Tor Browser issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues2023-01-05T16:39:08Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/15563ServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probably2023-01-05T16:39:08ZArthur EdelsteinServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probablyI haven't looked at ServiceWorkers (starting Firefox 33) closely, but I think they likely violate first party isolation. A brief look at some code in mozilla-central suggests that we may be able to use the same code to isolate SharedWork...I haven't looked at ServiceWorkers (starting Firefox 33) closely, but I think they likely violate first party isolation. A brief look at some code in mozilla-central suggests that we may be able to use the same code to isolate SharedWorkers and ServiceWorkers by first party domain.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/32615New Fennec onboarding and activitystream conflicts2021-07-09T18:24:30ZMatthew FinkelNew Fennec onboarding and activitystream conflictsIn legacy/trac#32097, we reverted some changes in Fennec's Onboarding and activitystream UI. It seems like this isn't sustainable. Mozilla made more changes with 68.3.0. Let's take a different approach.In legacy/trac#32097, we reverted some changes in Fennec's Onboarding and activitystream UI. It seems like this isn't sustainable. Mozilla made more changes with 68.3.0. Let's take a different approach.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/10760Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it2022-01-11T19:23:03ZTracIntegrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling itI mean integration like this with pdf.js addon, which was simply integrated to Firefox core.
**Trac**:
**Username**: RezonansowyI mean integration like this with pdf.js addon, which was simply integrated to Firefox core.
**Trac**:
**Username**: Rezonansowyhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/11154Disable TLS 1.0 (and 1.1) by default2023-08-14T22:26:56ZTracDisable TLS 1.0 (and 1.1) by defaultrunning the how's my ssl check the tor browser rated bad, the reason the tor browser is using old tls settings and old security cipers,
In the next update please set the minimum tls to 2 and the maximum to 3 in about:config for securit...running the how's my ssl check the tor browser rated bad, the reason the tor browser is using old tls settings and old security cipers,
In the next update please set the minimum tls to 2 and the maximum to 3 in about:config for security.tls.version this makes the minimum tls 1.1 and my max tls 1.2.
Also please disable use of insecure cipher suites security.ssl3.rsa_fips_des_ede3_sha in about:config
**Trac**:
**Username**: ZeroCoolhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/12449Firefox is insecure, it can't used with Tor2021-07-09T18:24:30ZcypherpunksFirefox is insecure, it can't used with TorFirefox is insecure, no sense to use it with Tor. It ruins everything: privacy, anonymity.
legacy/trac#10631 + performance.now(), etc, makes browser most danger process in system that runs privacy related software.Firefox is insecure, no sense to use it with Tor. It ruins everything: privacy, anonymity.
legacy/trac#10631 + performance.now(), etc, makes browser most danger process in system that runs privacy related software.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/13252Tor Browser on OS X should not store data into the application bundle2022-05-25T10:55:34ZTracTor Browser on OS X should not store data into the application bundle
The Tor application on OS X stores user data into its bundle (TorBrowser.app/Data/). This is bad. This causes various issues:
- the Tor application can't be code sign which decreases the security. See Ticket legacy/trac#13251: CodeSign...
The Tor application on OS X stores user data into its bundle (TorBrowser.app/Data/). This is bad. This causes various issues:
- the Tor application can't be code sign which decreases the security. See Ticket legacy/trac#13251: CodeSign Tor for OS X
- when installing a new version of Tor, all previous user data (bookmarks) are deleted.
**Trac**:
**Username**: torosxhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/13353TBB 3.6.6 won't import certificate2021-07-09T17:19:51ZTracTBB 3.6.6 won't import certificateIn Certificate Manager on the Servers tab I am trying to import a certificate. The GUI allows me to choose a file and the dialog closes but the certificate is not imported and no error dialog is shown.
I have tested the same certificate...In Certificate Manager on the Servers tab I am trying to import a certificate. The GUI allows me to choose a file and the dialog closes but the certificate is not imported and no error dialog is shown.
I have tested the same certificate in vanilla Firefox ESR 24.8.1 and TBB 3.6.2 (the only old version I have) and both work fine.
**Trac**:
**Username**: ZcbCkyj5https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/13367Rate limit gyroscope sampling frequency on FF mobile2022-01-11T19:33:18ZMike PerryRate limit gyroscope sampling frequency on FF mobileBy the time we get around to an official mobile port, we should double-check that Mozilla has reduced the sampling rate of the gyroscope on Android:
http://crypto.stanford.edu/gyrophone/files/gyromic.pdfBy the time we get around to an official mobile port, we should double-check that Mozilla has reduced the sampling rate of the gyroscope on Android:
http://crypto.stanford.edu/gyrophone/files/gyromic.pdfhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/14631Users that try to run from DMG files run into "Another copy of Firefox is run...2021-07-09T18:24:30ZArthur EdelsteinUsers that try to run from DMG files run into "Another copy of Firefox is running"Somehow we should figure out how to avoid this bug. Is it possible to write Firefox Profile files in /var/tmp or maybe not write them at all?Somehow we should figure out how to avoid this bug. Is it possible to write Firefox Profile files in /var/tmp or maybe not write them at all?https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/15933Relax domain isolation to use TLD instead of FQDN2021-07-09T17:23:47ZTracRelax domain isolation to use TLD instead of FQDNTorButton 1.9.2.2 in new TorBrowser 4.5, prevents some file host sites from functioning, such as load.to, ziifile.com, and others.
example link: http://www.load.to/StQUxNkHH4/dictionaries.7z
this download link will function in TBB 4.0....TorButton 1.9.2.2 in new TorBrowser 4.5, prevents some file host sites from functioning, such as load.to, ziifile.com, and others.
example link: http://www.load.to/StQUxNkHH4/dictionaries.7z
this download link will function in TBB 4.0.8 (with <Forbid Scripts Globally> activated)
in TBB 4.5, the same link will only loop back to the file host home page (with <Forbid Scripts Globally> activated). the download link *will* function, however, if TorButton extension is disabled.
maybe caused by the isolation of requests from same URL domain?? (file hosts frequently redirect user after the Download button is clicked. in this example, from http://www.load.to/ to http://s2.load.to)
thanks for attention
**Trac**:
**Username**: maximhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/164418-month-old Tor Browser offers to "Reset Tor Browser", removes extensions2023-08-24T18:57:11ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.org8-month-old Tor Browser offers to "Reset Tor Browser", removes extensionsI started an old copy of Tor Browser 4.0 I had in a directory. From file times it looks like it was last run on 2014-10-21, 8 months ago (today is 2015-06-24). When I started it, the about:tor page showed a banner at the bottom
It look...I started an old copy of Tor Browser 4.0 I had in a directory. From file times it looks like it was last run on 2014-10-21, 8 months ago (today is 2015-06-24). When I started it, the about:tor page showed a banner at the bottom
It looks like you haven't started Tor Browser in a while. Do you want to clean it up for a fresh, like-new experience? And by the way, welcome back!
with a button that says "Reset Tor Browser..."
