Tor Browser issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues2024-03-13T08:39:52Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/27281Enable Reader View again2024-03-13T08:39:52ZGeorg KoppenEnable Reader View againBack in legacy/trac#18950 we flipped prefs to disable Reader View due to fingerprinting concerns. Those got essentially addressed and we can now enabled the feature again. see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1369327.Back in legacy/trac#18950 we flipped prefs to disable Reader View due to fingerprinting concerns. Those got essentially addressed and we can now enabled the feature again. see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1369327.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28885notify users that update is downloading2023-12-12T12:59:07ZMark Smithnotify users that update is downloadingAn important improvement that was discussed in legacy/trac#25694 is to let users know when an update is in the process of being downloaded. Firefox does not show this information in an obvious way; users need to open about:preferences an...An important improvement that was discussed in legacy/trac#25694 is to let users know when an update is in the process of being downloaded. Firefox does not show this information in an obvious way; users need to open about:preferences and look in the Updates section or open the about box. Tor Browser users are sometimes confused because they know an update is available but have no easy way to know if it is being downloaded, and downloading the MAR files can take a while over Tor.
We plan to add a new "Downloading Tor Browser update..." message that will be displayed in the hamburger menu. We will also ensure that the standard "update" icon is displayed on the hamburger menu toolbar icon so users know to look inside for more info.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/32125Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display2023-10-17T16:14:20ZGusUsing private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit displayAfter providing some private obfs4 bridges, an user reported:
In the Tor Browser (stable and alpha 9.0a8), I cannot view my circuit or click to change my Tor circuit for a website while using a private obfs4.After providing some private obfs4 bridges, an user reported:
In the Tor Browser (stable and alpha 9.0a8), I cannot view my circuit or click to change my Tor circuit for a website while using a private obfs4.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28005Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere2023-09-12T14:05:18ZGeorge KadianakisOfficially support onions in HTTPS-EverywhereThe plan:
A major UX issue for onion services is their huge addresses. We want to fix this issue because an address with 56 random characters confuses people, it makes it harder to pass the address around, and it also makes it much hard...The plan:
A major UX issue for onion services is their huge addresses. We want to fix this issue because an address with 56 random characters confuses people, it makes it harder to pass the address around, and it also makes it much harder to verify it.
There is a field of literature called "secure name systems" but none of the candidates are good enough for us right now. Hence, we present a hotfix that might offer a situational relief for users for the medium-term future, until we come up with something better, or while we experiment with more solutions. I suggest we keep this ticket focused to this idea, instead of debating why this and not that since we've already been doing this for far too long.
The plan is to use the HTTPS-Everywhere extension that we already have in Tor Browser, and encourage people to write their own rulesets for onions. We are talking about community-maintained rulesets and nothing that is officially maintained by The Tor Project or by HTTPS-Everywhere. This ticket is about making it easier for people to create, import and use this rulesets. We are talking about UI/UX improvements, writing blog posts and doing Q&A.
Here are some example of community rulesets we can imagine:
* The SecureDrop ruleset: where securedrop makes a ruleset with their whole directory. People can download that to quickly visit securedrop destinations, by going to securedrop-nyt.tor.onion .
* The Torproject ruleset: where torproject makes a ruleset with all their onions. We developers can use that to quickly visit Tor sites over onion, by going to tor-trac.tor.onion instead of remembering the onion.
* The Bitcoin ruleset: where a "trusted" bitcoin entity publishes a ruleset with various cryptocurrency-related rules that allow people to quickly visit them.
This approach has both positives and negatives (I assure you this is the case with every "secure naming" project out there):
* Positives: Good security if the ruleset is taken from a trusted source. No state keeping. Reachable engineering effort. No global names, hence no fear of name squatting. Easy to understand tradeoffs.
* Negatives: Terrible security if the ruleset is evil. No global names: If you want people to use your shorten onion name, you need to persuade them to use your ruleset.
