_bogus field in <b>sd</b> if the digests matched
		* but the extrainfo was nonetheless incompatible.
		**/
		int
		routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri,
		routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const crypto_pk_t *identity_pkey,
		extrainfo_t *ei,
		signed_descriptor_t *sd,
		const char **msg)
		{
		int digest_matches, digest256_matches, r=1;
		tor_assert(ri);
		tor_assert(identity_pkey);
		tor_assert(sd);
		tor_assert(ei);
		if (!sd)
		sd = (signed_descriptor_t*)&ri->cache_info;

		if (ei->bad_sig) {
		if (msg) *msg = "Extrainfo signature was bad, or signed with wrong key.";
		@@ -5195,27 +5204,27 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri,
		/* Set digest256_matches to 1 if the digest is correct, or if no
		* digest256 was in the ri. */
		digest256_matches = tor_memeq(ei->digest256,
		ri->extra_info_digest256, DIGEST256_LEN);
		sd->extra_info_digest256, DIGEST256_LEN);
		digest256_matches \|=
		tor_mem_is_zero(ri->extra_info_digest256, DIGEST256_LEN);
		tor_mem_is_zero(sd->extra_info_digest256, DIGEST256_LEN);

		/* The identity must match exactly to have been generated at the same time
		* by the same router. */
		if (tor_memneq(ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
		if (tor_memneq(sd->identity_digest,
		ei->cache_info.identity_digest,
		DIGEST_LEN)) {
		if (msg) *msg = "Extrainfo nickname or identity did not match routerinfo";
		goto err; /* different servers */
		}

		if (! tor_cert_opt_eq(ri->signing_key_cert, ei->signing_key_cert)) {
		if (! tor_cert_opt_eq(sd->signing_key_cert, ei->signing_key_cert)) {
		if (msg) *msg = "Extrainfo signing key cert didn't match routerinfo";
		goto err; /* different servers */
		}

		if (ei->pending_sig) {
		char signed_digest[128];
		if (crypto_pk_public_checksig(ri->identity_pkey,
		if (crypto_pk_public_checksig(identity_pkey,
		signed_digest, sizeof(signed_digest),
		ei->pending_sig, ei->pending_sig_len) != DIGEST_LEN \|\|
		tor_memneq(signed_digest, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
		@@ -5226,7 +5235,7 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri,
		goto err; /* Bad signature, or no match. */
		}

		ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted;
		ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = sd->send_unencrypted;
		tor_free(ei->pending_sig);
		}