When I click on the button, the browser restarts and gives me the plain Firefox start page, with the Firefox logo and everything. It looks like all the extensions are gone (HTTPS-Everywhere, NoScript, Torbutton, Tor Launcher). check.torproject.org says the browser is using Tor. I also got a banner offering to update to 5.0a2.
I was trying the instructions from [[doc/TorBrowser/Hacking#UsinganExistingTorProcess]] so I had run
```
export TOR_SOCKS_PORT=9050
export TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1
./start-tor-browser
```
I don't know if that had anything to do with it.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/16620Transform window.name handling into Firefox patch2021-07-09T17:23:47ZMike PerryTransform window.name handling into Firefox patchRight now, we reset window.name in Torbutton in torbutton_check_progress(). We should rewrite this as a direct Firefox patch, as per our SponsorU Torbutton conversion deliverable.Right now, we reset window.name in Torbutton in torbutton_check_progress(). We should rewrite this as a direct Firefox patch, as per our SponsorU Torbutton conversion deliverable.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/16921system locale in rss view2021-07-09T18:24:30Zcypherpunkssystem locale in rss viewWhen I open an rss file from some website, the dates are shown in the locale language and format. Media files shown in rss like mp3 have the description in my system language. Do any of these get leaked somewhere? Could you block the bro...When I open an rss file from some website, the dates are shown in the locale language and format. Media files shown in rss like mp3 have the description in my system language. Do any of these get leaked somewhere? Could you block the browser the ability to reach these values in the first place whether they are currently being leaked or not?https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/16968Using ExitNodes with bridges make ExitNodes ignored without warning messages....2021-07-09T17:23:47ZcypherpunksUsing ExitNodes with bridges make ExitNodes ignored without warning messages. Comment from other cypherpunks: cant reproduceUsing ExitNodes with bridges make ExitNodes ignored without warning messagesUsing ExitNodes with bridges make ExitNodes ignored without warning messageshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/18311Document first party isolation for Tor researchers2021-07-09T17:23:47ZArthur EdelsteinDocument first party isolation for Tor researchersAcademics researching tor may not be aware that Tor Browser is isolating by URL bar domain (aka first party isolation), as implemented in legacy/trac#3455. We should note this somewhere in the tor documentation so this difference in beha...Academics researching tor may not be aware that Tor Browser is isolating by URL bar domain (aka first party isolation), as implemented in legacy/trac#3455. We should note this somewhere in the tor documentation so this difference in behavior between default tor and default Tor Browser is not overlooked by researchers. See also legacy/trac#5753https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/18534dom.event.clipboardevents.enabled .. default in Torbrowser2021-07-09T17:23:47Zcypherpunksdom.event.clipboardevents.enabled .. default in TorbrowserFrom blog comments:
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Preferences/Preference_reference/dom.event.clipboardevents.enabled
Torbrowser's default weakens user's anonymity. Imagine user selecting a name or address from a quer...From blog comments:
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Preferences/Preference_reference/dom.event.clipboardevents.enabled
Torbrowser's default weakens user's anonymity. Imagine user selecting a name or address from a query result of many names or addresses. Server gets this information.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/19508Proposal to drop Tor Browser's plugin patches2021-07-09T18:24:30ZArthur EdelsteinProposal to drop Tor Browser's plugin patchesTor Browser has three patches related to blocking plugins:
* legacy/trac#3547 adds a function that whitelists the flash plugin only and excludes loading all other plugins
* legacy/trac#8312 hides the link to "Manage plugins" when the plu...Tor Browser has three patches related to blocking plugins:
* legacy/trac#3547 adds a function that whitelists the flash plugin only and excludes loading all other plugins
* legacy/trac#8312 hides the link to "Manage plugins" when the plugin is disabled
* legacy/trac#10280 adds a UI for enabling/disabling plugins in the add-ons page
These patches were introduced when Flash was still in fairly wide use. But since then, Flash has been disabled by default in Firefox, and is replaced on a substantial number of websites by HTML5 video and JavaScript. Furthermore, we want to strongly discourage users from using Flash as there is a significant risk that it will bypass the proxy or expose the user to tracking or security vulnerabilities.
First, from what I can see, when the pref `plugin.disable` is set to true (as it is in `browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js`), all plugins (including Flash) are blocked from ever loading into the Firefox process. Therefore the code in our legacy/trac#3547 is never exercised.
Second, legacy/trac#10280 only makes it more likely for the user to set "plugin.disable" to false, by exposing that pref in the UI.
Finally, legacy/trac#8312 seems unnecessary because, when "plugin.disable" is true, no "Manage plugins" link appears. Instead, the only message is "A plugin is needed to display this content." Also, various popular video sites, such as YouTube and Vimeo, now use HTML5 video without any complaints about missing Flash.
So I would suggest we can drop these three patches. Instead we might consider a couple of UI tweaks to improve user safety:
1. Hide the Plugins section of about:addons altogether to prevent the user from even considering loading any plugins
2. Change the plugin failure message to "A plugin would be needed to display this content. For security reasons, Tor Browser does not support plugins."
I think both of these changes could be implemented as XUL overlays in torbutton.
Finally, for extra safety, we could add an extra C++ patch that ensures that whenever an nsPluginsDir::LoadPlugin implementation is called, the `plugin.disable` pref is checked and, if it is true, the function loads nothing and returns an error code. I think such a patch might be upstreamable.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/19757Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB2021-07-09T17:23:47ZNima FatemiMake a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TBCurrently it's very difficult to add an onion address and auth cookie to Tor Browser.
It would be nice to have an option in torbutton menu where you can set `HidServAuth` and optionally `MapAddress`, instead of having to edit your TB t...Currently it's very difficult to add an onion address and auth cookie to Tor Browser.
It would be nice to have an option in torbutton menu where you can set `HidServAuth` and optionally `MapAddress`, instead of having to edit your TB torrc file.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/20031web.whatsapp.com2021-07-09T17:23:47ZTracweb.whatsapp.comConnecting to web.whatsapp.com the square barcode gets displayed for less than 1 second and then overridden by the whatsapp icon.
Consequently using the iphone to sync the session to the web becomes impossible.
**Trac**:
**Username**:...Connecting to web.whatsapp.com the square barcode gets displayed for less than 1 second and then overridden by the whatsapp icon.
Consequently using the iphone to sync the session to the web becomes impossible.
