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Commit 9f975e99 authored by haxxpop's avatar haxxpop Committed by David Goulet
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hs-v3: Rename client_sk to client_auth_sk 


Signed-off-by: David Goulet's avatarDavid Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
parent b61403c7
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Inline Side-by-side
src/feature/hs/hs_client.c
View file @ 9f975e99
......@@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN];
ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey;
hs_client_service_authorization_t *client_auth = NULL;
curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk = NULL;
curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auht_sk = NULL;
tor_assert(desc_str);
tor_assert(service_identity_pk);
......@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
/* Check if we have a client authorization for this service in the map. */
client_auth = find_client_auth(service_identity_pk);
if (client_auth) {
client_sk = &client_auth->enc_seckey;
client_auht_sk = &client_auth->enc_seckey;
}
/* Create subcredential for this HS so that we can decrypt */
......@@ -1254,7 +1254,8 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
}
/* Parse descriptor */
ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(desc_str, subcredential, client_sk, desc);
ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(desc_str, subcredential,
client_auht_sk, desc);
memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential));
if (ret < 0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Could not parse received descriptor as client.");
......
src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c
View file @ 9f975e99
......@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ encrypted_data_length_is_valid(size_t len)
static int
decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
uint8_t **descriptor_cookie_out)
{
int ret = -1;
......@@ -1421,15 +1421,15 @@ decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
tor_assert(desc);
tor_assert(client);
tor_assert(client_sk);
tor_assert(client_auth_sk);
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero(
(char *) &desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey,
sizeof(desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey)));
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_sk,
sizeof(*client_sk)));
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_auth_sk,
sizeof(*client_auth_sk)));
/* Calculate x25519(client_x, hs_Y) */
curve25519_handshake(secret_seed, client_sk,
curve25519_handshake(secret_seed, client_auth_sk,
&desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey);
/* Calculate KEYS = KDF(SECRET_SEED, 40) */
......@@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
/* If the client id of auth client is not the same as the calculcated
* client id, it means that this auth client is invaild according to the
* client secret key client_sk. */
* client secret key client_auth_sk. */
if (tor_memneq(client->client_id, keystream, HS_DESC_CLIENT_ID_LEN)) {
goto done;
}
......@@ -1630,7 +1630,7 @@ desc_decrypt_superencrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **decrypted_out)
* decrypted_out is set to NULL. */
static size_t
desc_decrypt_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
char **decrypted_out)
{
size_t encrypted_len = 0;
......@@ -1643,12 +1643,12 @@ desc_decrypt_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
/* If the client secret key is provided, try to find a valid descriptor
* cookie. Otherwise, leave it NULL. */
if (client_sk) {
if (client_auth_sk) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->superencrypted_data.clients,
hs_desc_authorized_client_t *, client) {
/* If we can decrypt the descriptor cookie successfully, we will use that
* descriptor cookie and break from the loop. */
if (!decrypt_descriptor_cookie(desc, client, client_sk,
if (!decrypt_descriptor_cookie(desc, client, client_auth_sk,
&descriptor_cookie)) {
break;
}
......@@ -2253,7 +2253,7 @@ desc_decode_superencrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
* success else -1. */
static int
desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted_out)
{
int ret = -1;
......@@ -2268,7 +2268,7 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
/* Decrypt the encrypted data that is located in the superencrypted section
* in the descriptor as a blob of bytes. */
message_len = desc_decrypt_encrypted(desc, client_sk, &message);
message_len = desc_decrypt_encrypted(desc, client_auth_sk, &message);
if (!message_len) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor decryption failed.");
goto err;
......@@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
static int
(*decode_encrypted_handlers[])(
const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted) =
{
/* v0 */ NULL, /* v1 */ NULL, /* v2 */ NULL,
......@@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ static int
* negative value on error. */
int
hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted)
{
int ret;
......@@ -2391,7 +2391,8 @@ hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
tor_assert(decode_encrypted_handlers[version]);
/* Run the version specific plaintext decoder. */
ret = decode_encrypted_handlers[version](desc, client_sk, desc_encrypted);
ret = decode_encrypted_handlers[version](desc, client_auth_sk,
desc_encrypted);
if (ret < 0) {
goto err;
}
......@@ -2547,7 +2548,7 @@ hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded,
int
hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded,
const uint8_t *subcredential,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
hs_descriptor_t **desc_out)
{
int ret = -1;
......@@ -2575,7 +2576,7 @@ hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded,
goto err;
}
ret = hs_desc_decode_encrypted(desc, client_sk, &desc->encrypted_data);
ret = hs_desc_decode_encrypted(desc, client_auth_sk, &desc->encrypted_data);
if (ret < 0) {
goto err;
}
......
src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h
View file @ 9f975e99
......@@ -277,14 +277,14 @@ MOCK_DECL(int,
int hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded,
const uint8_t *subcredential,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
hs_descriptor_t **desc_out);
int hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded,
hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext);
int hs_desc_decode_superencrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *desc_out);
int hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk,
hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_out);
size_t hs_desc_obj_size(const hs_descriptor_t *data);
......
src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c
View file @ 9f975e99
......@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg)
hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client = NULL;
uint8_t descriptor_cookie[HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN];
curve25519_secret_key_t auth_ephemeral_sk;
curve25519_secret_key_t client_sk;
curve25519_secret_key_t client_auth_sk;
curve25519_public_key_t client_pk;
const char ephemeral_sk_b16[] =
"d023b674d993a5c8446bd2ca97e9961149b3c0e88c7dc14e8777744dd3468d6a";
......@@ -882,9 +882,9 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg)
ret = curve25519_secret_key_generate(&auth_ephemeral_sk, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ret = curve25519_secret_key_generate(&client_sk, 0);
ret = curve25519_secret_key_generate(&client_auth_sk, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_pk, &client_sk);
curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_pk, &client_auth_sk);
desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t));
......
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