Merge branch 'small_typo_fixes' (c134bb5a) · Commits · Mike Perry / Tor

src/common/compat.h

+2 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -546,7 +546,8 @@ const char *tor_socket_strerror(int e);
		#endif
		#define ERRNO_IS_EINPROGRESS(e) ((e) == EINPROGRESS)
		#define ERRNO_IS_CONN_EINPROGRESS(e) ((e) == EINPROGRESS)
		#define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e) (ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e) \|\| (e) == ECONNABORTED)
		#define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e) \
		(ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e) \|\| (e) == ECONNABORTED)
		#define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e) \
		((e) == EMFILE \|\| (e) == ENFILE \|\| (e) == ENOBUFS \|\| (e) == ENOMEM)
		#define ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e) ((e) == EADDRINUSE)

src/common/crypto_curve25519.c

+1 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -208,3 +208,4 @@ curve25519_public_from_base64(curve25519_public_key_t *pkey,
		return -1;
		}
		}

src/or/circuitbuild.c

+33 −28

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
		}

		/* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias
		* build success.. They get counted under use success */
		* "build" success, since they get counted under "use" success. */
		if (!circ->has_opened) {
		if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) {
		guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(
		@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
		* are not possible to differentiate from unresponsive servers.
		*
		* The probe is sent at the end of the circuit lifetime for two
		* reasons: to prevent cyptographic taggers from being able to
		* reasons: to prevent cryptographic taggers from being able to
		* drop cells to cause timeouts, and to prevent easy recognition
		* of probes before any real client traffic happens.
		*
		@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ)

		circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING);

		/* Update timestamp for circuit_expire_building to kill us */
		/* Update timestamp for when circuit_expire_building() should kill us */
		tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began);

		/* Generate a random address for the nonce */
		@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)

		} else {
		if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) {
		/* Unused remote circ close reasons all could be bias */
		/* Remote circ close reasons on an unused circuit all could be bias */
		log_info(LD_CIRC,
		"Circuit %d remote-closed without successful use for reason %d. "
		"Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.",
		@@ -1836,6 +1836,8 @@ pathbias_count_unusable(origin_circuit_t *circ)
		/* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to
		* CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here.
		* No need to log that case. */
		/* XXX note cut-and-paste code in this function compared to nearby
		* functions. Would be nice to refactor. -RD */
		log_info(LD_CIRC,
		"Stream-failing circuit has no known guard. "
		"Circuit is a %s currently %s",
		@@ -1886,11 +1888,11 @@ pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ)
		double
		pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
		{
		circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist;
		circuit_t *circ;
		int open_circuits = 0;

		/* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */
		for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) {
		/* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */
		for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
		origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
		if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) \|\| /* didn't originate here */
		circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */
		@@ -1928,9 +1930,10 @@ pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
		}

		/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
		* 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should
		* eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the
		* guard looks fine. */
		* <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that
		* we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good;
		* return 0 if the guard looks fine.
		*/
		static int
		entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
		{
		@@ -1949,7 +1952,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
		if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) {
		log_warn(LD_CIRC,
		"Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large amount of "
		"circuits. To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, "
		"circuits. To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, "
		"Tor has disabled use of this guard. "
		"Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld "
		"were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For "
		@@ -1992,7 +1995,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
		"Your Guard %s=%s is failing a very large amount of "
		"circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is "
		"overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against "
		"you or the potentially the guard itself. "
		"you or potentially the guard itself. "
		"Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld "
		"were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For "
		"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
		@@ -2058,10 +2061,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
		return 0;
		}

		/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included
		* reply_cell as its body. (If <b>reply_type</b> is CELL_CREATED, the body
		* contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If <b>reply_type</b> is
		* CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x\|y).)
		/** A "created" cell <b>reply</b> came back to us on circuit <b>circ</b>.
		* (The body of <b>reply</b> varies depending on what sort of handshake
		* this is.)
		*
		* Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is
		* correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath.
		@@ -2117,9 +2119,9 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ,

		/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ.
		*
		* Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
		* Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated
		* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
		* just give up: for circ to close, and return 0.
		* just give up: force circ to close, and return 0.
		*/
		int
		circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t circ, crypt_path_t layer, int reason)
		@@ -2130,7 +2132,7 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t circ, crypt_path_t layer, int reason)
		tor_assert(circ);
		tor_assert(layer);

		/* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
		/* XXX Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated
		* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
		* just give up.
		*/
		@@ -2223,15 +2225,18 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ,
		return 0;
		}

		/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>.
		* Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something
		* away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers
		/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>: three + the
		* number of endpoints that would give something away about our destination.
		*
		* If the routerlist <b>nodes</b> doesn't have enough routers
		* to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as
		* is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1.
		* XXX ^^ I think this behavior is a hold-over from back when we had only a
		* few relays in the network, and certainly back before guards existed.
		* We should very likely get rid of it. -RD
		*/
		static int
		new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit,
		smartlist_t *nodes)
		new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t exit, smartlist_t nodes)
		{
		int num_acceptable_routers;
		int routelen;

src/or/circuituse.c

+3 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -452,15 +452,15 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
		SET_CUTOFF(stream_cutoff, MAX(options->CircuitStreamTimeout,15)*1000 + 1000);

		/* Be lenient with cannibalized circs. They already survived the official
		* CBT, and they're usually not perf-critical. */
		* CBT, and they're usually not performance-critical. */
		SET_CUTOFF(cannibalized_cutoff,
		MAX(circ_times.close_ms*(4/6.0),
		options->CircuitStreamTimeout * 1000) + 1000);

		// Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long)
		/* Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) */
		SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (14/6.0) + 1000);

		// Server intro circs have an extra round trip
		/* Server intro circs have an extra round trip */
		SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (9/6.0) + 1000);

		SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms);

src/or/onion.c

+2 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,

		/** Perform the final (client-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of
		* type <b>type</b>, using our state in <b>handshake_state</b> and the
		* server's response in <b>reply</b> On success, generate <b>keys_out_len</b>
		* server's response in <b>reply</b>. On success, generate <b>keys_out_len</b>
		* bytes worth of key material in <b>keys_out_len</b>, set
		* <b>rend_authenticator_out</b> to the "KH" field that can be used to
		* establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure,

src/or/or.h

+1 −1

File changed.

Contains only whitespace changes.