**Trac**:
**Username**: cosimobarlumehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/21549Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance issues2020-07-14T22:25:12ZGeorg KoppenInvestigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance issuesIn order to avoid the asm.js disaster we should investigate whether wasm complies with our design requirements. It got [[in Firefox 52](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1342060|enabled)] but [[in ESR 52](https://bugzilla.mozi...In order to avoid the asm.js disaster we should investigate whether wasm complies with our design requirements. It got [[in Firefox 52](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1342060|enabled)] but [[in ESR 52](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1342440|re-disabled)].https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/21790Disable captive portal detection in Tor Browser based on ESR522021-07-09T18:24:30ZGeorg KoppenDisable captive portal detection in Tor Browser based on ESR52Firefox ships now with a captive portal detection feature. That's a thing we don't need and that phones home to Mozilla unnecessarily requesting http://detectportal.firefox.com/success.txt.Firefox ships now with a captive portal detection feature. That's a thing we don't need and that phones home to Mozilla unnecessarily requesting http://detectportal.firefox.com/success.txt.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22396What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?2022-06-22T02:07:18ZRoger DingledineWhat does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?When I get an html5 canvas warning in Tor Browser, it suggests that I pick "never for this site".
To me, the word "never" implies that Tor Browser is writing down my answer, and it will use that answer forever after. Like the "permanent...When I get an html5 canvas warning in Tor Browser, it suggests that I pick "never for this site".
To me, the word "never" implies that Tor Browser is writing down my answer, and it will use that answer forever after. Like the "permanent exceptions" for SSL certs.
On the other hand, my understanding of Tor Browser behavior is that it wouldn't write it to disk, so my choice would be lost on the next browser reset or new identity click.
There's a contradiction here. I'm assuming the second one is right. Is there a better phrase we can use than "never"?https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22654Firefox icon is shown for Tor Browser on Windows 10 start menu2023-08-24T18:57:11ZGeorg KoppenFirefox icon is shown for Tor Browser on Windows 10 start menuA user reported today in #tor that a Firefox icon is shown in the Windows start menu instead of the Tor Browser one.A user reported today in #tor that a Firefox icon is shown in the Windows start menu instead of the Tor Browser one.richardrichardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/23104CSS line-height reveals the platform Tor Browser is running on2022-05-18T00:58:57ZGeorg KoppenCSS line-height reveals the platform Tor Browser is running onDr. Neal Krawetz reported via HackerOne that it is possible to detect the platform a Tor Browser is running with the CSS `line-height` attribute: 19px is used on Linux, 19.5167px on macOS, and 19.2px or 20px on Windows.
We could think a...Dr. Neal Krawetz reported via HackerOne that it is possible to detect the platform a Tor Browser is running with the CSS `line-height` attribute: 19px is used on Linux, 19.5167px on macOS, and 19.2px or 20px on Windows.
We could think about adjusting that to 20px independent of the platform Tor Browser is running on.Igor OliveiraIgor Oliveirahttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/23317Update font whitelists to reflect any changed Firefox default fonts2021-07-09T17:23:47ZArthur EdelsteinUpdate font whitelists to reflect any changed Firefox default fontsMasayuki Nakano writes (about Windows fonts):
> We decided that we should change our default Japanese fonts from legacy "MS PGothic" (sans-serif) and "MS PMincho" (serif) which have bitmap glyph to modern "Meiryo" or "Yu Gothic" (sans-s...Masayuki Nakano writes (about Windows fonts):
> We decided that we should change our default Japanese fonts from legacy "MS PGothic" (sans-serif) and "MS PMincho" (serif) which have bitmap glyph to modern "Meiryo" or "Yu Gothic" (sans-serif) and "Yu Mincho" (serif).
We should consider updating "font.system.whitelist" to reflect this, although it depends on what fonts are available by default on most Windows systems. We should also check if any other default fonts have been added that we should include in our whitelists.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/23719Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security sett...2021-07-09T17:23:47ZcypherpunksMake sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)This could for example negatively affect HTTPS Everywhere's performance. I have however no data on whether JIT is disabled for WebExtensions in this case.This could for example negatively affect HTTPS Everywhere's performance. I have however no data on whether JIT is disabled for WebExtensions in this case.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/23899The incremental mar files script does not have an option to select the tmp dir2021-07-09T18:24:30ZboklmThe incremental mar files script does not have an option to select the tmp dirThe script to generate incremental mar files is using `/tmp` for its temporary files, which can be a problem on machines where the `/tmp` partition does not have a lot of space.
Instead it should probably be using the `tmp_dir` director...The script to generate incremental mar files is using `/tmp` for its temporary files, which can be a problem on machines where the `/tmp` partition does not have a lot of space.
Instead it should probably be using the `tmp_dir` directory defined in the rbm configuration.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/24309Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user2022-10-28T16:23:15ZIsabela FernandesActivity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user## Problem we are trying to solve:
Many users expect the guard node to change when asking for a new circuit.
There is nothing on circuit display that tells the user the first node is a guard, what guards are, and how it works when Tor c...## Problem we are trying to solve:
Many users expect the guard node to change when asking for a new circuit.
There is nothing on circuit display that tells the user the first node is a guard, what guards are, and how it works when Tor creates new circuits for the user.
## Expected behavior
If no other condition, guards will only change for a client every 3 months. Even if the user pick 'new identity' the guard should stay the same.
## Proposed solution:
First of all we need to update the Tor Browser User Manual to have an explanation about how the guard selection works, it should be in this section:
https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/managing-identities.html
All the solutions below will link to the manual, this will allow us to send the user to a place with more information. And not necessary have to explain everything in the display or UI.
Managing users expectations:
I believe that for now we are better served if we managed user expectation about what will change when they request such change, not in the circuit display.
The current places where the user will be asking for a new circuit are:
1 - Tor Button -> New Identity
At this action, Tor Browser will open a confirmation window (see screenshot: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/24309/new_identity_confirmation_window.png)
We should change the text here to set the right expectation about guards.
2 - Tor Button -> New Tor Circuit for this Site
Could we have a tool tip here that helps user know that guards won't change.
Circuit display UI:
keep IP and country name. Add 'guard' to the first node - guard should be a link to manual page.
Add a link at the bottom for "Learn More" which should also link to the manual page.
I am suggesting 2 links to the manual as an intentional effort of over communicating to the user.
## Things I would like to test
* User understanding of Tor Browser User Manual explanation about how guards selection works.
* Did we managed to set the right expectation for user? Test it with New Identity flow and New Tor Circuit flow.
* Do we need both links on circuit display?
## Things I am suggesting to be left for a second iteration or not doing and why
* Suggesting to not add functionality to let user pick a different guard. I think such a feature should be deeply discussed and done as a project of it own. Not as part of this solution.
* Suggestion to leave for a second iteration making the IP addresses linkable to more information about the relay (from atlas).
* Suggestion to not use JS for the more information on the relay feature mentioned above. We should never jeopardize the user safety for 'better UX'. We should be able to deliver better UX within the limitations we have by building a product that has security by design in mind.
## Tickets related to the problem:
* Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16665
* Circuit visualizer needs a cue about guards
This is the main ticket that contains lots of information describing the user problem in the comments posted. Would recommend reading it fully for better understanding.
* Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15239
* Add hyperlinks in tor circuit display to show "more info" about relays
This ticket has some suggestions for displaying more information about the relays (using atlas). We are taking into consideration these suggestions in the hypothesis above.
* Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20805
* Circuit display does not honor or use the UI font.
This ticket is more a bug then a UX issue. Although we should make sure that we set a rule of what font to use in the display, and fall back options. Let's make sure we are aligning this with: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style guidelines -- on UX Team roadmap (for March 2018)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/24957Tor Browser Help menu item goes to mozilla support page2021-07-09T18:24:30ZIgor OliveiraTor Browser Help menu item goes to mozilla support pageWhen the user clicks in the Help menu item, Tor Browser opens the support.mozilla.org page. Instead it should go to the Tor Browser User manual.When the user clicks in the Help menu item, Tor Browser opens the support.mozilla.org page. Instead it should go to the Tor Browser User manual.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/25741Create tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-central2023-03-02T09:57:52ZGeorg KoppenCreate tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-centralTo prepare our first Tor Browser for Android alpha we need to create a separate branch in our tor-browser repo that is tracking the mozilla-central branch (rebased with our patches) we want to use in the release. Follow-up beta and stabl...To prepare our first Tor Browser for Android alpha we need to create a separate branch in our tor-browser repo that is tracking the mozilla-central branch (rebased with our patches) we want to use in the release. Follow-up beta and stable branches are later on needed as well.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/26146Setting `general.useragent.override` does not spoof the platform part anymore...2023-09-06T06:38:17ZGeorg KoppenSetting `general.useragent.override` does not spoof the platform part anymore in ESR 60 which is confusingDespite updating `general.useragent.override` to match ESR 60 (done according to comment:16:ticket:25543) the platform part is not spoofed to Windows on my Linux box.
Now, that is intentional, see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug....Despite updating `general.useragent.override` to match ESR 60 (done according to comment:16:ticket:25543) the platform part is not spoofed to Windows on my Linux box.
Now, that is intentional, see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1404608.
So, we probably should not set `general.useragent.override` at all anymore and just rely on the settings we get with `privacy.resistFingerprinting`? Because if we explicitly set it to the Windows UA but then don't get that, this is weird.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/26345Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr2021-10-20T16:38:37ZcypherpunksDisable tracking protection UI in FF67-esrSome of its parts are already live and well in Nightly (such as the Tracking Protection switch in the hamburger menu). This makes it particularly devastating since more users may be tempted to enable it thereby harming their fingerprinti...Some of its parts are already live and well in Nightly (such as the Tracking Protection switch in the hamburger menu). This makes it particularly devastating since more users may be tempted to enable it thereby harming their fingerprinting.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1461743
https://www.ghacks.net/2018/06/10/mozilla-plans-to-push-tracking-protection-in-firefox/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/27257In Tor Browser prefs, "dom.network.enabled" should have been "dom.netinfo.ena...2021-07-09T17:19:51ZArthur EdelsteinIn Tor Browser prefs, "dom.network.enabled" should have been "dom.netinfo.enabled"Seems to have been a typo from legacy/trac#5642. Lucky for us, this pref is disabled by default in Firefox desktop and also the API is disabled by privacy.resistFingerprinting thanks to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=137207...Seems to have been a typo from legacy/trac#5642. Lucky for us, this pref is disabled by default in Firefox desktop and also the API is disabled by privacy.resistFingerprinting thanks to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1372072. We could set "dom.netinfo.enabled" to false just to be safe, or just remove the "dom.network.enabled" line altogether.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/27281Enable Reader View again2024-03-13T08:39:52ZGeorg KoppenEnable Reader View againBack in legacy/trac#18950 we flipped prefs to disable Reader View due to fingerprinting concerns. Those got essentially addressed and we can now enabled the feature again. see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1369327.Back in legacy/trac#18950 we flipped prefs to disable Reader View due to fingerprinting concerns. Those got essentially addressed and we can now enabled the feature again. see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1369327.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/27543QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor Browser 82021-07-09T17:23:47ZGeorg KoppenQR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor Browser 8A user reported on the blog that with the update to Tor Browser 8 the QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com shows up but quickly afterwards vanishes again which makes it de facto not possible to get it.
I could repro on Linux.A user reported on the blog that with the update to Tor Browser 8 the QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com shows up but quickly afterwards vanishes again which makes it de facto not possible to get it.
I could repro on Linux.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/27592TBA: 'Clear private data' option does not clear browsing history2021-07-09T18:24:30ZTracTBA: 'Clear private data' option does not clear browsing historyAlmost all visited URLs are saved in `/data/data/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/files/mozilla/profile.default/browser.db-wal`. Clearing private data from the settings or pressing the 'Quit' button does not delete that file. So basically...Almost all visited URLs are saved in `/data/data/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/files/mozilla/profile.default/browser.db-wal`. Clearing private data from the settings or pressing the 'Quit' button does not delete that file. So basically all browsing history is still stored after clearing private data. After clearing private data in the settings, it does say that some private data could not be deleted but if 'Site settings' is unchecked, it doesn't say that anymore. So normally we'd think that only site settings are not cleared.
**Trac**:
**Username**: towiw3https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28005Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere2023-09-12T14:05:18ZGeorge KadianakisOfficially support onions in HTTPS-EverywhereThe plan:
A major UX issue for onion services is their huge addresses. We want to fix this issue because an address with 56 random characters confuses people, it makes it harder to pass the address around, and it also makes it much hard...The plan:
A major UX issue for onion services is their huge addresses. We want to fix this issue because an address with 56 random characters confuses people, it makes it harder to pass the address around, and it also makes it much harder to verify it.
There is a field of literature called "secure name systems" but none of the candidates are good enough for us right now. Hence, we present a hotfix that might offer a situational relief for users for the medium-term future, until we come up with something better, or while we experiment with more solutions. I suggest we keep this ticket focused to this idea, instead of debating why this and not that since we've already been doing this for far too long.
The plan is to use the HTTPS-Everywhere extension that we already have in Tor Browser, and encourage people to write their own rulesets for onions. We are talking about community-maintained rulesets and nothing that is officially maintained by The Tor Project or by HTTPS-Everywhere. This ticket is about making it easier for people to create, import and use this rulesets. We are talking about UI/UX improvements, writing blog posts and doing Q&A.
Here are some example of community rulesets we can imagine:
* The SecureDrop ruleset: where securedrop makes a ruleset with their whole directory. People can download that to quickly visit securedrop destinations, by going to securedrop-nyt.tor.onion .
* The Torproject ruleset: where torproject makes a ruleset with all their onions. We developers can use that to quickly visit Tor sites over onion, by going to tor-trac.tor.onion instead of remembering the onion.
* The Bitcoin ruleset: where a "trusted" bitcoin entity publishes a ruleset with various cryptocurrency-related rules that allow people to quickly visit them.
This approach has both positives and negatives (I assure you this is the case with every "secure naming" project out there):
* Positives: Good security if the ruleset is taken from a trusted source. No state keeping. Reachable engineering effort. No global names, hence no fear of name squatting. Easy to understand tradeoffs.
