Loading src/or/circuitbuild.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay), * but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack, * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a * new TLS connection for each extend request. */ Loading src/or/circuitstats.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) #define MAX_TIMEOUT ((int32_t) (INT32_MAX/2)) /* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout * to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */ * to give clients on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */ if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) { if (cbt->timeout_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT || cbt->close_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. " Loading src/or/circuituse.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -2598,7 +2598,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn) log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "Attaching apconn to circ %u (stream %d sec old).", (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age); /* print the circ's path, so people can figure out which circs are /* print the circ's path, so clients can figure out which circs are * sucking. */ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ); Loading src/or/config.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(options); /* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge? * We use this so we don't count people who used our bridge thinking it is * We use this so we don't count clients who used our bridge thinking it is * a relay. If you change this, don't forget to change the log message * below. It's 4 hours (the time it takes to stop being used by clients) * plus some extra time for clock skew. */ Loading src/or/connection_edge.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn, * an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're configured to * do so. */ if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) { /* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ /* Don't let clients try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ tor_addr_t addr; int ok; ok = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name( Loading Loading
src/or/circuitbuild.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay), * but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack, * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a * new TLS connection for each extend request. */ Loading
src/or/circuitstats.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) #define MAX_TIMEOUT ((int32_t) (INT32_MAX/2)) /* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout * to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */ * to give clients on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */ if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) { if (cbt->timeout_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT || cbt->close_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. " Loading
src/or/circuituse.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -2598,7 +2598,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn) log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "Attaching apconn to circ %u (stream %d sec old).", (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age); /* print the circ's path, so people can figure out which circs are /* print the circ's path, so clients can figure out which circs are * sucking. */ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ); Loading
src/or/config.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(options); /* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge? * We use this so we don't count people who used our bridge thinking it is * We use this so we don't count clients who used our bridge thinking it is * a relay. If you change this, don't forget to change the log message * below. It's 4 hours (the time it takes to stop being used by clients) * plus some extra time for clock skew. */ Loading
src/or/connection_edge.c +1 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn, * an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're configured to * do so. */ if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) { /* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ /* Don't let clients try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ tor_addr_t addr; int ok; ok = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name( Loading