Commit ab0c85ee authored Feb 10, 2008 by Nick Mathewson

r14103@tombo: nickm | 2008-02-10 13:40:09 -0500

 Fix some XXX020s in command.c, and make it not-allowed to negotiate v1 using the v2 connection protocol: it is too hard to test, and pointless to support.


svn:r13460

parent b5c03f05

doc/spec/proposals/130-v2-conn-protocol.txt

+4 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ Proposal:

		The Data in the cell is a series of big-endian two-byte integers.

		* It is not allowed to negotiate V1 conections once the v2 protocol
		has been used. If this happens, Tor instances should close the
		connection.

		3. The rest of the "v2" protocol

		Once a v2 protocol has been negotiated, NETINFO cells are exchanged

src/or/command.c

+13 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -446,7 +446,10 @@ command_process_destroy_cell(cell_t cell, or_connection_t conn)
		}

		/** Process a 'versions' cell. The current link protocol version must be 0
		* to indicate that no version has yet been negotiated. DOCDOC say more. */
		* to indicate that no version has yet been negotiated. We compare the versions
		* cell to the list of versions we support, and pick the highest version we
		* have in common.
		*/
		static void
		command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t cell, or_connection_t conn)
		{
		@@ -473,6 +476,12 @@ command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t cell, or_connection_t conn)
		"list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection.");
		connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
		return;
		} else if (highest_supported_version == 1) {
		log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
		"Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. "
		"That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection.");
		connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
		return;
		}
		conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
		conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
		@@ -568,9 +577,10 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t cell, or_connection_t conn)
		if (abs(apparent_skew) > NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW &&
		router_get_by_digest(conn->identity_digest)) {
		char dbuf[64];
		/XXXX020 not always warn!/
		/XXXX This should check the trustedness of the other side. /
		int severity = server_mode(get_options()) ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN;
		format_time_interval(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), apparent_skew);
		log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_HTTP, "Received NETINFO cell with skewed time from "
		log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Received NETINFO cell with skewed time from "
		"server at %s:%d. It seems that our clock is %s by %s, or "
		"that theirs is %s. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: "
		"please check your time and date settings.",