* Negatives: Terrible security if the ruleset is evil. No global names: If you want people to use your shorten onion name, you need to persuade them to use your ruleset.
Here are some HTTPS-Everywhere issues we need to solve based on my Mexico notes:
* Be able to stop update channels per-channel.
* Need good UI to easily look and understand rules.
* Need to implement file extension to install ruleset with one-click from web button.
Here are some issues we need to think about:
* We need good user text to make sure that people don't shoot themselves in the foot too often by installing bad rulesets and whatnot (they already do it daily when they open onions from "search enginers" or reddit).
* Which tld to use? If we use .tor we open ourselves to DNS leaks in normal browsers. If we use .tor.onion that might be confusing to people.
* Are there any issues with SSL?
More resources:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2018MexicoCity/Notes/OnionV3ux
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2018MexicoCity/Notes/HTTPSEverywhereNotes
https://blog.torproject.org/cooking-onions-names-your-onionshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28111For about:tor, use a Tor Browser icon in identity box2022-10-03T16:51:15ZArthur EdelsteinFor about:tor, use a Tor Browser icon in identity boxRight now, the Firefox icon is displayed in the identity box. We should fix this. Antonela proposed the following design:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/27200/27200.pngRight now, the Firefox icon is displayed in the identity box. We should fix this. Antonela proposed the following design:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/27200/27200.pngrichardrichardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28381Oreo adaptive icon shape2021-07-09T17:23:47ZTracOreo adaptive icon shapePlease add support for icon shape
https://developer.android.com/guide/practices/ui_guidelines/icon_design_adaptive
https://material.io/guidelines/style/icons.html
**Trac**:
**Username**: cepxuoPlease add support for icon shape
https://developer.android.com/guide/practices/ui_guidelines/icon_design_adaptive
https://material.io/guidelines/style/icons.html
**Trac**:
**Username**: cepxuohttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/2854012/11 release Banner text2021-07-09T18:24:30ZSarah Stevenson12/11 release Banner textPlease create the following 6 banners where:
[Line 1, non-variable] Tor: Strength in Numbers
[Line 2, variable]
1. Keep Tor strong. Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation. https://marvelapp.com/a131e34/screen/48876408
2. ...Please create the following 6 banners where:
[Line 1, non-variable] Tor: Strength in Numbers
[Line 2, variable]
1. Keep Tor strong. Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation. https://marvelapp.com/a131e34/screen/48876408
2. Mozilla is matching every donation until 2019. Give now, and your gift becomes twice as strong.
^^ please notice that the 'Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation" phrase will change here and be: "Give now, and your gift becomes twice as strong."
3. Support internet freedom. Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation.
4. Defend the open web. Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation.
5. Support privacy and freedom online. Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation.
6. We need your support. Every dollar counts. Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation.
[Button]:
“Count me in.” To be used in English.
“Donate now.” To be used for all other languages.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28709Enable Fuzzyfox2021-07-09T18:24:30ZTom Rittertom@ritter.vgEnable FuzzyfoxFuzzyfox is a new timer mitigation technique currently in Nightly.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=fuzzyfox
There are some open issues on it that would be best to solve before enabling it by default, but this bug can serve...Fuzzyfox is a new timer mitigation technique currently in Nightly.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=fuzzyfox
There are some open issues on it that would be best to solve before enabling it by default, but this bug can serve as a tracker for either backporting it or evaluating it.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28822re-implement desktop onboarding for ESR 682020-07-14T22:25:11ZMark Smithre-implement desktop onboarding for ESR 68As of Firefox 64, the onboarding extension which we used to implement Tor Browser onboarding has been removed. See:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1462415
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1457565
More research ...As of Firefox 64, the onboarding extension which we used to implement Tor Browser onboarding has been removed. See:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1462415
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1457565
More research is required, but it looks like Firefox's new onboarding experience is integrated into their "activity stream" interface (aka new tab page).https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28885notify users that update is downloading2023-12-12T12:59:07ZMark Smithnotify users that update is downloadingAn important improvement that was discussed in legacy/trac#25694 is to let users know when an update is in the process of being downloaded. Firefox does not show this information in an obvious way; users need to open about:preferences an...An important improvement that was discussed in legacy/trac#25694 is to let users know when an update is in the process of being downloaded. Firefox does not show this information in an obvious way; users need to open about:preferences and look in the Updates section or open the about box. Tor Browser users are sometimes confused because they know an update is available but have no easy way to know if it is being downloaded, and downloading the MAR files can take a while over Tor.
We plan to add a new "Downloading Tor Browser update..." message that will be displayed in the hamburger menu. We will also ensure that the standard "update" icon is displayed on the hamburger menu toolbar icon so users know to look inside for more info.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30304Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings2020-10-16T16:22:27ZAlex CatarineuBrowser locale can be obtained via DTD stringsSee https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=467035.
Works in Tor Browser and Firefox 67 (with a different dtd file as in the bugzilla PoC), probably also next ESR.
Did not do a PoC but it would be easy to get a specific string in ...See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=467035.
Works in Tor Browser and Firefox 67 (with a different dtd file as in the bugzilla PoC), probably also next ESR.
Did not do a PoC but it would be easy to get a specific string in all locales, and just compare with value obtained via a hidden iframe that loads an xml with the translated string.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30429Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 682020-07-14T22:25:19ZGeorg KoppenRebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68We need to start rebasing our patches against Firefox 68. This is the ticket that tracks the whole effort.
It's helpful how we did it the last time: comment:6:ticket:25543. As mentioned there https://torpat.ch/ is a very valuable resour...We need to start rebasing our patches against Firefox 68. This is the ticket that tracks the whole effort.
It's helpful how we did it the last time: comment:6:ticket:25543. As mentioned there https://torpat.ch/ is a very valuable resource. It might need updating, though (which we should do while we are at it, or point Arthur to the things that need to get fixed).https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30460Update TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)2020-07-14T22:25:22ZShane IsbellUpdate TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)Update TOPL Project to use the new android toolchain. This will include updating gradle dependencies and changes to the api versions.Update TOPL Project to use the new android toolchain. This will include updating gradle dependencies and changes to the api versions.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30463Make sure telemetry reporting is disabled in Tor Browser 92020-07-14T22:25:23ZGeorg KoppenMake sure telemetry reporting is disabled in Tor Browser 9We explicitly unset telemetry reporting for mobile and have this disabled for desktop as well.
We should double-check this for Tor Browser 9, though, as MOZ_TELEMETRY_REPORTING gets now automatically set for builds using official settin...We explicitly unset telemetry reporting for mobile and have this disabled for desktop as well.
