Loading changes/bug17852 0 → 100644 +10 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Minor features (code hardening): - Use tor_snprintf() and tor_vsnprintf() even in external and low-level code, to harden against accidental failures to NUL- terminate. Part of ticket 17852. Patch from 'jsturgix'. Found with Flawfinder. o Minor bugfixes (private directory): - Prevent a race condition when creating private directories. Fixes part of bug 17852; bugfix on 0.2pre13. Part of ticket 17852. Patch from 'jsturgix'. Found with Flawfinder. src/common/compat.c +5 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -576,14 +576,17 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) int len, r; va_list tmp_args; va_copy(tmp_args, args); len = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, tmp_args); /* vsnprintf() was properly checked but tor_vsnprintf() available so * why not use it? */ len = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, tmp_args); va_end(tmp_args); if (len < (int)sizeof(buf)) { *strp = tor_strdup(buf); return len; } strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len+1); r = vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); /* use of tor_vsnprintf() will ensure string is null terminated */ r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; Loading src/common/util.c +63 −10 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -2056,9 +2056,10 @@ int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, const char *effective_user) { int fd; int r; struct stat st; char *f; //char *f; #ifndef _WIN32 unsigned unwanted_bits = 0; const struct passwd *pw = NULL; Loading @@ -2068,18 +2069,34 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, (void)effective_user; #endif /* * Goal is to harden the implementation by removing any * potential for race between stat() and chmod(). * chmod() accepts filename as argument. If an attacker can move * the file between stat() and chmod(), a potential race exists. * * Several suggestions taken from: * https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/RaceConditions.html */ tor_assert(dirname); f = tor_strdup(dirname); clean_name_for_stat(f); log_debug(LD_FS, "stat()ing %s", f); r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st); tor_free(f); if (r) { /* Open directory. * O_NOFOLLOW to ensure that it does not follow symbolic links */ fd = open(sandbox_intern_string(dirname), O_NOFOLLOW); /* Was there an error? Maybe the directory does not exist? */ if (fd == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) { /* Other directory error */ log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s cannot be read: %s", dirname, strerror(errno)); return -1; } /* Received ENOENT: Directory does not exist */ /* Should we create the directory? */ if (check & CPD_CREATE) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Creating directory %s", dirname); #if defined (_WIN32) Loading @@ -2091,23 +2108,51 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, r = mkdir(dirname, 0700); } #endif /* check for mkdir() error */ if (r) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Error creating directory %s: %s", dirname, strerror(errno)); return -1; } /* we just created the directory. try to open it again. * permissions on the directory will be checked again below.*/ fd = open(sandbox_intern_string(dirname), O_NOFOLLOW); if ( fd == -1 ) return -1; } else if (!(check & CPD_CHECK)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s does not exist.", dirname); return -1; } /* XXXX In the case where check==CPD_CHECK, we should look at the * parent directory a little harder. */ return 0; } tor_assert(fd); //f = tor_strdup(dirname); //clean_name_for_stat(f); log_debug(LD_FS, "stat()ing %s", dirname); //r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st); r = fstat(fd, &st); if (r == -1) { log_warn(LD_FS, "fstat() on directory %s failed.", dirname); close(fd); return -1; } //tor_free(f); /* check that dirname is a directory */ if (!(st.st_mode & S_IFDIR)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not a directory", dirname); close(fd); return -1; } #ifndef _WIN32 if (effective_user) { /* Look up the user and group information. Loading @@ -2124,7 +2169,6 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, running_uid = getuid(); running_gid = getgid(); } if (st.st_uid != running_uid) { const struct passwd *pw = NULL; char *process_ownername = NULL; Loading @@ -2140,6 +2184,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, pw ? pw->pw_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_uid); tor_free(process_ownername); close(fd); return -1; } if ( (check & (CPD_GROUP_OK|CPD_GROUP_READ)) Loading @@ -2156,6 +2201,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, gr ? gr->gr_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_gid); tor_free(process_groupname); close(fd); return -1; } if (check & (CPD_GROUP_OK|CPD_GROUP_READ)) { Loading @@ -2168,6 +2214,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, if (check & CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Permissions on directory %s are too permissive.", dirname); close(fd); return -1; } log_warn(LD_FS, "Fixing permissions on directory %s", dirname); Loading @@ -2177,15 +2224,18 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, new_mode |= 0050; /* Group should have rx */ } new_mode &= ~unwanted_bits; /* Clear the bits that we didn't want set...*/ if (chmod(dirname, new_mode)) { if (fchmod(fd, new_mode)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not chmod directory %s: %s", dirname, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } else { close(fd); return 0; } } #endif close(fd); return 0; } Loading Loading @@ -2900,6 +2950,9 @@ expand_filename(const char *filename) { tor_assert(filename); #ifdef _WIN32 /* Might consider using GetFullPathName() as described here: * http://etutorials.org/Programming/secure+programming/Chapter+3.+Input+Validation/3.7+Validating+Filenames+and+Paths/ */ return tor_strdup(filename); #else if (*filename == '~') { Loading src/ext/eventdns.c +5 −10 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ debug_ntoa(u32 address) { static char buf[32]; u32 a = ntohl(address); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d", tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d", (int)(u8)((a>>24)&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>16)&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>8 )&0xff), Loading Loading @@ -436,12 +436,7 @@ evdns_log(int warn, const char *fmt, ...) if (!evdns_log_fn) return; va_start(args,fmt); #ifdef _WIN32 _vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); #else vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); #endif buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = '\0'; tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); evdns_log_fn(warn, buf); va_end(args); } Loading Loading @@ -762,7 +757,7 @@ reply_handle(struct evdns_request *const req, u16 flags, u32 ttl, struct reply * /* we regard these errors as marking a bad nameserver */ if (req->reissue_count < global_max_reissues) { char msg[64]; snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Bad response %d (%s)", tor_snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Bad response %d (%s)", error, evdns_err_to_string(error)); nameserver_failed(req->ns, msg); if (!request_reissue(req)) return; Loading Loading @@ -1705,7 +1700,7 @@ evdns_server_request_add_ptr_reply(struct evdns_server_request *req, struct in_a assert(!(in && inaddr_name)); if (in) { a = ntohl(in->s_addr); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", (int)(u8)((a )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>8 )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>16)&0xff), Loading Loading @@ -2638,7 +2633,7 @@ int evdns_resolve_reverse(const struct in_addr *in, int flags, evdns_callback_ty u32 a; assert(in); a = ntohl(in->s_addr); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", (int)(u8)((a )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>8 )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>16)&0xff), Loading Loading
changes/bug17852 0 → 100644 +10 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Minor features (code hardening): - Use tor_snprintf() and tor_vsnprintf() even in external and low-level code, to harden against accidental failures to NUL- terminate. Part of ticket 17852. Patch from 'jsturgix'. Found with Flawfinder. o Minor bugfixes (private directory): - Prevent a race condition when creating private directories. Fixes part of bug 17852; bugfix on 0.2pre13. Part of ticket 17852. Patch from 'jsturgix'. Found with Flawfinder.
src/common/compat.c +5 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -576,14 +576,17 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) int len, r; va_list tmp_args; va_copy(tmp_args, args); len = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, tmp_args); /* vsnprintf() was properly checked but tor_vsnprintf() available so * why not use it? */ len = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, tmp_args); va_end(tmp_args); if (len < (int)sizeof(buf)) { *strp = tor_strdup(buf); return len; } strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len+1); r = vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); /* use of tor_vsnprintf() will ensure string is null terminated */ r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; Loading
src/common/util.c +63 −10 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -2056,9 +2056,10 @@ int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, const char *effective_user) { int fd; int r; struct stat st; char *f; //char *f; #ifndef _WIN32 unsigned unwanted_bits = 0; const struct passwd *pw = NULL; Loading @@ -2068,18 +2069,34 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, (void)effective_user; #endif /* * Goal is to harden the implementation by removing any * potential for race between stat() and chmod(). * chmod() accepts filename as argument. If an attacker can move * the file between stat() and chmod(), a potential race exists. * * Several suggestions taken from: * https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/RaceConditions.html */ tor_assert(dirname); f = tor_strdup(dirname); clean_name_for_stat(f); log_debug(LD_FS, "stat()ing %s", f); r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st); tor_free(f); if (r) { /* Open directory. * O_NOFOLLOW to ensure that it does not follow symbolic links */ fd = open(sandbox_intern_string(dirname), O_NOFOLLOW); /* Was there an error? Maybe the directory does not exist? */ if (fd == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) { /* Other directory error */ log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s cannot be read: %s", dirname, strerror(errno)); return -1; } /* Received ENOENT: Directory does not exist */ /* Should we create the directory? */ if (check & CPD_CREATE) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Creating directory %s", dirname); #if defined (_WIN32) Loading @@ -2091,23 +2108,51 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, r = mkdir(dirname, 0700); } #endif /* check for mkdir() error */ if (r) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Error creating directory %s: %s", dirname, strerror(errno)); return -1; } /* we just created the directory. try to open it again. * permissions on the directory will be checked again below.*/ fd = open(sandbox_intern_string(dirname), O_NOFOLLOW); if ( fd == -1 ) return -1; } else if (!(check & CPD_CHECK)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s does not exist.", dirname); return -1; } /* XXXX In the case where check==CPD_CHECK, we should look at the * parent directory a little harder. */ return 0; } tor_assert(fd); //f = tor_strdup(dirname); //clean_name_for_stat(f); log_debug(LD_FS, "stat()ing %s", dirname); //r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st); r = fstat(fd, &st); if (r == -1) { log_warn(LD_FS, "fstat() on directory %s failed.", dirname); close(fd); return -1; } //tor_free(f); /* check that dirname is a directory */ if (!(st.st_mode & S_IFDIR)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not a directory", dirname); close(fd); return -1; } #ifndef _WIN32 if (effective_user) { /* Look up the user and group information. Loading @@ -2124,7 +2169,6 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, running_uid = getuid(); running_gid = getgid(); } if (st.st_uid != running_uid) { const struct passwd *pw = NULL; char *process_ownername = NULL; Loading @@ -2140,6 +2184,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, pw ? pw->pw_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_uid); tor_free(process_ownername); close(fd); return -1; } if ( (check & (CPD_GROUP_OK|CPD_GROUP_READ)) Loading @@ -2156,6 +2201,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, gr ? gr->gr_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_gid); tor_free(process_groupname); close(fd); return -1; } if (check & (CPD_GROUP_OK|CPD_GROUP_READ)) { Loading @@ -2168,6 +2214,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, if (check & CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Permissions on directory %s are too permissive.", dirname); close(fd); return -1; } log_warn(LD_FS, "Fixing permissions on directory %s", dirname); Loading @@ -2177,15 +2224,18 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, new_mode |= 0050; /* Group should have rx */ } new_mode &= ~unwanted_bits; /* Clear the bits that we didn't want set...*/ if (chmod(dirname, new_mode)) { if (fchmod(fd, new_mode)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not chmod directory %s: %s", dirname, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } else { close(fd); return 0; } } #endif close(fd); return 0; } Loading Loading @@ -2900,6 +2950,9 @@ expand_filename(const char *filename) { tor_assert(filename); #ifdef _WIN32 /* Might consider using GetFullPathName() as described here: * http://etutorials.org/Programming/secure+programming/Chapter+3.+Input+Validation/3.7+Validating+Filenames+and+Paths/ */ return tor_strdup(filename); #else if (*filename == '~') { Loading
src/ext/eventdns.c +5 −10 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ debug_ntoa(u32 address) { static char buf[32]; u32 a = ntohl(address); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d", tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d", (int)(u8)((a>>24)&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>16)&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>8 )&0xff), Loading Loading @@ -436,12 +436,7 @@ evdns_log(int warn, const char *fmt, ...) if (!evdns_log_fn) return; va_start(args,fmt); #ifdef _WIN32 _vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); #else vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); #endif buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = '\0'; tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); evdns_log_fn(warn, buf); va_end(args); } Loading Loading @@ -762,7 +757,7 @@ reply_handle(struct evdns_request *const req, u16 flags, u32 ttl, struct reply * /* we regard these errors as marking a bad nameserver */ if (req->reissue_count < global_max_reissues) { char msg[64]; snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Bad response %d (%s)", tor_snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Bad response %d (%s)", error, evdns_err_to_string(error)); nameserver_failed(req->ns, msg); if (!request_reissue(req)) return; Loading Loading @@ -1705,7 +1700,7 @@ evdns_server_request_add_ptr_reply(struct evdns_server_request *req, struct in_a assert(!(in && inaddr_name)); if (in) { a = ntohl(in->s_addr); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", (int)(u8)((a )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>8 )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>16)&0xff), Loading Loading @@ -2638,7 +2633,7 @@ int evdns_resolve_reverse(const struct in_addr *in, int flags, evdns_callback_ty u32 a; assert(in); a = ntohl(in->s_addr); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa", (int)(u8)((a )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>8 )&0xff), (int)(u8)((a>>16)&0xff), Loading