Here are some HTTPS-Everywhere issues we need to solve based on my Mexico notes:
* Be able to stop update channels per-channel.
* Need good UI to easily look and understand rules.
* Need to implement file extension to install ruleset with one-click from web button.
Here are some issues we need to think about:
* We need good user text to make sure that people don't shoot themselves in the foot too often by installing bad rulesets and whatnot (they already do it daily when they open onions from "search enginers" or reddit).
* Which tld to use? If we use .tor we open ourselves to DNS leaks in normal browsers. If we use .tor.onion that might be confusing to people.
* Are there any issues with SSL?
More resources:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2018MexicoCity/Notes/OnionV3ux
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2018MexicoCity/Notes/HTTPSEverywhereNotes
https://blog.torproject.org/cooking-onions-names-your-onionshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/26146Setting `general.useragent.override` does not spoof the platform part anymore...2023-09-06T06:38:17ZGeorg KoppenSetting `general.useragent.override` does not spoof the platform part anymore in ESR 60 which is confusingDespite updating `general.useragent.override` to match ESR 60 (done according to comment:16:ticket:25543) the platform part is not spoofed to Windows on my Linux box.
Now, that is intentional, see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug....Despite updating `general.useragent.override` to match ESR 60 (done according to comment:16:ticket:25543) the platform part is not spoofed to Windows on my Linux box.
Now, that is intentional, see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1404608.
So, we probably should not set `general.useragent.override` at all anymore and just rely on the settings we get with `privacy.resistFingerprinting`? Because if we explicitly set it to the Windows UA but then don't get that, this is weird.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22654Firefox icon is shown for Tor Browser on Windows 10 start menu2023-08-24T18:57:11ZGeorg KoppenFirefox icon is shown for Tor Browser on Windows 10 start menuA user reported today in #tor that a Firefox icon is shown in the Windows start menu instead of the Tor Browser one.A user reported today in #tor that a Firefox icon is shown in the Windows start menu instead of the Tor Browser one.richardrichardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/164418-month-old Tor Browser offers to "Reset Tor Browser", removes extensions2023-08-24T18:57:11ZDavid Fifielddcf@torproject.org8-month-old Tor Browser offers to "Reset Tor Browser", removes extensionsI started an old copy of Tor Browser 4.0 I had in a directory. From file times it looks like it was last run on 2014-10-21, 8 months ago (today is 2015-06-24). When I started it, the about:tor page showed a banner at the bottom
It look...I started an old copy of Tor Browser 4.0 I had in a directory. From file times it looks like it was last run on 2014-10-21, 8 months ago (today is 2015-06-24). When I started it, the about:tor page showed a banner at the bottom
It looks like you haven't started Tor Browser in a while. Do you want to clean it up for a fresh, like-new experience? And by the way, welcome back!
with a button that says "Reset Tor Browser..."
When I click on the button, the browser restarts and gives me the plain Firefox start page, with the Firefox logo and everything. It looks like all the extensions are gone (HTTPS-Everywhere, NoScript, Torbutton, Tor Launcher). check.torproject.org says the browser is using Tor. I also got a banner offering to update to 5.0a2.
I was trying the instructions from [[doc/TorBrowser/Hacking#UsinganExistingTorProcess]] so I had run
```
export TOR_SOCKS_PORT=9050
export TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1
./start-tor-browser
```
I don't know if that had anything to do with it.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/11154Disable TLS 1.0 (and 1.1) by default2023-08-14T22:26:56ZTracDisable TLS 1.0 (and 1.1) by defaultrunning the how's my ssl check the tor browser rated bad, the reason the tor browser is using old tls settings and old security cipers,
In the next update please set the minimum tls to 2 and the maximum to 3 in about:config for securit...running the how's my ssl check the tor browser rated bad, the reason the tor browser is using old tls settings and old security cipers,
In the next update please set the minimum tls to 2 and the maximum to 3 in about:config for security.tls.version this makes the minimum tls 1.1 and my max tls 1.2.