We should double-check this for Tor Browser 9, though, as MOZ_TELEMETRY_REPORTING gets now automatically set for builds using official settings (as we do), see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1549886.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30504Investigate if New Identity works properly after moving to ESR 682020-07-14T22:25:12ZAlex CatarineuInvestigate if New Identity works properly after moving to ESR 68Apparently, it seems to be working. But after reloading Browser Console shows a few errors and warnings:
`PushService: onPermissionChange: Error updating registrations: InvalidStateError PushService.jsm:302`
`An IndexedDB transaction t...Apparently, it seems to be working. But after reloading Browser Console shows a few errors and warnings:
`PushService: onPermissionChange: Error updating registrations: InvalidStateError PushService.jsm:302`
`An IndexedDB transaction that was not yet complete has been aborted due to page navigation. IndexedDBHelper.jsm:145:23`
`Error: _initWorker called too early! Please read the session file from disk first. SessionFile.jsm:334:15`
`TypeError: win.gBrowser is undefined ProcessHangMonitor.jsm:410:18`https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30662Make sure about:newtab is blank2023-02-07T18:08:52ZAlex CatarineuMake sure about:newtab is blankMy understanding is that currently the desired behaviour is that `about:newtab` pages should be blank instead of the default Firefox newtab page. While working on legacy/trac#30429 I realized that after applying most of the desktop patch...My understanding is that currently the desired behaviour is that `about:newtab` pages should be blank instead of the default Firefox newtab page. While working on legacy/trac#30429 I realized that after applying most of the desktop patches `about:newtab` is still the Firefox default. Setting `browser.newtabpage.enabled = false` achieves the desired effect, but this pref is `true` for current esr60 and I could not find a browser patch that explicitly sets `about:newtab` to blank for current esr60.
In any case, we should probably set `browser.newtabpage.enabled = false` for esr68.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30665Get Firefox 68 ESR Working with latest android toolchain2020-07-14T22:25:15ZShane IsbellGet Firefox 68 ESR Working with latest android toolchainGet Firefox 68 ESR working in offline mode with updated android toolchain. This task does not include tor-android-service integration.
It may include patches for Rust 1.34.1.Get Firefox 68 ESR working in offline mode with updated android toolchain. This task does not include tor-android-service integration.
It may include patches for Rust 1.34.1.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30767Custom obfs4 bridge does not work on Tor Browser for Android2021-07-09T18:24:30ZGeorg KoppenCustom obfs4 bridge does not work on Tor Browser for AndroidWe got a report on our blog post (https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282217#comment-282217) mentioning that custom obfs4 bridges don't work on Android while they do on desktop. I tested with a bridge provided and can reproduce the issue.We got a report on our blog post (https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282217#comment-282217) mentioning that custom obfs4 bridges don't work on Android while they do on desktop. I tested with a bridge provided and can reproduce the issue.Shane IsbellShane Isbellhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30846Audit activity-stream for network requests2020-07-14T22:25:22ZAlex CatarineuAudit activity-stream for network requestsIn ff68 there are some snippets network requests coming from activity stream (`re[/activity-stream/lib/ASRouter.jsm`).](/activity-stream/lib/ASRouter.jsm`).) We should make sure to disable these and any other related background requests....In ff68 there are some snippets network requests coming from activity stream (`re[/activity-stream/lib/ASRouter.jsm`).](/activity-stream/lib/ASRouter.jsm`).) We should make sure to disable these and any other related background requests.
Some relevant prefs: https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-user.js/blob/a92c4086bbf8c4324c4369d1dc8a39338334af45/user.js#L109https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31013Saving images in Tor Browser on Android does not work2021-07-09T17:23:47ZGeorg KoppenSaving images in Tor Browser on Android does not workWe have reports on the blog that saving images does not work in Tor Browser on Android (https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282272#comment-282272).
Steps to reproduce:
1) With Tor Browser go to https://torproject.org
2) long-tap on the...We have reports on the blog that saving images does not work in Tor Browser on Android (https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282272#comment-282272).
Steps to reproduce:
1) With Tor Browser go to https://torproject.org
2) long-tap on the Tor logo in the upper left corner
3) Choose image
4) Save Image
5) Allow access to device to save images
6) Nothing happenshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31015svg.disabled = 'true' hides the the UI icons in extensions2021-07-09T18:24:30Zcypherpunkssvg.disabled = 'true' hides the the UI icons in extensionsIn "safest" security level `svg.disabled` is set to `true` in Tor Browser. This causes the UI icons in the latest versions of uBblock Origin and uMatrix to disappear.
The author of the extensions declined working on this with a note:
"...In "safest" security level `svg.disabled` is set to `true` in Tor Browser. This causes the UI icons in the latest versions of uBblock Origin and uMatrix to disappear.
The author of the extensions declined working on this with a note:
"I consider this a browser issue, to be reported to Firefox issue tracker. Extensions extend a browser abilities, they should not be subjected to restrictions which are meant to be imposed on web pages."
https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBlock-issues/issues/446
However as this is Tor Browser specific, I am reporting it here.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31055Retire Linus' default bridges2021-07-09T17:19:52ZPhilipp Winterphw@torproject.orgRetire Linus' default bridgesLinus mentioned to me that he intends to shut down his default bridges to reduce the maintenance burden and to eliminate the risk of seeing both entry and exit traffic.
The affected bridges are:
* 109.105.109.163:38980
* 109.105.109.16...Linus mentioned to me that he intends to shut down his default bridges to reduce the maintenance burden and to eliminate the risk of seeing both entry and exit traffic.
The affected bridges are:
* 109.105.109.163:38980
* 109.105.109.163:47779
* 109.105.109.165:10527
* 109.105.109.147:13764
I'll push a patch that removes these four bridges in a second.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31065Set network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost to true2020-07-14T22:25:17ZAlex CatarineuSet network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost to truehttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1507110 disables proxying localhost even when `network.proxy.no_proxies_on` is empty. We now need to also set `allow_hijacking_localhost=true` in order to avoid websites being able to access local network.https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1507110 disables proxying localhost even when `network.proxy.no_proxies_on` is empty. We now need to also set `allow_hijacking_localhost=true` in order to avoid websites being able to access local network.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31192TBA - Support x86_64 target2020-07-14T22:25:10ZcypherpunksTBA - Support x86_64 targethttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1480834#c0https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1480834#c0https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31286Include bridge configuration into about:preferences2021-12-17T13:52:51ZGeorg KoppenInclude bridge configuration into about:preferencesTorbutton as a standalone extension is going away (legacy/trac#10760) and while doing so we restructure our toolbar making it more usable by exposing New Identity directly on it (legacy/trac#27511). However, we need to find a new home fo...Torbutton as a standalone extension is going away (legacy/trac#10760) and while doing so we restructure our toolbar making it more usable by exposing New Identity directly on it (legacy/trac#27511). However, we need to find a new home for the bridge configuration as well if we want to remove the onion button from the toolbar. The current plan is to move it to `about:preferences` as a general setting. This ticket tracks that work.richardrichardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31293tor-android-service gradle failure when probing network interfaces2021-07-09T17:23:48ZMatthew Finkeltor-android-service gradle failure when probing network interfacesWhen building nightly android-aarch64 and android-x86 (I haven't tried the other platforms), the build fails on tor-android-service with:
```
Starting build: Tue Jul 30 16:12:53 2019
patching file build.gradle
patching file service/buil...When building nightly android-aarch64 and android-x86 (I haven't tried the other platforms), the build fails on tor-android-service with:
```
Starting build: Tue Jul 30 16:12:53 2019
patching file build.gradle
patching file service/build.gradle
patching file service/src/main/java/org/torproject/android/service/TorService.java
Hunk #2 succeeded at 99 (offset 3 lines).
