New configuration option: DisableDebuggerAttachment

If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging
attachment attempts by other processes. (Default: 1)

Supports Mac OS X and Gnu/Linux.

Sebastian provided useful feedback and refactoring suggestions.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>

changes/disable_debugger_attachment

+  o Minor features:
+    - If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging attachment
+      attempts by other processes. It has no impact for users who wish to
+      attach if they have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root.  We believe that
+      this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may
+      also work on *BSD systems (untested).  Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such
+      as Ubuntu have the kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable
+      it as an attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by
+      default. This feature will attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor
+      specifically - it will not attempt to alter the system wide ptrace scope
+      as it may not even exist. If you wish to attach to Tor with a debugger
+      such as gdb or strace you will want to set this to 0 for the duration of
+      your debugging. Normal users should leave it on. (Default: 1)
+

doc/tor.1.txt

@@ -251,6 +251,20 @@ Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option
     option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the
     **User** option to properly reduce Tor's privileges. (Default: 0)
 
+**DisableDebuggerAttachment** **0**|**1**::
+   If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging attachment attempts
+   by other processes. It has no impact for users who wish to attach if they
+   have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root.  We believe that this feature
+   works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD
+   systems (untested).  Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the
+   kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an attempt to
+   limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by default. This feature will
+   attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor specifically - it will not attempt
+   to alter the system wide ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish
+   to attach to Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set
+   this to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should leave it
+   on. (Default: 1)
+ 
 **FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
     If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
     directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching

src/or/config.c

@@ -40,6 +40,14 @@
 
 #include "procmon.h"
 
+/* Includes for the process attaching prevention */
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) && defined(__linux__)
+#include <sys/prctl.h> 
+#elif defined(__APPLE__)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#endif
+
 /** Enumeration of types which option values can take */
 typedef enum config_type_t {
   CONFIG_TYPE_STRING = 0,   /**< An arbitrary string. */
@@ -238,6 +246,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
   V(DirReqStatistics,            BOOL,     "1"),
   VAR("DirServer",               LINELIST, DirServers, NULL),
   V(DisableAllSwap,              BOOL,     "0"),
+  V(DisableDebuggerAttachment,   BOOL,     "1"),
   V(DisableIOCP,                 BOOL,     "1"),
   V(DNSPort,                     PORT,     "0"),
   V(DNSListenAddress,            LINELIST, NULL),
@@ -649,6 +658,47 @@ get_dirportfrontpage(void)
   return global_dirfrontpagecontents;
 }
 
+/* We only use the linux prctl for now. There is no Win32 support; this may
+ * also work on various BSD systems and Mac OS X - send testing feedback!
+ * 
+ * On recent Gnu/Linux kernels it is possible to create a system-wide policy
+ * that will prevent non-root processes from attaching to other processes
+ * unless they are the parent process; thus gdb can attach to programs that
+ * they execute but they cannot attach to other processes running as the same
+ * user. The system wide policy may be set with the sysctl
+ * kernel.yama.ptrace_scope or by inspecting /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope
+ * and it is 1 by default on Ubuntu 11.04.
+ *
+ * This ptrace scope will be ignored on Gnu/Linux for users with
+ * CAP_SYS_PTRACE and so it is very likely that root will still be able to
+ * attach to the Tor process.
+*/
+/** Attempt to disable debugger attachment. */
+static int tor_disable_debugger_attach(void) {
+    int r;
+    r = -1;
+    log_debug(LD_CONFIG,
+    "Attemping to disable debugger attachment to Tor for unprivileged users.");
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) && defined(HAVE_PRCTL)
+#ifdef PR_SET_DUMPABLE
+    r = prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(PT_DENY_ATTACH)
+    r = ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0);
+#endif
+
+// XXX: TODO - Mac OS X has dtrace and this may be disabled - implement it here
+// XXX: TODO - Windows probably has something similar - implement it here
+    if (r == 0) {
+      log_debug(LD_CONFIG,"Debugger attachment disabled for unprivileged users.");
+    } else {
+      log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unable to disable ptrace attach: %s",
+                          strerror(errno));
+    }
+    return r;
+}
+
 /** Allocate an empty configuration object of a given format type. */
 static void *
 config_alloc(config_format_t *fmt)
@@ -1195,6 +1245,13 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options)
   int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR;
   char *msg;
 
+   /* disable ptrace and later, other basic debugging techniques */
+  if (options->DisableDebuggerAttachment) {
+      tor_disable_debugger_attach();
+  } else {
+      log_notice(LD_CONFIG,"Debugger attachment enabled for unprivileged users.");
+  }
+ 
   if (running_tor && !have_lockfile()) {
     if (try_locking(options, 1) < 0)
       return -1;

src/or/or.h

@@ -2900,6 +2900,8 @@ typedef struct {
                     disclaimer. This allows a server administrator to show
                     that they're running Tor and anyone visiting their server
                     will know this without any specialized knowledge. */
+  int DisableDebuggerAttachment; /**< Currently Linux only specific attempt to
+                                      disable ptrace; needs BSD testing. */
   /** Boolean: if set, we start even if our resolv.conf file is missing
    * or broken. */
   int ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig;