diff --git a/mobile/android/app/geckoview-prefs.js b/mobile/android/app/geckoview-prefs.jsindex db07dc5a7b62..c4181f2fe2e8 100644--- a/mobile/android/app/geckoview-prefs.js+++ b/mobile/android/app/geckoview-prefs.js@@ -68,10 +68,6 @@ pref("browser.safebrowsing.features.fingerprinting.update", true); // Treat mouse as touch only on TV-ish devices pref("ui.android.mouse_as_touch", 2);-// Fenix is currently not whitelisted for Web Authentication-pref("security.webauth.webauthn_enable_android_fido2", false);-pref("security.webauth.webauthn", false);-
We could revert that change in the short-term. That will set GetAndroidFido2Enabled() as false.
I haven't read much of the webauthn/fido2 spec, and I don't know if there can be anything in Google Play's implementation can lead to something like proxy bypass or other issues. Maybe we can keep this disabled for now and test/investigate a bit before deciding whether we enable in future versions. We can also see if there is demand for it from users.
There is the consistent-behavior-across-platforms angle, too, we should consider. I.e. we should have some reasons at least why we diverge if we diverge and Mozilla is not diverging.
Ah. Desktop is still bound by #26614 for webauthn. Allowing u2f but disabling webauthn seems like a strange decision for Tor Browser, unless we have a reason for thinking u2f is "safer" than webauthn.
Let's disable webauthn in 10.0 and we can evaluate it for 10.5. It provides nice usability improvements (especially on mobile). If access to the WebAPI is protected by a permission in the browser (and, more generally, the API doesn't leak authentication providers by default, then I think enabling this is a good idea).
I'm considering this as covered by #26614. I don't see a benefit in disabling adding security.webauth.webauthn_enable_android_fido2 in addition to security.webauth.webauthn.