FAILURE: Build failed with an exception.
* What went wrong:
Could not determine a usable local IP for this machine.
```
The failure is on the gradle command:
```
# Build Android Libraries and Apps
$GRADLE_HOME/gradle-4.1/bin/gradle --offline -P androidplugin=3.0.1 -P appcompatVersion=23.4.0 -P compileVersion=26 -P targetVersion=26 -P minVersion=16 assembleRelease -x lint
```https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31308Sync mozconfig files used in tor-browser over to tor-browser-build for esr682020-07-14T22:25:16ZGeorg KoppenSync mozconfig files used in tor-browser over to tor-browser-build for esr68If we don't make sufficient progress on legacy/trac#23656 this time we should at least make sure all the `mozconfig` files we use for our official builds contain all the things they should contain (and only those) (the `--enable-proxy-by...If we don't make sufficient progress on legacy/trac#23656 this time we should at least make sure all the `mozconfig` files we use for our official builds contain all the things they should contain (and only those) (the `--enable-proxy-bypass-protection` option is one of them; the `MOZILLA_OFFICIAL` changes as well)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31395Remove inline <script> in aboutTor.xhtml2020-07-14T22:25:11ZAlex CatarineuRemove inline <script> in aboutTor.xhtmlWe should move the inline script in aboutTor.xhtml to some .js file so that we can remove the 'unsafe-inline' from about:tor CSP. See legacy/trac#31322.We should move the inline script in aboutTor.xhtml to some .js file so that we can remove the 'unsafe-inline' from about:tor CSP. See legacy/trac#31322.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31448gold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfd2020-07-14T22:25:17ZGeorg Koppengold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfdFor some reason both `gold`
```
40:57.34 toolkit/library/libxul.so
41:17.86 /var/tmp/dist/binutils/bin/ld.gold.real: internal error in relocate_section, at i386.cc:3684
```
and `lld`
```
40:55.77 toolkit/library/libxul.so
41:04.50 ld.lld...For some reason both `gold`
```
40:57.34 toolkit/library/libxul.so
41:17.86 /var/tmp/dist/binutils/bin/ld.gold.real: internal error in relocate_section, at i386.cc:3684
```
and `lld`
```
40:55.77 toolkit/library/libxul.so
41:04.50 ld.lld: error: dwarf.c:(.debug_info+0x20DE295A): has non-ABS relocation R_386_GOTOFF against symbol '.LC25'
```
fail when linking Firefox 68 in our build setup while `bfd` works.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31450Still use GCC for 64bit Linux debug builds after switch to 68 ESR2020-07-14T22:25:18ZGeorg KoppenStill use GCC for 64bit Linux debug builds after switch to 68 ESRWe switched to `clang` for our Linux builds as Mozilla did but we should still use `gcc` for our debug builds to have a chance of finding serious issues Mozilla missed with `clang` (which happened in the past).We switched to `clang` for our Linux builds as Mozilla did but we should still use `gcc` for our debug builds to have a chance of finding serious issues Mozilla missed with `clang` (which happened in the past).https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31457disable per-installation profiles2022-12-22T11:55:14ZMark Smithdisable per-installation profilesFirefox ESR68 includes installation-specific profiles. See: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1474285
With our current nightly builds, this causes an extra profile directory to be created and used (and probably our bundled br...Firefox ESR68 includes installation-specific profiles. See: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1474285
With our current nightly builds, this causes an extra profile directory to be created and used (and probably our bundled browser profile is not be used on Linux and Windows).
We should figure out how to disable this feature or modify it to be compatible with the way we crate and use browser profiles).https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31506Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to it fr...2022-07-09T10:41:45ZRoger DingledineWrite up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to it from inside Tor BrowserWe've been getting a steady stream of people who fail to run Tor Browser, who get the "Tor unexpectedly exited" error and they have no ideas what to do.
The internets are full of weird advices about what to do in this situation back in ...We've been getting a steady stream of people who fail to run Tor Browser, who get the "Tor unexpectedly exited" error and they have no ideas what to do.
The internets are full of weird advices about what to do in this situation back in 2014, few of which apply now, so people hunting in google are unlikely to solve this on their own.
I think the advice differs depending on the OS -- on Windows, the first step is about disabling antivirus and firewall; on OS X, the advice is...about finding the old tor process and killing it? Or something else?
We should write up a comprehensive "what the error means, what to do, in what order" explanation, and stick it on support.torproject.org so people can find it and so we can point people to it. And then we should link to it from inside Tor Browser, when the thing goes wrong, so there is a canonical place for users to read what they should do.
(And longer term, we should improve the automated handling of this error inside Tor Browser, but that can come later.)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31564Android bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymore2021-07-09T18:24:30ZGeorg KoppenAndroid bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymoreI compared two builds on two different machines with what is very likely our toolchain to come (armv7) and it turns out the .apk files are nor built reproducibly anymore.I compared two builds on two different machines with what is very likely our toolchain to come (armv7) and it turns out the .apk files are nor built reproducibly anymore.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31607App menu items stop working2020-07-14T22:25:21ZMark SmithApp menu items stop workingIn the ESR68-based Tor Browser on macOS, the App menu items are not working. For example, choosing `Quit` or pressing `Cmd+Q` has no effect. Same for `Preferences` and `Cmd+,`
I observed this problem while testing the es-ES and en-US bu...In the ESR68-based Tor Browser on macOS, the App menu items are not working. For example, choosing `Quit` or pressing `Cmd+Q` has no effect. Same for `Preferences` and `Cmd+,`
I observed this problem while testing the es-ES and en-US builds from the following location on an older macOS 10.11.6 system:
https://people.torproject.org/~gk/builds/9.0a6-build4/
I will re-test on a 10.14.x system to make sure it isn't specific to macOS 10.11.x.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/32125Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display2023-10-17T16:14:20ZGusUsing private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit displayAfter providing some private obfs4 bridges, an user reported:
In the Tor Browser (stable and alpha 9.0a8), I cannot view my circuit or click to change my Tor circuit for a website while using a private obfs4.After providing some private obfs4 bridges, an user reported:
In the Tor Browser (stable and alpha 9.0a8), I cannot view my circuit or click to change my Tor circuit for a website while using a private obfs4.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/32166Tor Browser (and Firefox) clobber my clipboard when I return to the window in...2021-07-09T17:23:48ZRoger DingledineTor Browser (and Firefox) clobber my clipboard when I return to the window in certain ways1) click-click the url in the url bar, so the url is highlighted
2) go to another application, highlight something new with your mouse, and then alt-tab back to the browser.
