Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug1297b-v2'

  o Minor bugfixes:

    - Don't close hidden service client circuits which have almost

      finished connecting to their destination when they reach the

      normal circuit-build timeout.  Previously, we would close

      introduction circuits which are waiting for an acknowledgement

      from the introduction-point relay and rendezvous circuits which

      have been specified in an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden

      service after the normal CBT; now, we mark them as 'timed out',

      and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel.  This

      behaviour change can be disabled using the new

      CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option.  Fixes part of

      bug 1297.

    - Don't close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits when they

      reach the normal circuit-build timeout.  Previously, we would

      close them.  This behaviour change can be disabled using the new

      CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option.  Fixes

      the remaining part of bug 1297.

  o Minor bugfixes:

    - Make sure we never mark the wrong rendezvous circuit as having

      had its introduction cell acknowleged by the introduction-point

      relay.  Previously, when we received an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on a

      client-side hidden-service introduction circuit, we might have

      marked a rendezvous circuit other than the one we specified in

      the INTRODUCE1 cell as INTRO_ACKED, which would have produced a

      warning message and interfered with the hidden service

      connection-establishment process.  Bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha, when

      the stream-isolation feature which might cause Tor to open

      multiple rendezvous circuits for the same hidden service was

      added.  Fixes bug 4759.

    **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses

    instead. (Default: 80, 443)

**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::

    Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16

    characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22

    characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal

    purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times

    for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and

    this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden

    services can be configured to require authorization using the 

    **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.

**ReachableAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::

    A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows

    you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except

    and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory

    information) to port 80.

**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::

    Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16

    characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22

    characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal

    purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times

    for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and

    this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden

    services can be configured to require authorization using the 

    **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.

**CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**::

    If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden service client circuits

    which have not moved closer to connecting to their destination

    hidden service when their internal state has not changed for the

    duration of the current circuit-build timeout.  Otherwise, such

    circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish

    connecting to their destination hidden services.  In either case,

    another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same

    destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0)

**CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**::

    If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden-service-side rendezvous

    circuits after the current circuit-build timeout.  Otherwise, such

    circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish

    connecting to their destinations.  In either case, another

    rendezvous circuit for the same destination client will be

    launched. (Default: 0)

**LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::

    A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections

    (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these

  }

}

/** Return a circ such that:

 *  - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to <b>rend_query</b>, and

 *  - circ-\>purpose is equal to <b>purpose</b>.

/** Return a circ such that

 *  - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to

 *    <b>rend_data</b>-\>onion_address,

 *  - circ-\>rend_data-\>rend_cookie is equal to

 *    <b>rend_data</b>-\>rend_cookie, and

 *  - circ-\>purpose is equal to CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY.

 *

 * Return NULL if no such circuit exists.

 */

origin_circuit_t *

circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query, uint8_t purpose)

circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data)

{

  circuit_t *circ;

  tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(purpose));

  for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {

    if (!circ->marked_for_close &&

        circ->purpose == purpose) {

        circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) {

      origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);

      if (ocirc->rend_data &&

          !rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_query,

                                ocirc->rend_data->onion_address))

          !rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data->onion_address,

                                ocirc->rend_data->onion_address) &&

          tor_memeq(ocirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,

                    rend_data->rend_cookie,

                    REND_COOKIE_LEN))

        return ocirc;

    }

  }

circuit_t *circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn);

void circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason);

origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id);

origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query,

                                                        uint8_t purpose);

origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(

  const rend_data_t *rend_data);

origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start,

                                         const char *digest, uint8_t purpose);

or_circuit_t *circuit_get_rendezvous(const char *cookie);