Suggestion obfusicating bridges information
Due to the open source nature of Tor a censor can and often will extract the contact information of default obfs4 bridges directly from the source code and they can have some intern continuously request bridges from the private bridges redistribution system.
I think I found a solution for this which forces the censor to either start mapping the large portions of the internet, block expensive domains, tolerate circumvention or actively search with potentially identifiable methods rising the financial cost of censorship.
My solution is: a. Put the bridge's information in a chunck of information that also contains the required information to connect to some other web participants.
b. Have the browser send to each of the web participants mentioned in the chunck a pre-programmed and preferably chunck and bridge specific request that has no meaning to those web participants.
c. program the bridge to emit a sign of recognition when receiving the previously mentioned request.
d. Now have the client and the bridge built a connection, while ignoring the rest of the web participants they have just identified to be unimportant for their purposes.
If we were to implement this I suggest we use high value web services that block Tor or have agreed to participate and have the recognition request use little bandwidth to avoid getting blocked out of spite or lack of blocking cost.