Also please disable use of insecure cipher suites security.ssl3.rsa_fips_des_ede3_sha in about:config
**Trac**:
**Username**: ZeroCoolhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/33693snowflake's 0.0.3.0 dummy address means rate limits are skipped means BW cont...2023-05-02T02:20:52ZRoger Dingledinesnowflake's 0.0.3.0 dummy address means rate limits are skipped means BW controller events show no bandwidth usedSnowflake's default bridge pretends to be on 0.0.3.0. It's a dummy address since snowflake-client knows how to connect to the right bridge and ignores the address that Tor tells it.
But my Tor client still uses that bridge address to ma...Snowflake's default bridge pretends to be on 0.0.3.0. It's a dummy address since snowflake-client knows how to connect to the right bridge and ignores the address that Tor tells it.
But my Tor client still uses that bridge address to make decisions. For example, connection_is_rate_limited() decides "no, it isn't rate limited", because tor_addr_is_internal() says 0.0.3.0 is essentially part of localhost. And that choice has a cascading effect where when I attach my nyx to Tor Browser to graph bandwidth use (`nyx -i 9151`), the BW events all say "0 0" because my Tor hasn't sent or received any non-internal bytes.
The quick fix is to keep using a dummy address, but to pick one that isn't an internal address. I confirmed that if I change snowflake's dummy address to 11.0.3.0, then connection_is_rate_limited() decides it's external, my BW events work again, and nyx gives me graphs. That is, Tor is smart enough to know that even though the connection is from the Tor client to the localhost snowflake client, the connection is "really" to the (non-localhost) destination bridge address.
I confess that I don't know which "apparently routable but don't worry we won't actually connect to it, probably" address is the best choice here. :/
The longer term answer is to have some other way to signal that it's a dummy address, or to change the PT interface so we don't need the fake address. But I don't think we need to wait for the longer term answer here.
The reason I noticed this issue is because I am pondering lobbying for the Tor Browser folks to give me a tiny bandwidth graph (or activity spinner) somewhere in the browser, because I got a super slow snowflake, but I was still getting 5-10KBytes/s, and my page did load after like 90 seconds, but if I hadn't been staring at the
```
2020/03/23 09:33:05 Traffic Bytes (in|out): 9018 | 10981 -- (27 OnMessages, 24 Sends)
```
lines I would have assumed that it was wedged.Cecylia BocovichCecylia Bocovichhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/25741Create tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-central2023-03-02T09:57:52ZGeorg KoppenCreate tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-centralTo prepare our first Tor Browser for Android alpha we need to create a separate branch in our tor-browser repo that is tracking the mozilla-central branch (rebased with our patches) we want to use in the release. Follow-up beta and stabl...To prepare our first Tor Browser for Android alpha we need to create a separate branch in our tor-browser repo that is tracking the mozilla-central branch (rebased with our patches) we want to use in the release. Follow-up beta and stable branches are later on needed as well.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/30662Make sure about:newtab is blank2023-02-07T18:08:52ZAlex CatarineuMake sure about:newtab is blankMy understanding is that currently the desired behaviour is that `about:newtab` pages should be blank instead of the default Firefox newtab page. While working on legacy/trac#30429 I realized that after applying most of the desktop patch...My understanding is that currently the desired behaviour is that `about:newtab` pages should be blank instead of the default Firefox newtab page. While working on legacy/trac#30429 I realized that after applying most of the desktop patches `about:newtab` is still the Firefox default. Setting `browser.newtabpage.enabled = false` achieves the desired effect, but this pref is `true` for current esr60 and I could not find a browser patch that explicitly sets `about:newtab` to blank for current esr60.
