Commit 935fb0dc authored by Nick Mathewson's avatar Nick Mathewson 👻
Browse files

Merge branch 'maint-0.4.3' into release-0.4.3

parents dd7838cd 55cb6c3f
o Minor bugfixes (hidden services):
- Block a client-side assert by disallowing the registration of an x25519
client auth key that's all zeroes. Fixes bug 33545; bugfix on
0.4.3.1-alpha. Patch based on patch from "cypherpunks".
\ No newline at end of file
......@@ -50,11 +50,18 @@ parse_private_key_from_control_port(const char *client_privkey_str,
if (base64_decode((char*)privkey->secret_key, sizeof(privkey->secret_key),
key_blob,
strlen(key_blob)) != sizeof(privkey->secret_key)) {
strlen(key_blob)) != sizeof(privkey->secret_key)) {
control_printf_endreply(conn, 512, "Failed to decode x25519 private key");
goto err;
}
if (fast_mem_is_zero((const char*)privkey->secret_key,
sizeof(privkey->secret_key))) {
control_printf_endreply(conn, 553,
"Invalid private key \"%s\"", key_blob);
goto err;
}
retval = 0;
err:
......
......@@ -2132,6 +2132,13 @@ parse_auth_file_content(const char *client_key_str)
"can't be decoded: %s", seckey_b32);
goto err;
}
if (fast_mem_is_zero((const char*)auth->enc_seckey.secret_key,
sizeof(auth->enc_seckey.secret_key))) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization private key can't be all-zeroes");
goto err;
}
strncpy(auth->onion_address, onion_address, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32);
/* We are reading this from the disk, so set the permanent flag anyway. */
......
......@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ typedef enum {
REGISTER_SUCCESS_AND_DECRYPTED,
/* We failed to register these credentials, because of a bad HS address. */
REGISTER_FAIL_BAD_ADDRESS,
/* We failed to register these credentials, because of a bad HS address. */
/* We failed to store these credentials in a persistent file on disk. */
REGISTER_FAIL_PERMANENT_STORAGE,
} hs_client_register_auth_status_t;
......
......@@ -1434,10 +1434,14 @@ decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
tor_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero(
(char *) &desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey,
sizeof(desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey)));
tor_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero((char *) client_auth_sk,
sizeof(*client_auth_sk)));
tor_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero((char *) desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN));
/* Catch potential code-flow cases of an unitialized private key sneaking
* into this function. */
if (BUG(fast_mem_is_zero((char *)client_auth_sk, sizeof(*client_auth_sk)))) {
goto done;
}
/* Get the KEYS component to derive the CLIENT-ID and COOKIE-KEY. */
keystream_length =
build_descriptor_cookie_keys(desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN,
......
......@@ -732,6 +732,10 @@ test_parse_auth_file_content(void *arg)
/* Bigger key than it should be */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:"
"vjqea4jbhwwc4hto7ekyvqfbeodghbaq6nxi45hz4wr3qvhqv3yqa"));
/* All-zeroes key */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:"
"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"));
done:
tor_free(auth);
}
......
......@@ -467,6 +467,20 @@ test_hs_control_bad_onion_client_auth_add(void *arg)
cp1 = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(&conn)->outbuf, &sz);
tt_str_op(cp1, OP_EQ, "512 Failed to decode x25519 private key\r\n");
tor_free(cp1);
tor_free(args);
/* Register with an all zero client key */
args = tor_strdup("jt4grrjwzyz3pjkylwfau5xnjaj23vxmhskqaeyfhrfylelw4hvxcuyd "
"x25519:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=");
retval = handle_control_command(&conn, (uint32_t) strlen(args), args);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Check contents */
cp1 = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(&conn)->outbuf, &sz);
tt_str_op(cp1, OP_EQ, "553 Invalid private key \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\"\r\n");
client_auths = get_hs_client_auths_map();
tt_assert(!client_auths);
......
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