Tor Browser locale is leaked via title of link tag on non-html page
ryotak reported via our HackerOne bug bounty program that the Tor Browser locale is leaked via the title of the link tag on any non-html page.
For a test ryotak came up with see: https://people.torproject.org/~gk/tests/tor_plaintext_locale_leak.html.
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- Georg Koppen added component::applications/tor browser in Legacy / Trac ff68-esr-will-have in Legacy / Trac owner::tbb-team in Legacy / Trac priority::high in Legacy / Trac resolution::fixed in Legacy / Trac severity::normal in Legacy / Trac sponsor::44-can in Legacy / Trac status::closed in Legacy / Trac tbb-fingerprinting-locale in Legacy / Trac type::defect in Legacy / Trac labels
added component::applications/tor browser in Legacy / Trac ff68-esr-will-have in Legacy / Trac owner::tbb-team in Legacy / Trac priority::high in Legacy / Trac resolution::fixed in Legacy / Trac severity::normal in Legacy / Trac sponsor::44-can in Legacy / Trac status::closed in Legacy / Trac tbb-fingerprinting-locale in Legacy / Trac type::defect in Legacy / Trac labels
- Author Developer
Trac:
Summary: Tor Browser locale is leaked via title of link tag on 404 error page to Tor Browser locale is leaked via title of link tag on non-html page
Description: ryotak reported via our HackerOne bug bounty program that the Tor Browser locale is leaked via the title of link tag on 404 error page.For a test ryotak came up with see: https://people.torproject.org/~gk/tests/tor_plaintext_locale_leak.html.
to
ryotak reported via our HackerOne bug bounty program that the Tor Browser locale is leaked via the title of the link tag on any non-html page.
For a test ryotak came up with see: https://people.torproject.org/~gk/tests/tor_plaintext_locale_leak.html.
- Author Developer
Replying to Thorin:
FWIW: this behavior (or at least the PoC) stopped working as of FF68+, so you should be good to go in the next ESR cycle. It returns a blank.
Interesting, I wonder what bugfix on Mozilla's side is responsible for that...
Trac:
Keywords: N/A deleted, ff68-esr-will-have added The error is 68+ is
Security Error: Content at
https://people.torproject.org/~gk/tests/test.txt
may not load or link tore[/content-accessible/plaintext.css
.](/content-accessible/plaintext.css`.)If I'm following this correctly:
- 57+ https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=863246 - blocked
re[/URIs
](/URIs`) (yay!) - 57+ https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1395486 - they allowed plaintext.css in 57+ as a regression from 863246 (boo!)
- 68+ https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1514655 - and now they've closed it down again (yay!)
However, the last bugzilla is
css, enhancement
: and I wouldn't be surprised if it got reverted again. IDK, I just want to make sure that's it's a permanent [edit: and full] solution- 57+ https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=863246 - blocked
Adding Sponsor 44 to ESR68 tickets
Trac:
Sponsor: N/A to Sponsor44-can- Author Developer
9.0a6, which is about to get built, is based on ESR 68, so closing.
Trac:
Status: new to closed
Resolution: N/A to fixed - Trac closed
closed
- Trac moved from legacy/trac#30657 (moved)
moved from legacy/trac#30657 (moved)
- Trac added Fingerprinting label and removed 1 deleted label
added Fingerprinting label and removed 1 deleted label