diff --git a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
index cad2af5c0d0c7f4ede421db3cbe5736d93594bcb..2e642c7953f729bdf6ae35b2f5e53b3d4727d404 100644
--- a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
+++ b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@
     - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
       choosing to a side-channel attacker.  Previously, a Tor client
       would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
-      soon as it had chosen one, thus leaking information about which
-      relays it picked for a circuit to a timing attack.  (Tor is
-      likely to still leak information about which relays it has
-      chosen for a circuit to other processes on the same computer,
-      through e.g. which cache lines it loads while building the
-      circuit.)
-
+      soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
+      when it picked a router earlier in the list.  If an attacker
+      can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
+      proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
+      grained information about which relays a client was picking
+      (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
+      exits).  The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
+      (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
+      take chances.  Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.