In any case, we should probably set `browser.newtabpage.enabled = false` for esr68.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31457disable per-installation profiles2022-12-22T11:55:14ZMark Smithdisable per-installation profilesFirefox ESR68 includes installation-specific profiles. See: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1474285
With our current nightly builds, this causes an extra profile directory to be created and used (and probably our bundled br...Firefox ESR68 includes installation-specific profiles. See: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1474285
With our current nightly builds, this causes an extra profile directory to be created and used (and probably our bundled browser profile is not be used on Linux and Windows).
We should figure out how to disable this feature or modify it to be compatible with the way we crate and use browser profiles).https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/24309Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user2022-10-28T16:23:15ZIsabela FernandesActivity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user## Problem we are trying to solve:
Many users expect the guard node to change when asking for a new circuit.
There is nothing on circuit display that tells the user the first node is a guard, what guards are, and how it works when Tor c...## Problem we are trying to solve:
Many users expect the guard node to change when asking for a new circuit.
There is nothing on circuit display that tells the user the first node is a guard, what guards are, and how it works when Tor creates new circuits for the user.
## Expected behavior
If no other condition, guards will only change for a client every 3 months. Even if the user pick 'new identity' the guard should stay the same.
## Proposed solution:
First of all we need to update the Tor Browser User Manual to have an explanation about how the guard selection works, it should be in this section:
https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/managing-identities.html
All the solutions below will link to the manual, this will allow us to send the user to a place with more information. And not necessary have to explain everything in the display or UI.
Managing users expectations:
I believe that for now we are better served if we managed user expectation about what will change when they request such change, not in the circuit display.
The current places where the user will be asking for a new circuit are:
1 - Tor Button -> New Identity
At this action, Tor Browser will open a confirmation window (see screenshot: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/24309/new_identity_confirmation_window.png)
We should change the text here to set the right expectation about guards.
2 - Tor Button -> New Tor Circuit for this Site
Could we have a tool tip here that helps user know that guards won't change.
Circuit display UI:
keep IP and country name. Add 'guard' to the first node - guard should be a link to manual page.
Add a link at the bottom for "Learn More" which should also link to the manual page.
I am suggesting 2 links to the manual as an intentional effort of over communicating to the user.
## Things I would like to test
* User understanding of Tor Browser User Manual explanation about how guards selection works.
* Did we managed to set the right expectation for user? Test it with New Identity flow and New Tor Circuit flow.
* Do we need both links on circuit display?
## Things I am suggesting to be left for a second iteration or not doing and why
* Suggesting to not add functionality to let user pick a different guard. I think such a feature should be deeply discussed and done as a project of it own. Not as part of this solution.
* Suggestion to leave for a second iteration making the IP addresses linkable to more information about the relay (from atlas).
* Suggestion to not use JS for the more information on the relay feature mentioned above. We should never jeopardize the user safety for 'better UX'. We should be able to deliver better UX within the limitations we have by building a product that has security by design in mind.
## Tickets related to the problem:
* Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16665
* Circuit visualizer needs a cue about guards
This is the main ticket that contains lots of information describing the user problem in the comments posted. Would recommend reading it fully for better understanding.
* Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15239
* Add hyperlinks in tor circuit display to show "more info" about relays
This ticket has some suggestions for displaying more information about the relays (using atlas). We are taking into consideration these suggestions in the hypothesis above.
* Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20805
* Circuit display does not honor or use the UI font.
This ticket is more a bug then a UX issue. Although we should make sure that we set a rule of what font to use in the display, and fall back options. Let's make sure we are aligning this with: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style guidelines -- on UX Team roadmap (for March 2018)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28111For about:tor, use a Tor Browser icon in identity box2022-10-03T16:51:15ZArthur EdelsteinFor about:tor, use a Tor Browser icon in identity boxRight now, the Firefox icon is displayed in the identity box. We should fix this. Antonela proposed the following design:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/27200/27200.pngRight now, the Firefox icon is displayed in the identity box. We should fix this. Antonela proposed the following design:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/27200/27200.pngrichardrichardhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/32418Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest2022-07-13T07:21:22ZTracTorbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newestTorbrowser 9.01/Windows 7 x86
Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest
(I try to attach a screenshot, this seems to be difficult)
**Trac**:
**Username**: YetiTorbrowser 9.01/Windows 7 x86
Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest
(I try to attach a screenshot, this seems to be difficult)
**Trac**:
**Username**: Yetihttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28810Have tor operate on different ports by default for alpha, release and nightly...2022-07-09T18:25:53ZrichardHave tor operate on different ports by default for alpha, release and nightly Tor Browser buildsThe change in legacy/trac#28546 changes the default install directory based on build (release, alpha, or nightly) for windows, and legacy/trac#28809 will do the same for macOS.
