Unverified Commit 2a7263db authored by Georg Koppen's avatar Georg Koppen
Browse files

Bug 21256: Included remaining things for the 7.0.x update

parent 47ca2d1b
......@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
<address><email>gk#torproject org</email></address>
<pubdate>January 24th, 2018</pubdate>
<pubdate>January 25th, 2018</pubdate>
......@@ -2308,6 +2308,7 @@ maximized windows are detrimental to privacy in this mode.
<listitem><command>Display Media information</command>
......@@ -2390,6 +2391,7 @@ a defense-in-depth by setting <command>media.peerconnection.enabled</command> an
<command>media.navigator.enabled</command> to <command>false</command>.
<listitem><command>MIME Types</command>
......@@ -2438,6 +2440,25 @@ properties and <command>0.0</command> for the two last ones.
<listitem><command>Battery Status API</command>
The Battery Status API provides access to information about the system's battery
charge level. From Firefox 52 on it is disabled for web content. Initially, it
was possible on Linux to get a double-precision floating point value for the
charge level, which means there was a large number of possible values making it
almost behave like an identifier allowing to track a user cross-origin. But
still after that got fixed (and on other platforms where the precision was just
two significant digits anyway) the risk for tracking users remained as combined
with the <command>chargingTime</command> and <command>dischargingTime</command>
the possible values <ulink url="https://senglehardt.com/papers/iwpe17_battery_status_case_study.pdf">
got estimated to be in the millons</ulink> under normal conditions. We avoid all
those possible issues with disabling the Battery Status API by setting
<command>dom.battery.enabled</command> to <command>false</command>.
<listitem><command>System Uptime</command>
......@@ -2572,10 +2593,15 @@ against timing-based side channel fingerprinting risks.
Due to <ulink url="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=863246">bugs
</ulink> <ulink url="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1120398">
in Firefox</ulink> it is possible to detect the locale and the platform of a
Tor Browser user. Moreover, it is possible to find out the extensions a user has
installed. This is done by including resource:// and/or chrome:// URIs into
web content which point to resources included in Tor Browser itself or in
installed extensions.
Tor Browser user. Moreover, it is possible to
<ulink url="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-sanchez-rola.pdf">
find out the extensions</ulink> a user has installed. This is done by
including resource:// and/or chrome:// URIs into web content, which point to
resources included in Tor Browser itself or in installed extensions, and
exploiting the different behavior resulting out of that: the browser raises
an exception if a webpage requests a resource but the extension is not
installed. This does not happen if the extension is indeed installed but the
resource path does not exist.
......@@ -2738,6 +2764,33 @@ size exfiltration.
<listitem><command>Web Audio API</command>
The <ulink url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Audio_API">
Web Audio API</ulink> provides several means to aid in fingerprinting users.
At the simplest level it allows differentiating between users having the API
available and those who don't by checking for an <command>AudioContext</command>
or <command>OscillatorNode</command> object. However, there are more bits of
information that the Web Audio API reveals if audio signals generated with an
<command>OscillatorNode</command> are processed as
<ulink url="https://senglehardt.com/papers/ccs16_online_tracking.pdf">hardware
and software differences</ulink> influence those results.
We disable the Web Audio API by setting <command>dom.webaudio.enabled</command>
to <command>false</command>. That has the positive side effect that it disables
one of several means to perform
<ulink url="https://petsymposium.org/2017/papers/issue2/paper18-2017-2-source.pdf">
ultrasound cross-device tracking</ulink> as well, which is based on having
<command>AudioContext</command> available.
......@@ -2802,14 +2855,43 @@ datareporting.healthreport.about.reportUrlUnified</command> to <command>
data:text/plain,</command>. The same is done with <command>
datareporting.healthreport.about.reportUrl</command> and the new tiles feature
related <command>browser.newtabpage.directory.ping</command> and <command>
browser.newtabpage.directory.source</command> preferences. Additionally, we
disable the UITour backend by setting <command>browser.uitour.enabled</command>
to <command>false</command>. Finally, we provide <ulink url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.0-2&amp;id=9f24ce35cd8776a0f7c3a4d54992ecb0eaad6311">a patch</ulink>
browser.newtabpage.directory.source</command> preferences.
<command>browser.newtabpage.remote</command> is set to <command>false</command>
in this context as well, as a defense-in-depth given that this feature is
already of by default. Additionally, we disable the UITour backend by setting
<command>browser.uitour.enabled</command> to <command>false</command> and avoid
getting Mozilla experiments installed into Tor Browser by flipping
<command>experiments.enabled</command> to <command>false</command>. On the
update side we prevent the browser from pinging the new
<ulink url="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Firefox/Kinto">Kinto</ulink> service for
blocklist updates as it is not used for it yet anyway. This is done by setting
<command>services.blocklist.update_enabled</command> to <command>false</command>.
The captive portal detection code is disabled as well as it phones home to
Mozilla. We set <command>network.captive-portal-service.enabled</command> to
<command>false</command> to achieve that. Unrelated to that we make sure that
Mozilla does not get bothered with TLS error reports from Tor Browser users by
hiding the respective checkbox with
<command>security.ssl.errorReporting.enabled</command> set to
<command>false</command>. And while we have the Push API disabled as there are
no Service Workers available in Tor Browser yet, we remove the value for
<command>dom.push.serverURL</command> as a defense-in-depth. Finally, we provide
<ulink url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.0-2&amp;id=9f24ce35cd8776a0f7c3a4d54992ecb0eaad6311">a patch</ulink>
to prevent Mozilla's websites from querying whether particular extensions are
installed and what their state in Tor Browser is by using the
<command>window.navigator.AddonManager</command> API. As a defense-in-depth the
patch makes sure that not only Mozilla's websites can't get at that information
but that the whitelist governing this access is empty in general.
We have <ulink url="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Safe_Browsing">Safebrowsing</ulink>
disabled in Tor Browser. In order to avoid pinging providers for list updates we
remove the entries for <command>browser.safebrowsing.provider.mozilla.updateURL</command>
and <command>browser.safebrowsing.provider.mozilla.gethashURL</command> (and the
values for Google related preferences as well).
<listitem><command>Operating System Type Fingerprinting</command>
......@@ -2839,16 +2921,13 @@ tag on our bug tracker</ulink>.
<para><command>Implementation Status:</command>
At least three HTML5 features have different implementation status across the
At least two HTML5 features have a different implementation status across the
major OS vendors and/or the underlying hardware: the <ulink
API</ulink>, the <ulink
Connection API</ulink>, and the <ulink
url="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Sensor_API">Sensor API</ulink>. We disable these APIs through the Firefox preferences
<command>dom.network.enabled</command>, and
<command>dom.network.enabled</command> and
<command>device.sensors.enabled</command>, setting both to <command>false</command>.
......@@ -3786,7 +3865,7 @@ through the source URL parameters.
We believe the Referer header should be made explicit, and believe that Referrer
Policy provides a <ulink
Policy, which is available since Firefox 52, provides a <ulink
decent step in this direction</ulink>. If a site wishes to transmit its URL to
third party content elements during load or during link-click, it should have
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