Loading changes/bug21018 0 → 100644 +11 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Major bugfixes (parsing, security): - Fix a bug in parsing that could cause clients to read a single byte past the end of an allocated region. This bug could be used to cause hardened clients (built with --enable-expensive-hardening) to crash if they tried to visit a hostile hidden service. Non-hardened clients are only affected depending on the details of their platform's memory allocator. Fixes bug 21018; bugfix on 0.2.0.8-alpha. Found by using libFuzzer. Also tracked as TROVE-2016-12-002 and as CVE-2016-1254. src/or/rendcommon.c +4 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1113,8 +1113,10 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, intro_size); if (n_intro_points <= 0) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to parse introduction points. Either the " "service has published a corrupt descriptor or you have " "provided invalid authorization data."); "service has published a corrupt descriptor, or you have " "provided invalid authorization data, or (maybe!) the " "server is deliberately serving broken data in an attempt " "to crash you with bug 21018."); goto err; } else if (n_intro_points > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Found too many introduction points on a hidden " Loading src/or/routerparse.c +3 −3 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -3613,7 +3613,7 @@ get_next_token(memarea_t *area, if (tok->tp == ERR_) { /* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */ if (**s == '@') if (*s < eol && **s == '@') tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_; else tok->tp = K_OPT; Loading Loading @@ -4619,7 +4619,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted, crypto_cipher_free(cipher); len = ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len - CIPHER_IV_LEN; dec = tor_malloc(len); dec = tor_malloc_zero(len + 1); declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(session_key, dec, len, ipos_encrypted + 2 + client_entries_len, ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len); Loading Loading @@ -4651,7 +4651,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted, "small."); return -1; } dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1); dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1 + 1); declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(descriptor_cookie, dec, ipos_encrypted_size - Loading Loading
changes/bug21018 0 → 100644 +11 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line o Major bugfixes (parsing, security): - Fix a bug in parsing that could cause clients to read a single byte past the end of an allocated region. This bug could be used to cause hardened clients (built with --enable-expensive-hardening) to crash if they tried to visit a hostile hidden service. Non-hardened clients are only affected depending on the details of their platform's memory allocator. Fixes bug 21018; bugfix on 0.2.0.8-alpha. Found by using libFuzzer. Also tracked as TROVE-2016-12-002 and as CVE-2016-1254.
src/or/rendcommon.c +4 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1113,8 +1113,10 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, intro_size); if (n_intro_points <= 0) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to parse introduction points. Either the " "service has published a corrupt descriptor or you have " "provided invalid authorization data."); "service has published a corrupt descriptor, or you have " "provided invalid authorization data, or (maybe!) the " "server is deliberately serving broken data in an attempt " "to crash you with bug 21018."); goto err; } else if (n_intro_points > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Found too many introduction points on a hidden " Loading
src/or/routerparse.c +3 −3 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -3613,7 +3613,7 @@ get_next_token(memarea_t *area, if (tok->tp == ERR_) { /* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */ if (**s == '@') if (*s < eol && **s == '@') tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_; else tok->tp = K_OPT; Loading Loading @@ -4619,7 +4619,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted, crypto_cipher_free(cipher); len = ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len - CIPHER_IV_LEN; dec = tor_malloc(len); dec = tor_malloc_zero(len + 1); declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(session_key, dec, len, ipos_encrypted + 2 + client_entries_len, ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len); Loading Loading @@ -4651,7 +4651,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted, "small."); return -1; } dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1); dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1 + 1); declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(descriptor_cookie, dec, ipos_encrypted_size - Loading