Loading doc/tor-design.tex +13 −9 Original line number Diff line number Diff line % XXX Cite SS03 \documentclass[times,10pt,twocolumn]{article} \usepackage{latex8} Loading Loading @@ -212,11 +211,15 @@ security, and became useless if any node in the path went down or rotated its keys. In Tor, clients negotiate {\it rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required. Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not require OS kernel patches or network stack support. This prevents us from anonymizing non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our portability and deployability. Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not anonymize non-TCP protocols---not requiring patches (or built-in support) in an operating system's network stack has been valuable to Tor's portability and deployability. %Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor only anonymizes %TCP-based protocols---not requiring patches (or built-in support) in an %operating system's network stack has been valuable to Tor's %portability and deployability. We have implemented all of the above features except rendezvous points. Our source code is Loading @@ -227,7 +230,7 @@ earlier versions of Onion Routing. We have deployed a wide-area alpha network to test the design, to get more experience with usability and users, and to provide a research platform for experimentation. As of this writing, the network stands at sixteen nodes in thirteen As of this writing, the network stands at eighteen nodes in thirteen distinct administrative domains on two continents. We review previous work in Section~\ref{sec:related-work}, describe Loading Loading @@ -273,7 +276,8 @@ delivery confirmation. But because these designs typically involve many packets that must be delivered quickly, it is difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the communication from correlating the timing and volume of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it \cite{SS03}. These protocols are similarly vulnerable to an active adversary who introduces timing patterns into traffic entering the network and looks for correlated patterns among exiting traffic. Loading Loading @@ -1520,8 +1524,8 @@ in~\cite{mix-acc}.\\ \Section{Early experiences: Tor in the Wild} \label{sec:in-the-wild} As of mid-January 2004, the Tor network consists of 17 nodes (15 in the US, 2 in Europe), and more are joining each week as the code As of mid-January 2004, the Tor network consists of 18 nodes (16 in the US, 2 in Europe), and more are joining each week as the code matures.\footnote{For comparison, the current remailer network has about 30 reliable nodes. We haven't asked PlanetLab to provide Tor nodes, since their AUP wouldn't allow exit nodes (see Loading Loading
doc/tor-design.tex +13 −9 Original line number Diff line number Diff line % XXX Cite SS03 \documentclass[times,10pt,twocolumn]{article} \usepackage{latex8} Loading Loading @@ -212,11 +211,15 @@ security, and became useless if any node in the path went down or rotated its keys. In Tor, clients negotiate {\it rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required. Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not require OS kernel patches or network stack support. This prevents us from anonymizing non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our portability and deployability. Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not anonymize non-TCP protocols---not requiring patches (or built-in support) in an operating system's network stack has been valuable to Tor's portability and deployability. %Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor only anonymizes %TCP-based protocols---not requiring patches (or built-in support) in an %operating system's network stack has been valuable to Tor's %portability and deployability. We have implemented all of the above features except rendezvous points. Our source code is Loading @@ -227,7 +230,7 @@ earlier versions of Onion Routing. We have deployed a wide-area alpha network to test the design, to get more experience with usability and users, and to provide a research platform for experimentation. As of this writing, the network stands at sixteen nodes in thirteen As of this writing, the network stands at eighteen nodes in thirteen distinct administrative domains on two continents. We review previous work in Section~\ref{sec:related-work}, describe Loading Loading @@ -273,7 +276,8 @@ delivery confirmation. But because these designs typically involve many packets that must be delivered quickly, it is difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the communication from correlating the timing and volume of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it \cite{SS03}. These protocols are similarly vulnerable to an active adversary who introduces timing patterns into traffic entering the network and looks for correlated patterns among exiting traffic. Loading Loading @@ -1520,8 +1524,8 @@ in~\cite{mix-acc}.\\ \Section{Early experiences: Tor in the Wild} \label{sec:in-the-wild} As of mid-January 2004, the Tor network consists of 17 nodes (15 in the US, 2 in Europe), and more are joining each week as the code As of mid-January 2004, the Tor network consists of 18 nodes (16 in the US, 2 in Europe), and more are joining each week as the code matures.\footnote{For comparison, the current remailer network has about 30 reliable nodes. We haven't asked PlanetLab to provide Tor nodes, since their AUP wouldn't allow exit nodes (see Loading