3) the browser will re-highlight the url for you, clobbering wh...1) click-click the url in the url bar, so the url is highlighted
2) go to another application, highlight something new with your mouse, and then alt-tab back to the browser.
3) the browser will re-highlight the url for you, clobbering whatever you highlighted in the other application.
This behavior is really frustrating because I have two common workflows:
a) highlight a thing in my browser and then paste it onto irc or into a terminal
b) highlight a thing from irc or a terminal and then go back to the browser, ctrl-t to get a new window, and paste it into the url bar of the browser
and if I have done action 'a' as my most recent browser interaction (which is common because one of the ways I finish a browser interaction is by wanting to paste a url into another application), then later when I try action 'b', I end up instead pasting the original url from my earlier browser interaction.
This is a change in the browser behavior compared to a year or two ago -- specifically, I believe step 3 didn't used to happen.
The bug impacts me on both Tor Browser (8.x and 9.x) and Firefox (60esr on Debian).https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/32418Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest2022-07-13T07:21:22ZTracTorbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newestTorbrowser 9.01/Windows 7 x86
Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest
(I try to attach a screenshot, this seems to be difficult)
**Trac**:
**Username**: YetiTorbrowser 9.01/Windows 7 x86
Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest
(I try to attach a screenshot, this seems to be difficult)
**Trac**:
**Username**: Yetihttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28809Create build-specific installer for macOS2022-07-09T18:24:42ZrichardCreate build-specific installer for macOSSimilar to legacy/trac#28546 modify macOS installer to allow Tor Browser release, alpha and nightly to be installed side-by-side.Similar to legacy/trac#28546 modify macOS installer to allow Tor Browser release, alpha and nightly to be installed side-by-side.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28810Have tor operate on different ports by default for alpha, release and nightly...2022-07-09T18:25:53ZrichardHave tor operate on different ports by default for alpha, release and nightly Tor Browser buildsThe change in legacy/trac#28546 changes the default install directory based on build (release, alpha, or nightly) for windows, and legacy/trac#28809 will do the same for macOS.
It would be nice if we could run these different builds si...The change in legacy/trac#28546 changes the default install directory based on build (release, alpha, or nightly) for windows, and legacy/trac#28809 will do the same for macOS.
It would be nice if we could run these different builds simultaneously by having tor listen to different ports by default so that we do not need to kill our existing running Tor Browser instance or manually change the port settings ourselves.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31888Create unit test in wine to validate widl's output when building IA2Accessibl...2022-05-17T22:51:59ZrichardCreate unit test in wine to validate widl's output when building IA2Accessible interfacesJust to make sure wine doesn't break us in the future. Number of points reflects both dev time and effort to get patch accepted.Just to make sure wine doesn't break us in the future. Number of points reflects both dev time and effort to get patch accepted.richardrichardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/33693snowflake's 0.0.3.0 dummy address means rate limits are skipped means BW cont...2023-05-02T02:20:52ZRoger Dingledinesnowflake's 0.0.3.0 dummy address means rate limits are skipped means BW controller events show no bandwidth usedSnowflake's default bridge pretends to be on 0.0.3.0. It's a dummy address since snowflake-client knows how to connect to the right bridge and ignores the address that Tor tells it.
But my Tor client still uses that bridge address to ma...Snowflake's default bridge pretends to be on 0.0.3.0. It's a dummy address since snowflake-client knows how to connect to the right bridge and ignores the address that Tor tells it.
But my Tor client still uses that bridge address to make decisions. For example, connection_is_rate_limited() decides "no, it isn't rate limited", because tor_addr_is_internal() says 0.0.3.0 is essentially part of localhost. And that choice has a cascading effect where when I attach my nyx to Tor Browser to graph bandwidth use (`nyx -i 9151`), the BW events all say "0 0" because my Tor hasn't sent or received any non-internal bytes.
The quick fix is to keep using a dummy address, but to pick one that isn't an internal address. I confirmed that if I change snowflake's dummy address to 11.0.3.0, then connection_is_rate_limited() decides it's external, my BW events work again, and nyx gives me graphs. That is, Tor is smart enough to know that even though the connection is from the Tor client to the localhost snowflake client, the connection is "really" to the (non-localhost) destination bridge address.
I confess that I don't know which "apparently routable but don't worry we won't actually connect to it, probably" address is the best choice here. :/
The longer term answer is to have some other way to signal that it's a dummy address, or to change the PT interface so we don't need the fake address. But I don't think we need to wait for the longer term answer here.
The reason I noticed this issue is because I am pondering lobbying for the Tor Browser folks to give me a tiny bandwidth graph (or activity spinner) somewhere in the browser, because I got a super slow snowflake, but I was still getting 5-10KBytes/s, and my page did load after like 90 seconds, but if I hadn't been staring at the
```
2020/03/23 09:33:05 Traffic Bytes (in|out): 9018 | 10981 -- (27 OnMessages, 24 Sends)
```
lines I would have assumed that it was wedged.Cecylia BocovichCecylia Bocovichhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/33854Spoof Network ID2021-07-09T17:19:52ZrichardSpoof Network IDMozilla 1561005 added a unique string identifier to `nsINetworkLinkService.idl`. It's at least partially based off of a hash of the user's IP and MAC address. It's not clear to me what it's used for, but we should probably stub out the i...Mozilla 1561005 added a unique string identifier to `nsINetworkLinkService.idl`. It's at least partially based off of a hash of the user's IP and MAC address. It's not clear to me what it's used for, but we should probably stub out the implementations.
Relevant ticket:
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1561005https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/34389Multi-Account Container extension "corrupt" upon installation2021-07-09T17:23:48ZTracMulti-Account Container extension "corrupt" upon installationHi. I'm running TB 9.5 on Ubuntu 20.04. To further improve my privacy, I'd like to install Multi-Account Containers extension to have cookie (session) isolation between tabs. I've tried installing versions that I verified work in vanilla...Hi. I'm running TB 9.5 on Ubuntu 20.04. To further improve my privacy, I'd like to install Multi-Account Containers extension to have cookie (session) isolation between tabs. I've tried installing versions that I verified work in vanilla Firefox. All attempts fail with same error "The add-on downloaded from this site could not be installed because it appears to be corrupt." Screenshot here: https://i.imgur.com/zlCxx2I.png
**Trac**:
**Username**: TechyGruehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/40478Onion alias url rewrite is broken2021-07-09T17:19:52ZMatthew FinkelOnion alias url rewrite is brokenThe urlbar is not re-written anymore. I tested nightlies from 15 May and it's broken there, too, so it's been broken for a while. I'm testing with `2600.securedrop.tor.onion`.The urlbar is not re-written anymore. I tested nightlies from 15 May and it's broken there, too, so it's been broken for a while. I'm testing with `2600.securedrop.tor.onion`.