It would be nice if we could run these different builds si...The change in legacy/trac#28546 changes the default install directory based on build (release, alpha, or nightly) for windows, and legacy/trac#28809 will do the same for macOS.
It would be nice if we could run these different builds simultaneously by having tor listen to different ports by default so that we do not need to kill our existing running Tor Browser instance or manually change the port settings ourselves.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/28809Create build-specific installer for macOS2022-07-09T18:24:42ZrichardCreate build-specific installer for macOSSimilar to legacy/trac#28546 modify macOS installer to allow Tor Browser release, alpha and nightly to be installed side-by-side.Similar to legacy/trac#28546 modify macOS installer to allow Tor Browser release, alpha and nightly to be installed side-by-side.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31506Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to it fr...2022-07-09T10:41:45ZRoger DingledineWrite up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to it from inside Tor BrowserWe've been getting a steady stream of people who fail to run Tor Browser, who get the "Tor unexpectedly exited" error and they have no ideas what to do.
The internets are full of weird advices about what to do in this situation back in ...We've been getting a steady stream of people who fail to run Tor Browser, who get the "Tor unexpectedly exited" error and they have no ideas what to do.
The internets are full of weird advices about what to do in this situation back in 2014, few of which apply now, so people hunting in google are unlikely to solve this on their own.
I think the advice differs depending on the OS -- on Windows, the first step is about disabling antivirus and firewall; on OS X, the advice is...about finding the old tor process and killing it? Or something else?
We should write up a comprehensive "what the error means, what to do, in what order" explanation, and stick it on support.torproject.org so people can find it and so we can point people to it. And then we should link to it from inside Tor Browser, when the thing goes wrong, so there is a canonical place for users to read what they should do.
(And longer term, we should improve the automated handling of this error inside Tor Browser, but that can come later.)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22396What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?2022-06-22T02:07:18ZRoger DingledineWhat does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?When I get an html5 canvas warning in Tor Browser, it suggests that I pick "never for this site".
To me, the word "never" implies that Tor Browser is writing down my answer, and it will use that answer forever after. Like the "permanent...When I get an html5 canvas warning in Tor Browser, it suggests that I pick "never for this site".
To me, the word "never" implies that Tor Browser is writing down my answer, and it will use that answer forever after. Like the "permanent exceptions" for SSL certs.
On the other hand, my understanding of Tor Browser behavior is that it wouldn't write it to disk, so my choice would be lost on the next browser reset or new identity click.
There's a contradiction here. I'm assuming the second one is right. Is there a better phrase we can use than "never"?https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/13252Tor Browser on OS X should not store data into the application bundle2022-05-25T10:55:34ZTracTor Browser on OS X should not store data into the application bundle
The Tor application on OS X stores user data into its bundle (TorBrowser.app/Data/). This is bad. This causes various issues:
- the Tor application can't be code sign which decreases the security. See Ticket legacy/trac#13251: CodeSign...
The Tor application on OS X stores user data into its bundle (TorBrowser.app/Data/). This is bad. This causes various issues:
- the Tor application can't be code sign which decreases the security. See Ticket legacy/trac#13251: CodeSign Tor for OS X
- when installing a new version of Tor, all previous user data (bookmarks) are deleted.
**Trac**:
**Username**: torosx